Moontower #207

2 quick thoughts:

  1. I spoke to a quant investing club at Cal this past week. Lots of seniors in the room so the one bit of advice I wanted to make sure I left them:

    Optimize for learning when choosing your first job. 2 components to this:

    a) Mind your inputs

    Specifically, surround yourself with the best people you can both in terms of character/courage and ability). Your environment will shape you (tyrannically so — its incentives, values, and culture will be absorbed) so make sure you are deliberate in choosing one.

    b) Get to having real responsibility as fast as possible

    Responsibility = risk and risk accelerates learning. A little more responsibility than you think is appropriate will stretch you — if you want to rise to that you likely will. If you don’t feel stretched, even if you’re making good money, the human capital part of your ledger is being docked. Rest-and-vest attitudes are deceptively expensive in the long run — don’t ever adopt one in your 20s and 30s (and probably not after that either).

  2. Paul Bloom, from his chat with Russ Roberts, on chosen suffering:

    I think there’s a wise point there, which is: one of the — it may be the major theme of my book — is about the importance of chosen suffering. I have a very different opinion about unchosen suffering, we can talk about that. The importance of choosing suffering as part of a good life is, I think, the projects that make life worth living involve suffering. We often know this ahead of time. And, having kids is such an example. For one thing having kids, at least for me–maybe I’m prone towards anxiety–is really an experiment in feeling mild dread for the rest of my life. Loving such fragile creatures–and they remain fragile even into their 20s — it is like there is a hangman’s noose sitting around your neck all the time. And then they will separate from you. If you do it right, if you are lucky, and if you do it right, these creatures that you love and devoted your life to, will leave you. And, actually, if you do it right they will think a lot less about you than you will think about them, because they’re into their own lives. It’s such a perverse project. And I think it’s a very human one.

    Russ Roberts: Yeah. I agree with that, obviously. What you said reminds me of a quote I heard from Elizabeth Stone. It’s the following: ‘Making the decision to have a child–it is momentous. It is to decide forever to have your heart go walking around outside your body.‘ I thought that captured the kind of anxiety you’re talking about there.

    [Kris — choosing responsibility is a form of chosen suffering. But it’s so obviously a privilege. I am tediously dramatic about this — the kids and I were bringing in the garbage bins to the tune of their whining and I banged them over the head with “you should be happy you get to do this…would you rather not have legs and not be able to be helpful?” I wish I uttered a more sensitive example on the spot but that’s what happened.]


Money Angle

I added another post to this Moontowermoney.com series:

Checkpoint: Risk Tolerance (moontowermoney.com)

Full post:

In a Word About Goals and Risk is unavoidable. Let’s get to the good news, we established 2 cornerstone axioms:

Risk is personal

If you need ransom money by Friday betting your savings on a hand of blackjack or borrowing cash from a loan shark become prudent alternatives in light of your singular goal.

On the other hand, a comfortable person who risks what they need for something they merely want is setting themselves up for failure. Even if the gamble pays off, that decision pattern eventually catches up with them.

Doing the inner work to distinguish “need to haves” from “nice to haves” is a personal exercise. Looking over the fence at your neighbor leads to miswanting and disappointment. We cannot fully see what practical and mental constraints others have that lead to their choices. You must ruthlessly “do you”.

A bright side of personal investing is that it is solitaire. You do not need to worry about competitors the way professional investors do. Professionals are compared to benchmarks which introduces tracking error risks (”why are you only up 8% when the SP500 is up 11%?”) and path dependency. Employees are more likely to browse LinkedIn job boards when you don’t keep up, which aggravates your competitive position further.

💡The personal investor is unburdened by the expectations of others

Risk is unavoidable

Examples of this reality:

  • If you don’t invest your cash its purchasing power will erode. In the past 100 years, cash has lost >95% of its value. Not investing is surrendering to an inevitable, maybe slow, but quite inevitable loss.
  • If you do invest, you open yourself to the possibility of a faster loss. This is true in both nominal and real (ie adjusted for inflation) terms. In the 21st century alone we’ve seen sharp drawdowns from the Dot Com bubble, the 2008 GFC, and the covid pandemic in 2020. Drawdowns of these magnitudes, while rare, are inevitable and part of the investing experience. As Meb Faber shows, this is true even in real terms:
  • The trade-off between “failing fast” and “failing slow” shifts as you age. If you lose 40% of your assets at age 24 you have your whole adult life to recover. If you’re in your 60s such a sharp loss could impair your standard of living throughout retirement. This is commonly referred to as sequence of return riskIt’s the basis of “glide paths” that slip your investment mix from higher to lower risk holdings as you age.

Wrapping Up With Helpful Framings

By now we have laid out the nature of markets as well as the investing “problem”. The strategy we employ needs to be well-matched to our risk tolerance. Investment returns are carrots for us to take risk and solve our “problem”. There is no way to fully remove risk from a strategy but we can imagine a frontier of strategies that require lesser units of risk for the same potential reward. For example, if a fair coin flip offered 2-1 odds then this is a great investment. But if you bet all your money on it you turn this great investment into one that is not worth the risk since losing all your money is not an acceptable outcome.

💡We want to avoid strategies that are inferior with respect to our goals

Our tolerance for risk is a personal function of our emotions and our stated goals. Financial advisors try to match their approach to a client’s risk appetite with questionnaires such as the Grable & Lytton Risk Assessment (link). A common though cynical take is such gauges are more about covering their liability than actually zeroing in on risk tolerance. A charitable view is that asking someone to predict how they’d feel if their account lost 25% is a doomed exercise from the start. We are not Vulcans capable of such reasoned foresight.

When it comes to goals, the problem is more tractable, especially for near-term objectives. If you are saving for a down payment on a house in the next few years, you can compare your savings rate to the fluctuations of your account to decide how much risk is reasonable. If you have $450k saved for a $500k down payment and you are able to save $25k per year, then if you took no risk you are about 2 years from affording a home. If you invest the $450k in BTC you could lose many years worth of savings in a single swoop. You should match your the riskiness of your investments to what you consider a “need to have” vs a “nice to have”. A common sense approach is a robust balance between being simple enough and effective enough.

When it comes to personal finance, optimization suffers from garbage-in, garbage-out problems. The idea is not to make perfect the enemy of the good. It’s to find an approach that mostly works that you can stick to. It is easy to get bogged down in FIRE-esque micro-budgeting or dazzled by promises of easy money in rental properties or option selling. But before you even consider an investing strategy, it’s critical to establish your goals for both your wealth and your time. If eeking out an extra 1% on a $500k portfolio takes 100 hours, you are working for $50/hr with no guarantee that you are focused on the right levers.

2 qualitative frameworks that can help define your investment mission:

  • Jeff Bezos’ regret minimization framework Imagine you are old or at your funeral looking back in time. What did you want to give the world or your family? What would you regret not having done? The idea is simple — don’t take risks that close those doors. Structure your life so you can take the risks that open those doors. The key to this is defending your aspirations with a mix of personal courage plus resistance to distraction and comparison.
  • Venkatesh Rao’s fixed point futurism This is the antidote to the inherent spreadsheet nihilism of efficiency, optimization, and “paper-clip maximization”. It is deeply personal.
    • Fixed-point futurism is related to the idea of inventing the future rather than predicting it…It’s simple: don’t make plans, choose fixed points. Choose one thing to make true, force to be true, about the future. Something that is likely to be within your control, no matter how the future plays out. Something that isn’t rationally derived from something else more basic, but is sort of arbitrary and self-defining. It sounds silly, but it’s really amazing how such small assertions of personal agency, far short of putting a “ dent in the universe ” can magically make life feel more meaningful. You’re arbitrarily using your life to declare that futures, where you wear blue shirts, are better than ones in which you don’t. Many people intuitively do fixed-point futurism. In fact, in the U.S ., the so-called American Dream has historically been based on the standard fixed point of homeownership. As in, “no matter what happens in the future, I’ll be a homeowner. ” A way to understand fixed-point futurism is to think of it as a priceless commitment. No matter what happens, and no matter what else goes wrong or off-the-rails in weird ways, you’ll make sure one thing goes really, really right, even if you have to go crazy making sure it does. The nice thing about fixed-point futurism is that you don’t have to worry about tradeoffs. You don’t have to constantly revisit cost-benefit analyses. You don’t have to worry about competing priorities. The fixed point is priceless, so you can commit to it without knowing lots of important things about the future.
    • This type of thinking says “I’m going to play in a band even if there’s no reward. I just want to do it”. It could mean taking an insurance policy knowing that no matter what your kids will have X even if it’s not as “smart” as self-insuring the future via a separately managed investment account. A reckless person can use fixed-point thinking to rationalize poor decisions, but overly analytical people can benefit from pulling their noses out of Excel to think more approximately. The whole “it’s better to be roughly right, than precisely wrong” thing.

