Friends,
One of the Substacks I never fail to read is Range Widely by David Epstein, author of Range (my notes on his interview about the book) and The Sports Gene: Inside the Science of Extraordinary Athletic Performance.
David is a journalist by trade. His writing is well-researched. Social science research, especially the kind of pop-sci stuff that climbs the heap to find itself in airport bookstores, should require a “grain of salt” rating (G: “germane”, PG: “possibly garbage”, R: “rumored at best“). David’s process and intellectual demeanor indicate care — he resists the temptation to oversell conclusions.
Personally, I rarely read social science books — I’ll just listen to a podcast with the author if I care. The insights in such books feel like they have an asymmetrical yield — if they confirm what you already thought then the opportunity cost of reading that book is high (I’ll be lucky if I read 500 more books before I’m dead) and if the book has a ground-breaking insight it’ll almost certainly be out of fashion within a decade (“the game theory of getting published in social science” is a comically fractal idea. If you google that phrase, you’ll see why).
Anyway, David’s history of intellectual care makes him an ideal candidate to interview other social science authors about their books — critical enough to ask good questions but friendly enough that he can get the interviews in the first place.
Enough preamble…some excerpts I enjoyed from David’s Q&A with psychologist Adam Grant on his new book Hidden Potential: The Science of Achieving Greater Thing (emphasis mine):
This doesn’t mean we should ignore “gifted” students. We need to think differently about how we nurture their potential too. Empirically, the rate of child prodigies becoming adult geniuses is surprisingly low. I suspect one of the reasons is that they learn to excel at other people’s crafts but not to develop their own. Mastering Mozart’s melodies doesn’t prepare you to write your own original symphonies. [Kris: this is exactly the point Trent Reznor made to Rick Rubin as he wrestled with his own potential]. Memorizing thousands of digits of pi does little to train your mind to come up with your own Pythagorean theorem. And the easier a new skill comes to you, the less experience you have with facing failure. This is a lesson that chess grandmaster Maurice Ashley drove home for me: the people who struggle early often build the character skills to excel later. We need to start investing in character skills sooner.
Let’s moan about the reality of realty today.
My quick take when I saw that tweet and the comments:
This tweet is getting a lot of hate but…it’s exactly what I did for every place I’ve bought. Got an agent from the same firm so they can double dip. I mean the whole options market revolves around understanding the dynamic of billing both sides.
You’ll get better allocations when there’s a judgment call (there usually is) on the splits if you are a regular client of the broker. Give up a half-cent commission on a 5k lot a couple times a month lot so you can get 1/2 instead of 1/4 allocation on the 10k lot good by a dime.
In the options world, the analytics and nerd stuff get s a lot of attention but it’s also the most democratic aspect. The highest edge (although least scalable) part of the game is relationship maintenance. There’s an equilibrium of tit-for-tat that resides within a snapshot of time that is defined by prevailing technology and the split of predator/prey populations. Large shifts in either the tech or the populations alter the parameters of the equilibrium pecking order. There is one constant — middlemen “control” the flow. Flow is the plankton at the bottom of the food chain.
I think as a metaphor for many businesses — AI is gonna handle the calculus. But getting close to the people who wake up in the morning with opinions that lead them to buy and sell will always be the job to be done. The nerd stuff is satisfying. But making money is just grimy work.
It’s important to have the right expectations lest you cry when you find out who makes the most money (especially per unit of risk).
[A prior riff on the idea: The Juicy Stuff Doesn’t Hit The Pit]
One last thing…if the persistence of 6% broker commissions in our Zillow-enabled world has you puzzled, it seems like times might be changing. A recent settlement seems watershed:
🔗The Middleman Economy: Why Realtors Just Took a Big Loss and Homebuyers Might Benefit (9 min read)
by Matt Stoller
A shocking $1.8 billion antitrust decision by a jury against the National Association of Realtors for price-fixing could rearrange housing markets.
🔗New post: A Simple Demonstration of Return Vs Volatility
Compounded returns
For multi-period investing where we do not take any distributions or “money off the table” we cannot use simple arithmetic means to compute an expected return.
Consider the same bet after 2 trials. These are the 4 possibilities each equally likely:
If we look at the summary table, there is no difference between the mean expected return and the median.
Let’s keep the mean return the same but raise the volatility. An investment that is equally likely to:
Even though this is more volatile than the first investment, the mean expected return is still 20% per trial. You can compute this in 2 ways:
50% * +100% + 50% * -60% = 20%
or
Terminal wealth = 50% * 2 + 50% * .4 = 1.2 or 20% return
But let’s see what happens when we look at the compounded scenario where we fully re-invest the proceeds of the first period into a second period.
Now the mean compounded return has dropped from 20% to just 4.72% and the median outcome is a loss of 10.6%!
The divergence between mean and median returns comes from the compounded effect of volatility.
When it comes to investing, we are usually re-investing rather than taking our profits off the table each year. We hope to grow our wealth year by year like this:
1.10 * 1.10 * 1.10 … or 1.10n where n is the number of compounding intervals (typically years).
Therefore, we want to look at compounded not mean rates of return. To compute them we simply take the n-th root of our terminal wealth where n is the number of years.
If you doubled your money in 5 years then your CAGR = 21/5 – 1 = 14.9%
Note that if you took the naive average return you could say you earned 100% in 5 years or 20% per year. But this defies reality where you re-invested a growing sum of capital every year.
It’s important to note that the expected mean return of these investments is still 20% per year. It’s just that the median is much lower. In the high volatility example, your lived experience usually results in a loss of 10.6% but the mean 2-period return is still positive 4.7%. The complication is that the avergae is driven by the 25% probability that you double your money in 2 consecutive year. In every other scenario, you lose money.
Volatility is altering the distribution of your outcomes not the mean outcome.
Mathematically the median is the geometric mean. In a multiplicative process, you care more about the geometric mean. After all, you only get one life.
A logreturn is a compounded return where we assume continuous compounding. So instead of every year, it’s more like every second. Of course, if our wealth grows from $1 to $2 in 5 years but we assume tiny compouding intervals, then the rate per interval must be small. After all the start and end of our journey ($1 to $2) is the same, we are just slicing it into smaller sections.
Computing an expected logreturn is simple. Using the volatile example:
.5 * ln(2) + .5 + ln(.40) = -11.2%
Note that this is slightly worse than the geometric mean return (aka median) we computed earlier of -10.6%
The following table presents different investments that each have an expected arithmetic return of 20%. Just like the examples above. But the various payoffs are altered to proxy different levels of volatility. An investment that can earn 21% or 19% is much less volatile than one that can return 100% or -60% even though the average return is the same.
We use the simplest measure to represent the volatility — the ratio of the best return to the worst return.
The stable investment volatility proxy is 1.21 / 1.19 = 1.017
The volatile investment above is 2 / .4 = 5.00
Table snippet:
These charts show the divergence between arithmetic and median returns as we increase the volatility (the ratio of the best return to the worst return):
An investment that is equally likely to return 60% as it is to lose 20% has a 20% expected return but if you keep re-investing your long-term median outcome is closer to a 12-13% CAGR.
What if we raise the volatility further to a ratio of 5 (terminal wealth of 2x vs .4x):
At a ratio of 3.5 (1.87x vs .53x) our median result is zero. At a ratio of 5, the average return remains 20% but the median return is losing 10%. Almost all the paths are losing they are just being counterbalanced by the unlikely event that you keep flipping heads.
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