🔗Learn More

  • Newfound Research’s Failing Slow, Failing Fast, and Failing Very Fast (Link)
  • Nick Maggiulli’s A Change in Perspective (Link)
  • Alpha Architect’s Even God Would Get Fired As An Active Manager (Link)
  • Venkatesh Rao on Fixed Point Futurism (Link)

Money Angle For Masochists

I knocked out Euan Sinclair’s Positional Option Trading in a few hours which is to say much of it overlapped with my own knowledge. It takes the approach professionals start with but adapts it to the constraints of retail (you probably aren’t delta-hedging for example).

You can see my notes:

Positional Option Trading by Sinclair (Moontower)

I want to direct your attention, especially to these 10 points (emphasis mine):

  1. “Option pricing models don’t really price options. The market prices options through the normal market forces of supply and demand. Pricing models convert the market’s prices into parameters.”
  2. If we pay the wrong implied volatility level for an option, we might still make money, but we would have been better off replicating the option in the underlying.
  3. Risk premiums versus inefficiencies discussion from chapter 2

    [Kris: I appreciate how Sinclair attempts to categorize each source of edge as either a risk premium or inefficiency. He’s also candid about the difficulty in categorizing some of them, but the thought process is useful to observe for understanding what kind of evidence he needs to sort the edge.]

    1. A risk premium is earned as compensation for taking a risk. If the premium is mispriced, it will be profitable even after accepting the risk. A risk premium can be expected to persist, as the counterparty is paying for insurance against the risk.
    2. In contrast, inefficiency is a trading opportunity caused by the market not noticing something. An inefficiency will last only until other people notice it.
    3. Differentiating a risk premium from an inefficiency can be challenging.
  4. Behavioral explanations can be used as part of a checklist for why an inefficiency might exist. For example, together with historical data and a theory of underreaction, one can have enough confidence that post-earnings drift is a real edge. The data suggests the trade, but the psychological reason gives a theoretical justification.
  5. In the long term, values are related to macro variables such as inflation, monetary policy, commodity prices, interest rates, and earnings. These change on the order of months and years. Worse still, they are all codependent. A better way to think of market data might be that we are seeing a small number of data points that occur a lot of times. This makes quantitative analysis of historical data much less useful than is commonly thought. [Kris: This is the old “Thinking in N not T” where we recognize that samples drawn from the same regime reduce N. This is also why I think the concept of attractor landscapes is important.]
  6. Calendar spreads have a similar payoff diagram to a butterfly at the expiration of the front-month option. [Kris: This intuition can guide one’s thinking about how the skew in the front month relates to the slope of the term structure]
  7. A method for choosing the strike to sell [Kris: paraphrasing Sinclair in my own lingo: choose the strike that has the greatest dollar premium to a flat vol surface (as opposed to the highest vol, which will correspond to a low premium option)
  8. Despite views to the contrary, skew trades are not particularly useful for speculating on the movement of the implied skew itself. The fluctuations in implied skew are dwarfed by the effects of stock movement and the level of implied volatility. [Kris: I’ve said this before and strongly agree. Sinclair offers a math justification based on the order of magnitude comparing Greeks]
    1. Skew trades might make more sense with longer-dated options that have more vega and less gamma, but the skews are also more stable. It’s possible to make money with this trade, but the edge is likely overwhelmed by noise.
    2. Ratio trades have all the same problems mentioned with skew trades and are an even worse vehicle for trading. An idea that isn’t very good to start with. [Kris: In my opinion, risk reversals and ratio spreads are “path trades” and should be framed as bets on spot/vol correlation. In fact, a great demonstration of this point is the challenge of calibrating your delta in the presence of strong spot/vol correlation. Actually, buying the ratio to sell the single skewed option, which will have a higher skew premium in dollar, not vol, terms could be a better expression of the skew trade!]
  9. Stops don’t just stop losses. They drastically change the shape of the return distribution and can lower the average return. Adding stops won’t transform a losing strategy into a winning strategy. The only reason that we would add a stop is that we prefer the shape of the stopped distribution.
  10. A position should be exited when we are wrong. Sometimes this will coincide with losing money. In this case, a stop is harmless. But sometimes losing money corresponds to situations for which we have more edge. Here, a stop is actively damaging and contrary to the idea behind the strategy. [Kris: Fully agree and why I believe in risk rules that are independent of P/L for option trading. Instead, focus on ex-ante risk shocks].

From My Actual Life

I’m introducing the boys to the first 2 Terminator movies and they are into it (we are about halfway through the first movie. We put them to bed last night right after Arnold removes his eye and dons the Gargoyle shades for the first time).

I was curious about what the internet thought of how age-appropriate these movies are (they’re not) and got a nice chuckle about one reviewer reminding readers that Terminator was an “Eighties R” — which means a “hard R”.

In the olden days, getting a VHS from the rental shop (pre-Blockbuster) is one of those memories that I can trace the footsteps of. When I was in first grade a friend slept over and my mom rented Terminator for us to watch. My youngest is in 2nd grade. He hasn’t looked away once from the screen. Which reminded me that I’ve gotten more squeamish as I’ve gotten older.

To bring things around from today’s open, nobody has ever had more responsibility resting on his shoulders than this annoying kid:

John Connor's role in Terminator: Dark Fate explained by director - Polygon

Stay groovy ☮️

Moontower #206

Friends,

Wednesday’s He Disrespected Me post got a lot of engagement. Not unsurprising. Divorce, culture, masculinity stuff. I shared that stuff because it was taking up some mind real estate but writing about it helps me flush it. Diagnosing and understanding that type of stuff has an irresistible allure but I think it’s also kind of corrosive — you probably aren’t going to find useful conclusions at the end of what is nothing-more-than-armchair exploration (on our part, not the scholars). I indulge it when it internal kettle starts steaming, but once I release the pressure, I want to go right back to focusing on more nutritious material.

[I also tend to avoid people whose personality is basically “sharing opinions on the latest culture war item”. Major NPC energy.

Egh, I take that back — NPC is very literally a dehumanizing insult — my wife just learned the term this week so I was just using it in a sentence in case she reads this. But really, I do avoid those people. They like to think of themselves as independent thinkers and somehow don’t quite notice the irony.]

Back to inspiration and learning.

Grant Sanderson is the mathematician and YouTuber behind the 3blue1brown channel about discovery and creativity in math. The about from his webpage:

My name is Grant Sanderson. These videos, and the animation engine behind them, began as side projects as I was wrapping up my time studying math and computer science at Stanford.

From there, I was fortunate enough to start forging a less traditional path into math outreach thanks to Khan Academy’s talent search, which led me to make videos and write articles about multivariable calculus and a few other miscellaneous topics for them until the end of 2016. Since then, my main focus has been on 3b1b.

The channel is amazing but he’s also one of my favorite people to hear interviewed. I recommend 2 podcasts.

🎙️Richard Rusczyk interviews Grant Sanderson (AoPS)

Rusczyk is the founder of Art of Problem Solving, a math education portal I’ve discussed before (my 5th grader takes Pre-Algebra online with them). I actually know of AoPS because its founding is connected to Rusczyk’s Math Olympian friend Sandor Lehoczky who is a top executive at Jane Street (he left SIG’s pioneering index desk to be an early employee at JS shortly after I joined SIG). In 1994, Rusczyk’ and Lehoczky self-published the seminal two-volume set The Art of Problem Solving, books that continue to have a revolutionary impact on math preparation for ambitious high school students.

🎙️Grant Sanderson on Dwarkesh Patel Lunar Society podcast (Moontower notes)

My full notes are linked above. Here are some of the excerpts I emphasized:

 

On the future of education 

[key ideas: reducing distance to students, educator’s role is not just explanation but more importantly “bring out knowledge” not put it in, the non-linear influence of a teacher on a student’s future, and the chaotic concept of “sensitivity to initial conditions”]

Grant: I think it’s not a bad thing for more educators who are good at what they’re doing to put their stuff online for sure. I highly encourage that even if it’s as simple as getting someone to put a camera in the back of the classroom. I don’t think it would be a good idea to get those people out of the classroom.

If anything I think one of the best things that I could do for my career would be to put myself into more classrooms…

One of the most valuable things that you can have if you’re trying to explain stuff online is a sense of empathy for what possible viewers that are out there. The more distance that you put between yourself and them in terms of life circumstances…

The other thing I might disagree with is the idea that the reach is lower. Yes, it’s a smaller number of people but you’re with them for much, much more time and you actually have the chance of influencing their trajectory through a social connection in a way that you just don’t over Youtube.

You’re using the word education in a way that I would maybe sub out for the word explanation…You want explanations to be online but the word education derives from the same root as the word educe, to bring out, and I really like that as a bit of etymology because it reminds you that the job of an educator is not to take their knowledge and shove it into the heads of someone else the job is to bring it out.

when people talk about online education as being valuable or revolutionary or anything like that, there’s a part of me that sort of rolls my eyes because it just doesn’t get at the truth that online explanations have nothing to do with all of that important stuff that’s actually happening

Putting in work with calculations

Grant: I think where a lot of self-learners shoot themselves in the foot is by skipping calculations by thinking that that’s incidental to the core understanding. But actually, I do think you build a lot of intuition just by putting in the reps of certain calculations. Some of them may turn out not to be all that important and in that case, so be it, but sometimes that’s what maybe shapes your sense of where the substance of a result really came from.

The “failure to disrupt”

[key ideas: learning is not bottlenecked by good explanations but by social incentives. I found this deeply resonant. Reading between the lines — we are aspirational and good at copying others or trying to impress them, so if we know that we should provide good models for learners to emulate — not to make any equivalence between what I try to do with Moontower and Grant but you can probably see why I’m such a fan of this guy]

Grant: I would reemphasize that what’s probably most important to getting people to actually learn something is not the explanation…but instead, it’s going to be the social factors. Are the five best friends you have also interested in this stuff and do they tend to push you up or they tend to pull you down when it comes to learning more things? Or do you have a reason to? There’s a job that you want to get or a domain that you want to enter where you just have to understand something or is there a personal project that you’re doing?

The existence of compelling personal projects and encouraging friend groups probably does way way more than the average quality of explanation online ever could because once you get someone motivated, they’re just they’re going to learn it and it maybe makes it a more fluid process if there’s good explanations versus bad ones and it keeps you from having some people drop out of that process,which is important.

There’s a lot more in my excerpts and of course the whole interview is worth a listen.


Money Angle

I added another post to my ongoing Money Wiki. A reminder that the wiki, found at moontowermoney.com, is a Moontower guide to personal investing. It’s broken into 3 main units:

  1. The Nature of Investing
  2. Risk Absorption
  3. Implementation

The new post:

🔗2 Sides Of Compounding (permalink)

(These posts are intended to be concise so this is the full body of it ⬇️)

 

A Famous Riddle

The lily pad doubles in size every day and after 365 days it completely covers the pond. On what day does the lily pad cover half the pond?

Answer:

The 364th day

Compound Growth

Our minds struggle with geometric growth (ie x²) and exponential growth (ie 2ˣ). We extrapolate and interpolate linearly but the key observation is that these processes are multiplicative, not additive.

This is the same process that governs compounding investment returns. When you invest, it’s typical that you stay invested or re-invest. If you start with $100,000 and earn 10%, you now have $110,000 to reinvest.

The tricky bit about compounding is appreciating how small changes in the rate of growth have a disproportionate impact on final wealth.

If you start investing at age 30 with $100k, and compound growth at 8% per year instead of 7%, you will have 45% more wealth by age 70.

notion image

This is a cold splash of water when you consider how many forces conspire to knock at least 1-2% off your investment returns:

  • Financial advisory AUM fees
  • Mutual fund expense ratios
  • The difference between ordinary income taxes and long-term capital gains
  • State income taxes
  • Property taxes that revalue higher as your home appreciates
  • Inflation

Another significant observation is how compounding’s best friend is uninterrupted time. If we doubled the rates of return in the chart to Hall of Fame return levels of 16% and 14% CAGRs but cut the compounding time in half to 20 years, you end up a bit worse off than in the 40-year case.

Teach your kids about compounding early!

{🗨️“Compound interest is the eighth wonder of the world. He who understands it, earns it … he who doesn’t … pays it.” — Albert Einstein

The power of time While Warren Buffet has been an above-average investor over his entire career, his status as one of the richest people in the world owes much to longevity. [He was stellar for several decades but as you might expect by the time he was managing tens of billions, the performance asymptotically reverted to just market-like returns.] He didn’t become a billionaire until he was about 60. He has since been compounding for 30+ years! Most people don’t even make it into their 90s let alone can say they’ve been investing since they were teens.}

The Compounding “Gotcha”

If you earn a 10% return, then lose 10% your average return is 0…but your realized return is -1%

$100 —> $110 —> $99

If you lose 50%, you need to make 100% to get back to even.

More generally:

If you lose X%, you must earn X/(1−X)% to return your money.

notion image

2 key things to note:

  1. Return math is asymmetric — the return required to recover is larger than the percentage loss
  1. This asymmetry gets worse with volatility. The larger the loss, the steeper the recovery function. If you lose 75% on an investment you need to triple your money to get back to even!

This property of compounding math is so fundamental to investing that it underpins everything from risk management to option pricing. If you are interested in learning more there are several useful links below but the main takeaways:

  • Investing is a multiplicative process so we want to look at compounded returns not simple returns.
  • Volatility is asymmetric — over time it pulls median returns (the returns you expect to see) lower than average returns.
  • Volatility has a non-linear relationship with expected returns — while you need some volatility (if there were no volatility you would not get anything more than a risk-free rate), some drawdowns are too steep to recover from.

📎Learn More

I’ve written a lot on this topic.

Moontower

From Around the Web

 


From My Actual Life

Extra $25 bucks and a week wait and voila custom low Blazer 77s. Would have put a🌛 emoji on the black leather back tag if those were allowable characters.

Customize your own. It’s a pretty quick, fun process. You can customize many of the Nike styles. Could be the perfect gift idea with the holidays around the corner.

 

Stay groovy ☮️

Moontower #205

Friends,

One of the Substacks I never fail to read is Range Widely by David Epstein, author of Range (my notes on his interview about the book) and The Sports Gene: Inside the Science of Extraordinary Athletic Performance.

David is a journalist by trade. His writing is well-researched. Social science research, especially the kind of pop-sci stuff that climbs the heap to find itself in airport bookstores, should require a “grain of salt” rating (G: “germane”, PG: “possibly garbage”, R: “rumored at best“). David’s process and intellectual demeanor indicate care — he resists the temptation to oversell conclusions.

Personally, I rarely read social science books — I’ll just listen to a podcast with the author if I care. The insights in such books feel like they have an asymmetrical yield — if they confirm what you already thought then the opportunity cost of reading that book is high (I’ll be lucky if I read 500 more books before I’m dead) and if the book has a ground-breaking insight it’ll almost certainly be out of fashion within a decade (“the game theory of getting published in social science” is a comically fractal idea. If you google that phrase, you’ll see why).

Anyway, David’s history of intellectual care makes him an ideal candidate to interview other social science authors about their books — critical enough to ask good questions but friendly enough that he can get the interviews in the first place.

Enough preamble…some excerpts I enjoyed from David’s Q&A with psychologist Adam Grant on his new book Hidden Potential: The Science of Achieving Greater Thing (emphasis mine):

  • Many people believe that if you’re not precocious, it’s a sign that you lack potential. But potential is not about where you start — it’s a matter of how far you’ll travel. And the latest science reveals that we shouldn’t mistake speed for aptitude. Our rate of learning is driven by motivation and opportunity, not just ability. Think of all the late bloomers who weren’t lucky enough to stumble on a passion, or to have a parent, teacher, or coach early on who recognized and developed their hidden potential.

    This doesn’t mean we should ignore “gifted” students. We need to think differently about how we nurture their potential too. Empirically, the rate of child prodigies becoming adult geniuses is surprisingly lowI suspect one of the reasons is that they learn to excel at other people’s crafts but not to develop their own. Mastering Mozart’s melodies doesn’t prepare you to write your own original symphonies. [Kris: this is exactly the point Trent Reznor made to Rick Rubin as he wrestled with his own potential]. Memorizing thousands of digits of pi does little to train your mind to come up with your own Pythagorean theorem. And the easier a new skill comes to you, the less experience you have with facing failure. This is a lesson that chess grandmaster Maurice Ashley drove home for me: the people who struggle early often build the character skills to excel later. We need to start investing in character skills sooner.

  • Because Glennie is deaf, she had to find nontraditional ways to learn, like using different parts of her body to feel vibrations that correspond to different pitches. She and her teacher were constantly trying different ways to do that, and different ways to do everything, really. As you write: “Continually varying the task and raising the bar made learning a joy.” I’ve long been fascinated by this issue of variable practice. Mixing things up constantly might seem counterintuitive, but it turns out to be better for learning.
  • You note that concert pianists who reach international acclaim by age 40 typically were not obsessed early on, and that they usually had a slow but steady increase in their commitment to music. It just made me think of the first page of Battle Hymn — in which the author promises the secrets to raising stereotypically successful children, and recounts assigning her daughter violin and soon she’s supervising five hours of deliberate practice a day. That part was excerpted in the Wall St. Journal, and it was the Journal’s most commented upon article ever! It really seeped into the public consciousness, I think. What didn’t make as much of an impression was the part later in the book where the author (to her credit) recounts her daughter turning to her and saying: “You picked it, not me,” and more or less quits. [Kris: I’m very careful riding our kids in areas that they are naturally drawn to because of such “reactance”. I don’t want to turn “their thing” into “my thing”. You have an extra gear to give for those things that you discover independently.]
  • The issue of “learning styles.” This is the very popular idea that some people learn best by listening, others by reading, others by looking, etc. Maybe someone prefers podcasts to books because they style themself an “auditory learner.” Trouble is, a mountain of research has failed to back this idea up [Kris: Veritasium calls this “the biggest myth in education”. Although I suspect the testing design for experiments that dismiss the idea might be strawmanning the contention or interpreting it too narrowly].People may indeed have a style of learning that feels most comfortable, but that doesn’t mean they’re actually learning more that way. In fact, to use a line from Range, in many cases, difficulty is not a sign that you aren’t learning, but ease is [Kris: I’ve found that many teachers I respect agree with this so it’s not as bold a statement as it might appear even if this is the first time you’ve heard that. I remind my kids — if it’s easy it’s just review, not learning. Non-superficial learning hurts. I might even go as far to say that learning and pain are nearly synonyms. To be clear, such a statement is more useful as a reminder than a universal truth. Experiential learning is an easy counterexample]. As you write: “Sometimes you even learn better in the mode that makes you the most uncomfortable, because you have to work harder at it.” I was just reading a study (“Measuring actual learning versus feeling of learning”) which showed that Harvard physics students preferred lectures from highly-rated instructors to active learning exercises. But they learned more from the latter. The main difference in the active group was that students had to try to solve problems in groups before they really knew what they were doing, and so they would discuss, generate questions, and hit dead-ends, all before seeing correct solutions. We know that forcing learners to try to generate solutions before seeing them enhances learning (the so-called “generation effect”), but it doesn’t feel great, so we may avoid it.
  • Back in December, you helped me get in touch with RA Dickey, and he was every bit as stellar of an interview as you promised. His story helps to illuminate why so many people fail to try new methods when we get stuck. It’s not so much that we’re stubborn or resistant to change. We hate the thought of giving up the gains we’ve already made. We forget that sometimes, the best way to move forward is to go back to the drawing board. [Kris: Feeling seen] If your fastball is slowing down and your career is stalling, you have nothing to lose by tinkering with the knuckleball. We shouldn’t be so afraid of failing that we fail to try. 

Money Angle

Let’s moan about the reality of realty today.

My quick take when I saw that tweet and the comments:

This tweet is getting a lot of hate but…it’s exactly what I did for every place I’ve bought. Got an agent from the same firm so they can double dip. I mean the whole options market revolves around understanding the dynamic of billing both sides.

You’ll get better allocations when there’s a judgment call (there usually is) on the splits if you are a regular client of the broker. Give up a half-cent commission on a 5k lot a couple times a month lot so you can get 1/2 instead of 1/4 allocation on the 10k lot good by a dime.

In the options world, the analytics and nerd stuff get s a lot of attention but it’s also the most democratic aspect. The highest edge (although least scalable) part of the game is relationship maintenance. There’s an equilibrium of tit-for-tat that resides within a snapshot of time that is defined by prevailing technology and the split of predator/prey populations. Large shifts in either the tech or the populations alter the parameters of the equilibrium pecking order. There is one constant — middlemen “control” the flow. Flow is the plankton at the bottom of the food chain.

I think as a metaphor for many businesses — AI is gonna handle the calculus. But getting close to the people who wake up in the morning with opinions that lead them to buy and sell will always be the job to be done. The nerd stuff is satisfying. But making money is just grimy work.

It’s important to have the right expectations lest you cry when you find out who makes the most money (especially per unit of risk).

[A prior riff on the idea: The Juicy Stuff Doesn’t Hit The Pit]

One last thing…if the persistence of 6% broker commissions in our Zillow-enabled world has you puzzled, it seems like times might be changing. A recent settlement seems watershed:

🔗The Middleman Economy: Why Realtors Just Took a Big Loss and Homebuyers Might Benefit (9 min read)
by Matt Stoller

A shocking $1.8 billion antitrust decision by a jury against the National Association of Realtors for price-fixing could rearrange housing markets.

Money Angle For Masochists

🔗New post: A Simple Demonstration of Return Vs Volatility

  • Expected return for a bet is the simple probability-weighted average of outcomes.
  • If there is a 50% chance of a bet making 21% and a 50% chance of it returning 19% this it’s a good bet that is also not volatile. You expect to make 20% on average (despite the fact that you can’t ever make that on any single bet since you can only earn 19% or 21%).
  • Your expected terminal wealth after a single trial is 1.2x what you started with.
  • Since we took a simple average of the outcomes we computed an arithmetic mean return of 20%

Compounded returns

For multi-period investing where we do not take any distributions or “money off the table” we cannot use simple arithmetic means to compute an expected return.

Consider the same bet after 2 trials. These are the 4 possibilities each equally likely:

  • Best return, best return
  • Best return, worst return
  • Worst return, best return
  • Worst return, worst return

If we look at the summary table, there is no difference between the mean expected return and the median.

Let’s keep the mean return the same but raise the volatility. An investment that is equally likely to:

  • go up 100%
  • fall by 60%

Even though this is more volatile than the first investment, the mean expected return is still 20% per trial. You can compute this in 2 ways:

50% * +100% + 50% * -60% = 20%

or

Terminal wealth  = 50% * 2 + 50% * .4 = 1.2 or 20% return

But let’s see what happens when we look at the compounded scenario where we fully re-invest the proceeds of the first period into a second period.

Now the mean compounded return has dropped from 20% to just 4.72% and the median outcome is a loss of 10.6%!

The divergence between mean and median returns comes from the compounded effect of volatility.

Investing Is a Multiplicative Process

When it comes to investing, we are usually re-investing rather than taking our profits off the table each year. We hope to grow our wealth year by year like this:

1.10 * 1.10 * 1.10 … or 1.10n where n is the number of compounding intervals (typically years).

Therefore, we want to look at compounded not mean rates of return. To compute them we simply take the n-th root of our terminal wealth where n is the number of years.

If you doubled your money in 5 years then your CAGR = 21/5 – 1 = 14.9%

Note that if you took the naive average return you could say you earned 100% in 5 years or 20% per year. But this defies reality where you re-invested a growing sum of capital every year.

CAGR is a median return

It’s important to note that the expected mean return of these investments is still 20% per year. It’s just that the median is much lower. In the high volatility example, your lived experience usually results in a loss of 10.6% but the mean 2-period return is still positive 4.7%. The complication is that the avergae is driven by the 25% probability that you double your money in 2 consecutive year. In every other scenario, you lose money.

Volatility is altering the distribution of your outcomes not the mean outcome. 

Mathematically the median is the geometric mean. In a multiplicative process, you care more about the geometric mean. After all, you only get one life.

A note on log returns

A logreturn is a compounded return where we assume continuous compounding. So instead of every year, it’s more like every second. Of course, if our wealth grows from $1 to $2 in 5 years but we assume tiny compouding intervals, then the rate per interval must be small. After all the start and end of our journey ($1 to $2) is the same, we are just slicing it into smaller sections.

Computing an expected logreturn is simple. Using the volatile example:

.5 * ln(2) + .5 + ln(.40) = -11.2%

Note that this is slightly worse than the geometric mean return (aka median) we computed earlier of -10.6%

Volatility’s effect on compounded returns

The following table presents different investments that each have an expected arithmetic return of 20%. Just like the examples above. But the various payoffs are altered to proxy different levels of volatility. An investment that can earn 21% or 19% is much less volatile than one that can return 100% or -60% even though the average return is the same.

We use the simplest measure to represent the volatility — the ratio of the best return to the worst return.

The stable investment volatility proxy is 1.21 / 1.19 = 1.017

The volatile investment above is 2 / .4 = 5.00

Table snippet:

These charts show the divergence between arithmetic and median returns as we increase the volatility (the ratio of the best return to the worst return):

An investment that is equally likely to return 60% as it is to lose 20% has a 20% expected return but if you keep re-investing your long-term median outcome is closer to a 12-13% CAGR.

What if we raise the volatility further to a ratio of 5 (terminal wealth of 2x vs .4x):

At a ratio of 3.5 (1.87x vs .53x) our median result is zero. At a ratio of 5, the average return remains 20% but the median return is losing 10%. Almost all the paths are losing they are just being counterbalanced by the unlikely event that you keep flipping heads.

Takeaways

  • Investing is a multiplicative process so we want to look at compounded or log returns not simple returns
  • Compounded returns ask “what growth rate when multiplied from period to period gets us from the start point to the end point?”
  • Compounded and logreturns are always less than arithmetic returns
  • Compounded and log returns are better measures for what you expect to find in your bank account after volatility has taken its toll. Remember if you lose 50% on an investment you need 100% to get back to even. If you earn 50% on an investment you only need to lose 33% to be back at even.
  • If there was no volatility there’d be no promise of return, but volatility is a quadratic drag on returns. The sweet spot for your portfolio likely falls in the realm of the volatility of broadly diversified portfolios. By rebalancing you can reduce concentration risks that threaten to turn your entire nest egg into a coin flip. Even if this coin has positive expectancy, remember you can’t eat theoretical edge.

Moontower #204

Friends,

For the past 3 years, the Berkeley Chess School has done a weekly lesson in our backyard. About 15 kids attend. They are mostly 2nd and 5th graders because we know the families through our kids.

I walk home from school with all the kids on chess day. I usually throw out a math question or riddle and by now the kids just ask for them on our strolls. Lately, the questions deal with rates, percentages/fractions, exponents/roots, or some basic number play stuff (“How do you know if a number is divisible by 9?”)

Some examples:

  • Start with $100. If you earn 10% then lose 10%, how much money do you have?
  • What’s larger 3⁴ or 4³ and similar questions?
  • If you travel 5 miles in 12 minutes, how fast are you going?[I haven’t dropped this one on them: “If I drive around a one-mile track and average 30 mph for the first lap, how fast do I have to drive the second lap to average 60 mph for both laps combined?” (Solution)]
  • If you have 5 kids on your team and only 4 kids start how many possible starting lineups are there?
  • If you lose 25%, how much do you have to make to get back to even?[I like that one because it’s a useful elasticity idea. If X is the loss percentage, you need to earn back X/(1-X).

    If you are selling lemonade and you cut your price by 20%, you need to sell 25% more cups to be revenue-neutral.]

I started giving these questions because, well it’s just play. Riddles are inherently satisfying. But I’m also conscious of imparting some durable concepts. It’s not quite as deliberate as hiding the dog’s pill in the peanut butter but there’s some overlap. Honestly, the main motivation is keeping the kids who aren’t into sports engaged. There’s about 40 minutes between the kids getting to my house and the start of chess. The 2nd graders usually play soccer and the 5th graders hoop it up. A few kids aren’t into either but they gravitate to the riddles (my boys just wanna play sports and my 5th grader, Zak, with sass tells his friends “This is the stuff I deal with all the time”).

Lately, I’ve been doing more exponent stuff because I know they aren’t doing that yet in 5th grade but it’s reachable for them. Zak is taking the online Pre-Algebra I course on Art of Problem Solving which is comprised of 7 chapters. He just wrapped chapter 2 which is all about exponents so that’s been top-of-mind for coming up with the questions.

The challenge question to end the chapter was to solve for the 2 possible values of X (see below). But keep in mind, they haven’t learned how to compute square roots or any other kind of roots. You can do this without any involved computations and without roots. You can find the solution at the end of the post.

Find the 2 possible values of x:

Anyway, I didn’t give the kids that question but by this past week, they understood the basics of computing a simple exponent or taking a square root. So I took a stab at base 10 logarithms. I just explained it as the power you need to raise 10 to get to the target number.

“So if our target is 100, what do you have to raise 10 to? How about a target of 1,000?”

They had no trouble with this. So I explained how both the Richter and decibel scales were log scales that compressed a wide range into a smaller ruler. A 6 on the Richter is not twice the energy of a 3 but 1000x more energy. Every integer increase in the scale is just a higher order of magnitude.

The most pleasant thing happened. The kids that gravitated to this stuff were stoked. As it it settled in their brains they were all Keanu Reeves “Whoa, that’s so cool”.

I texted one of the parents:

Putting aside the pure joy of watching a kid unlock, exponents and logs are fundamentally important operations like adding and subtracting. Our first formal introduction to them outside a math class is usually science (exponential growth/decay) but more prosaic to this audience is the topic of investing, specifically the idea of compound growth. It’s an idea you’d love to see people internalize as young as possible.

Typically when someone (and I’ve done this too) writes about compounding they reference Einstein’s 8th Wonder of the World quote or talk about how our minds think linearly and find exponential growth unintuitive. [This was a common conversation at the start of the COVID pandemic with VCs patting themselves on the back for lateral thinking about how coefficients of virality applied to…the domain where exponential growth is usually people’s first contact with the topic. Like twisting a eulogy into a chance to talk about yourself. I’m not even mad, it’s the whole wheel of cheese].

With that in mind, I’ll leave you with an excerpt from Grant Sanderson, the mathematician behind the 3Blue1Brown YouTube channel. This is from his appearance on

excellent Lunar Society Podcast:

Have you come across those studies where anthropologists interview tribes of people that are removed enough from normal society that they don’t have the level of numeracy that you or I do? But there’s some notion of counting. You have one coconut or nine coconuts like you have a sense of that. But if you ask what number is halfway between one and nine, those groups will answer three whereas you or I or people in our world would probably answer five and because we think on this very linear scale.

It’s interesting that evidently the natural way to think about things is logarithmically, which kind of makes sense. The social dynamics of as you go from solitude to a group of 10 people to a group of 100 people have roughly equal steps in increasing complexity more so than if you go from 1 to 51 to 102 and I wonder if it’s it’s the case that by adding numeracy in some senses we’ve also like lost some numeracy or lost some intuition in others, where now if you ask middle school teachers what’s a difficult topic to teacher for students to understand they’re like logarithms. But that should be deep in our bones right so somehow it got unlearned

What a cheeky observation. Gives a second entendre to the expression “natural log”.


Money Angle

I’m using this space to invite you to play PitBulls (formerly StockSlam) online this coming Friday evening. It’s totally free but space is limited.

Reserve your spot (choose Friday November 3rd if you want to play with me)

This is my testimonial for the game:

One of the most fortuitous decisions I made in my career was accepting a job from SIG out of college. Back in 2000 going to Silicon Valley or I-Banking was all the rage. While trading was a coveted job, the idea of going to an exchange floor to sling options was not a mainstream career choice. And SIG was not a well-known company outside this narrow world.

The job offer I got from them was the lowest paying, but the interview process stood apart from the banks and other firms I talked to. It was clear that working for SIG meant a serious education in decision-making commensurate with the objective — to take responsibility for risking the partners’ own money after as little as 9 months of training.

I was placed at the American Stock Exchange where I would learn from senior traders including their head of education in NY, Mike Steiner, simply known as Steiner.

Steiner was a natural teacher, able to communicate complex ideas with simplicity and frankly, joy. It was no surprise when I discovered 20 years later he retired to become a physics teacher in public school.

In 2022, we reconnected and he showed me the prototype for what would become Pitbulls. Pitbulls is a game distilling the essence and mechanics of the mock trading program we used in training. Pitbulls is a fast-paced game requiring players to think quantitatively while building intuition and understanding investor psychology. Steiner focused on making it fun — it’s a game first. But when I saw it I was immediately struck by its potential to bring investing principles to life!

Skills that will immediately develop from the very first game:

  • market making in an open outcry market
  • tracking multiple quotes from competitors
  • managing a rudimentary portfolio
  • reacting to new information

Deeper concepts embedded in Pitbulls:

  • arbitrage pricing, inter-dependent pricing
  • expected value and probability
  • the concept of edge as the foundation of a business
  • how you can be profitable without relying on prediction
  • making trading decisions under uncertainty
  • risk and diversification
  • the role, wisdom, and conditions of a healthy market
  • an introduction to derivatives
  • a bridge from trading to investing principles

Steiner has been hosting in-person playshops for years and I helped organize larger events in NYC, SF, and Chicago to overwhelmingly positive feedback. Unsurprisingly, the most universal suggestion was “give us an online version”. People wanted to play on their own and host their own sessions.

Starting now, you can play online!

I’ve been writing about financial education topics for years. These posts go into how Pitbulls and its underpinnings can improve your thinking in powerful ways.

Money Angle For Masochists

Quant legend Peter Muller wrote a candid, somewhat irreverent post 20 years ago that holds timeless wisdom.

🔗Proprietary trading: truth and fiction (Link)

Excerpts:

  1. But the most important risk is the possibility of our models not working correctly. To minimize that risk, we set loss targets for strategies — if we lose more money than the pre-specified target then the strategy is re-evaluated and shut down for a while (perhaps forever). This is not that different from the old school of proprietary trader management: ‘Go ahead and trade, don’t do anything too risky, and if you lose more than $x we’re going to shut you down. ’Our strategies are evaluated by looking at reward/risk measures. For symmetric, market-neutral strategies without significant tail events, the Sharpe Ratio (SR) is probably the best ex-ante measure. SR is defined as the portfolio annual excess return divided by the annualized standard deviation of that return. Our benchmark is cash, hence measuring excess returns is appropriate for our portfolio. For long-only managers, the Information Ratio—which measures excess returns relative to a benchmark—is more appropriate. When we evaluate past performance, we also look at peak-to-trough drawdowns (a measure of the maximum drop between consecutive maximum and minimum values of return over the life of the strategy) as an additional risk variable. This can help pick up serial correlation in portfolio returns that the Sharpe Ratio doesn’t capture. Also of interest is the fraction of expected gross profits consumed by expected transaction costs. The higher this number, the more money we expect to lose if our model stops working. At least some of our edge comes from opportunities that are created in the market by institutional managers who trade too much. Their trading is usually based on either an exaggerated view of how well they can predict investment returns or a misunderstanding of how trading costs increase with size. The strategies of institutional managers can still be perfectly rational despite providing us with opportunities through over-trading, simply because of the huge agency issues in portfolio management.
  2. In Grinold and Kahn’s book on Active Portfolio Management, the authors describe the ‘FundamentalLaw of Active Management’: a strategy’s Sharpe Ratio is proportional to the number of independent bets taken by the strategy multiplied by the correlation of those bets with their outcome. To get a higher SR, you need to increase the number of your bets or increase the strength of your forecasts. In my opinion, it is far better to refine an individual strategy by increasing both the number of bets within the strategy and the strength of the forecasts made in the strategy, than to attempt to put together lots of weaker strategies. Depth is more important than breadth for investment strategies…I would much rather have a single strategy with an expected Sharpe Ratio of 2 than a strategy that has an expected Sharpe Ratio of 2.5 formed by putting together five supposedly uncorrelated strategies each with an expected Sharpe Ratio of 1. In the latter case, you’re faced with the risk that the strategies are more correlated than you realize (think Long Term Capital). There is also the increased effort of ascertaining whether each individual strategy really has a Sharpe Ratio of 1.
  3. An important choice for many proprietary traders is whether to focus on shorter or longer-horizon strategies. Typically, shorter horizon strategies get their edge from providing temporal liquidity to a marketplace or predicting short-term trends that arise from efficient trading. Longer-term models focus on asset pricing inefficiencies. How does the implementation of these strategies compare? Shorter-horizon investment strategies are desirable because they tend to create higher Sharpe ratios. If your average holding period is a day or a month, you have the opportunity to place many more bets than if you hold positions for three months to a year or longer. On the flip side, shorter horizon strategies tend to have capacity issues (it’s easy to make a small amount of money with them, but harder to make a lot of money). Shorter horizon strategies also require serious investments in trading infrastructuresince quick and inexpensive execution is much more important than for longer horizon strategies. Risk management for shorter-horizon strategies tends to occur through position trading rather than portfolio construction. Assets are not held for long periods of time and portfolio characteristics change quickly. The biggest risk for shorter horizon strategies model risk, or the risk that the trading strategy deployed has stopped working. Since even the best trading strategies experience periodic drawdowns, the hardest challenge for the short-term model-based trader is to figure out whether his model is going through a regular drawdown or has stopped working altogether. Longer-horizon model-driven investment strategies have different issues. Since assets are held for longer periods of time, execution costs (although still important) are not the primary focus. Statistical inference becomes more difficult and the danger of overfitting or mining data becomes larger. Risk management for longer-term strategies happens in portfolio construction: since rebalancing occurs less frequently, more care needs to be taken to ensure the portfolio is not exposed to unintended sources of risk. Because they tend to have lower Sharpe ratios, longer horizon strategies have a different kind of capacity issue—the capacity for pain. However, there is one advantage: because trading occurs less frequently it’s possible to lead a much better lifestyle than if you’re running shorter horizon strategies!

Moontower #203

In Wednesday’s Munchie Generative Instincts, there was talk of representing data visually.

I quoted Eugene Wei:

The reason the book [Tufte] influenced me so deeply is that it is actually a book about the pursuit of truth through knowledge. It is ostensibly about producing better charts; what stays with you is the principles for general clarity of thought. Reading the book, chiseling away at my line graphs late nights, talking to people all over the company to understand what might explain each of them, gave me a path towards explaining the past and predicting the future. Ask anyone about any work of art they love, whether it’s a book or a movie or an album, and it’s never just about what it’s about. I haven’t read Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance; I’m guessing it wasn’t written just for motorcycle enthusiasts. A good line graph is a fusion of right and left brain, of literacy and numeracy. Just numbers alone aren’t enough to explain the truth, but accurate numbers, represented truthfully, are a check on our anecdotal excesses, confirmation biases, tribal affiliations.

I wanted to share a few places where you can see visuals expertly used to teach or bring the user through a story.

🧪Math and Science Interactive Essays

🔭Explorables

  • Nicky CaseNicky’s work bursts with brilliance and creativity.

    The archive is loaded with explorables.

    Don’t miss: An Interactive Introduction to Attractor Landscapes

    If you have ever heard the word “sticky” in a trading context that explorable is a must. It’s a fascinating lens for articulating option regimes.

    Nicky also has one on the Wisdom/Madness of Crowds.

    Nicky is incredibly transparent and the work is 100% open-source. I find it insanely inspirational.

  • Explorable Explanations…a hub for learning through play! We’re a disorganized “movement” of artists, coders & educators who want to reunite play and learning.

    Straight into the veins.

🍮Pudding posts

The Pudding is a digital publication that brings cultural stories to life using interactive visualizations. They highlight some of their favorites in this introduction.

Their recent newsletter featured several fun ones. I often check out the articles even if the topic doesn’t interest me just because the design and tech used to create them is always fresh:

Romance Novels (Link)

What does a happily ever after look like? We look at over 1,400 romance covers to find out what visuals are used.

Invisible Epidemic (Link)

Watch 24 hours of an American day, and the invisible crisis hiding in plain sight

A series of experimental clocks that connect data to time

A clock where the time is…

  1. in a song title
  2. mentioned on YouTube
  3. made of news headlines
  4. the population of a US place

Money Angle

The intellectual force-of-nature

publishes a widely-read daily letter that I often pull from called The Diff. It’s in the same league as Stratechery or Matt Levine which is to say GOAT-level.

Byrne also publishes an educational post on Wednesdays in a letter called Capital Gains.

This week’s Capital Gains was one of my favorites. I’ll leave you with excerpts even though it’s pretty short. It’s one of those irreducible posts that should just be excerpted in full (said otherwise — just read it). There’s no waste.

[As usual, emphasis mine]

Risk and Returns, Before and After the Fact (Capital Gains)

There are two ways to talk about long-term returns from investing in a given asset class. One is easy because it has limited utility, and the other is a useful intellectual exercise, but impossible to get right.

  • Long-term returns are, in a simplistic model, the current dividend yield plus long-term growth in dividends per share—where “long-term” is very long-term, like a lifetime or longer. And growth in dividends per share is, also in the very long term, a function of growth in revenue per share: margins tend to be surprisingly stable over long periods, and multiples can only go so far in one direction or another…This model looks too easy, and in some ways it is. For example, it’s correct over a timescale long enough to be irrelevant to individuals; there can be long swings towards lower margins, like the one that took place in the US from the 60s through the 90s. And there can be swings in the opposite direction, like the rise in corporate margins that’s taken place since then. But these trends can’t go on forever—each one of them could easily be the majority of the lifetime of a specific individual investor. Swings in valuation can happen, too; P/E ratios went from ~20x in the late 1920s (on low-quality earnings that were increasingly from financial engineering) to the mid-single digits in the late 1940s, back to 20+ in the 60s, back to single digits by the late 70s, and so on
  • The discussion of fundamental drivers of equity returns hammered home the idea that valuation is not a driver of returns, because it moves so slowly. Even if the market switched from trading at ~10x earnings in the early 20th century to ~25x today, that’s 70 basis points per year of annual return. But the flip side of this is that over shorter periods, valuation’s role as a return driver goes way up. Year to year, the market’s moves are typically the result of multiple expansion rather than earnings growth or dividends…Over even shorter periods, valuation becomes even more important; an intraday swing or the change in price from one trade to the next are, almost by definition, overwhelmingly driven by valuation multiples rather than some tiny incremental update to a company’s fundamentals.
  • In the very long run, stocks tend to go up. But that’s only sustainable if that long-term gain is compensation for some shorter-term variability. You can know roughly what you’re getting into by looking at broad valuation metrics, which tell you that stocks are fairly expensive right now, especially in the context of higher rates. But you can’t get much more information than that—the difficulty of timing the market is a function of how all the easy ways have been arbitraged away, and what’s left is a bedrock of uncertainty that, over short timescales, dominates fundamental drivers and long-term trends.

Money Angle for Masochists

I just want to attach a thought to Byrne’s post that seems cruel to dump on casual investors. Hence its home in the Masochism section.

If valuation is a limited return driver except over a long-run period, a period nobody knows anything about

AND you are invested in managers who have valuation-based strategies, then Byrne’s post has Shrodinger’s cat vibes. There’s a duality of epistemology between the description of “what happened” with “what will happen” that really doesn’t seem to overlap in any pragmatic context. And the assumption of that overlap is the rationalization that underpins all long-term investing sales pitches.

Let’s back up and consider the problem of the long-term generally.

The best we can do is have sound frameworks for decision-making. Being probabilistic thinkers, understanding incentives, etc etc. All the stuff you hear on podcasts, Mungerisms, yadda yadda. It’s all sound even if it’s hard to implement in a messy world.

I feel that our frameworks have limited potential in outperforming the wisdom of crowds for long time horizons. Those frameworks help but their value is more in avoiding stupidity rather than aiding one in outperforming unemotional benchmarks that already incorporate intelligent portfolio construction logic — diversification, cutting losers (ie following trends) and rebalancing.

Everybody would love to hide behind “we are good at this in the long run and until that long run happens you shouldn’t judge us” while they collect nonrefundable fees. I don’t think there is data that you can look at that solves the problem of “who is good at beating benchmarks over the long term” for a price that doesn’t negate the advantage. But even price aside, how do you say “this buy-and-hold approach is better than a benchmark”? You need to believe they know something about the far future that other smart people do not. And the type of people that are good at that (if “that” exists) do not strike me as the same imaginations that are drawn to value investing.

The longer you hold an investment, the less your entry price matters. The most important driver of the investment will be the rate at which it compounds invested capital. A company that has the promise to do this is unlikely to be cheap. Everyone understands the math and understands that getting the entry price wrong is okay if they:

a) get business returns roughly right

and

b) don’t sell

The re-rating of the multiple matters more for the short to medium-term investor.

Doesn’t this put long-term investing at odds with the extreme couponing personas that value investors project?!

These other ideas make sense:

  • Buffet preaches buying great businesses at fair prices
  • Trader types are cool to buy a crap business they think is oversold but will re-rate when flows stabilize or there’s capitulation or whatever short-term thesis they envision materializes. They are just focused on beating the spread on the new slate of volatile stocks each week (or month).
  • The growth investor appears to have internalized the idea that you can pay up for the best businesses and you’ll do great in the long run.

It’s the long-term value investors trying to buy pristine ROIC for bargain prices who appear to be spitting on the laws of investing gravity. Value investing seems like a mean reversion trade. “Trade” being the operative word here not “investing”.

The premise of long-term value investing appears logically incoherent when you try to marry “cheap” with “good business” in transparent public markets. Shorter-term strategies attract more competition (if you can “buy well” you’d like to exploit that skill 1000x a year rather than 5x a year) but they are at least possible to evaluate.

You could ask a manager, “What kind of things I should look at to figure out if your strategy is getting worse?” Tell me how to judge you. Tell me how to judge whether it even makes sense to try to get alpha in your space. There’s an old interview with an option guy Wayne Himelsein where he discusses strategy evaluation:

Are you achieving your premise? So you’ve said yourself, I know where I want to neutralize, and I know where I want to get my alpha. And if that’s where you get your alpha, you have to know that number one, you have alpha there. So if you look at your growth tilt and measure that against Fama growth factor, do you beat it? If not, you’ve got no edge.

He talks about mapping a strategy. Comparing the exposures to a time series of different exposures to see how it behaves.

“I don’t ever listen to what [the manager] tells me. I just run it versus we have in here about 180 different exposures that we have time series for factors or exposures [to find out] “what is inside this thing?”

How intentional are the exposures?

Managers will tell you that they’re doing something but don’t even know what they’re exposed to. “Did you know you have a 30% exposure to momentum? Oh, no, I didn’t. I’m actually a value investor.”

This is an older interview, but it’s increasingly common knowledge today that these lines of questioning inform pod shops’ risk and compensation frameworks.

This doesn’t work for choosing long-term investors.

The problem feels intractable.

You might convince me there are some weirdos who have first-hand tinkered with things that inform a vision of the far future. But they wouldn’t balk at the ticket price to board that ride anyway. They believe.

VC makes sense because overpaying doesn’t matter if you are truly drawing from a power law distribution (that’s a big “if” though).

And trading oriented managers can be evaluated. Just ask them the terms they want to be evaluated, hang them on their own inconsistencies, and choose from whoever’s left.

But long-term investors who want cheap prices? I don’t know if that job is even doable ex-ante and if it is I don’t think you wear a suit to do it.


From My Actual Life

I just finished Vice Principals. Lee Russell is so despicable he has to be one of the best characters ever.

I leave you with a playlist-level song that outros one of the episodes:

Stay groovy ☮️

Moontower #202

Friends,

Today’s a long Money Angle so we’ll skip right to it after a chuckle.

Money Angle

I tried to buy some Treasury Inflation-Protected securities (TIPs bonds) last week. I failed. But I learned a lot about how they work.

I’ll paraphrase and quote from State Street’s outstanding primer for basic background info then explain the mechanics with an example.

Overview

  • TIPs bonds were introduced in 1997
  • 5, 10, 30 year terms
  • Like ordinary treasuries they are backed by the “full faith and credit” of the US government
  • The principal and income are indexed to inflation
  • At maturity, the holder receives the greater of the inflation-indexed principal or the original principal. In other words, there is an embedded put option struck at the inflation index price level at the time of issue

Coupon

  • The annual coupon rate is fixed at issue
  • The coupon is paid semi-annually (each payment is 1/2 the coupon rate)
  • Although the coupon rate is fixed, the principal amount of the bond adjusts monthly based on the CPI-U or Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (not seasonally adjusted)

Relationship to inflation

The breakeven rate allows you to compare TIPs to nominal treasuries

Breakeven: The annualized rate of CPI inflation over the life of the bond that makes the total return of a TIPS equal to that of a similar-tenor Treasury. Calculated as the yield difference between Treasury bonds and TIPS of the same maturity, breakeven rates are, ultimately, a proxy for the market’s inflation expectations. The lower the rate, the lower the expectation for inflation.

Positive inflation typically benefits the performance of TIPS, while falling inflation (deflation/ disinflation) may cause lower performance. It is important to note that market inflation expectations are often already priced into TIPS. Therefore, for inflation trends to be beneficial for the relative return of TIPS, it must develop at a rate that is higher than the market’s anticipated breakeven inflation rates.

The following example illustrates how the inflation adjustment feature of TIPS works during a period of inflation and what it means for returns. If the US 10-year yield is 3.87% and the yield on a 10-year TIPS bond is 1.58%, this means that the breakeven rate is 2.29%. If inflation over the next 10 years is actually 2.5%, this would lead to stronger relative performance, all else equal, for TIPS versus nominals, as realized inflation was higher than what was estimated (as represented by the breakeven) at the time of purchase.

A change in market expectations or uncertainty about inflation can change TIPS prices before maturity, however. For example, beginning in April 2021 nominal and real yields both fell. Yet, real yields fell faster as a result of widening breakeven rates and investors’ desire to mitigate the effects of inflation on their Treasury exposure. At the time, therefore, investors felt breakeven rates (i.e., market-based inflation expectations) were understated and not reflective of the loose policy environment. As expectations increased, TIPS outperformed nominal Treasuries by more than 8% through 2021.7

Why are TIPs returns only loosely correlated to inflation?

Because interest rate themselves are correlated with inflation and…

like all bonds, TIPS are subject to interest-rate risk. And because of this, they are not a perfect hedge against inflation. For example, in March 2022, the Fed began an aggressive rate hike campaign to combat rising inflation. Through year end, the central bank raised rates by a total of 4.25%, which was the fastest rate hike cycle in decades.10 During the same period, TIPS registered a loss of 10.8%,11 primarily due to their duration risk amid the unprecedented speed of the rate hike cycle. These bond losses were widespread among many other fixed income asset classes, such as nominal Treasuries, investment grade corporate bonds, high yield bonds, etc

Taxes

  • TIPs income is taxed at ordinary rates
  • The income is state and local tax-exempt
  • Phantom income tax: The principal amount of the bond is indexed to inflation. In a positive inflation environment that increase in principal is taxable even though you do not receive distributions. It is possible that your annual tax liability exceeds the coupon income. At maturity, you will be repaid the appreciated principal amount but there will not be a capital gains tax as you have been paying the taxes on the phantom income during the holding period

Example

A quick bit on the CPI-U inflation index.

From Historical CPI-U data we can see:

  • The period from 1982-1984 has a defined index value of 100
  • The August 2023 index value was 307.026

In other words, $3.07 today equates to $1.00 in the 1982-1984 period

Let’s examine a 30-year TIPs bond issued on February 28, 2023

  1. The dated date is February 15, 2023. That’s when interest starts to accrue.
  2. The coupon is 1.50%. That rate is fixed forever.
    • The holder receives .75% of the adjusted principal value every 6 months from the dated date (every August and February 15th)

Adjusting the principal

When the above 30-year TIPs was dated on February 15, 2023 the CPI-U index was at 297.254 which would have corresponded to an index ratio of 1.00.

The index ratio is the amount you multiply the $100 par value of the bond to find the adjusted principal.

On October 1, 2023, ref CPI was 305.691

305.691/297.254 = 1.02838

According to the table that’s exactly the index ratio on October 1. That means the adjusted principal of the bond on that day is $102.838

For demonstration’s sake, pretend it paid a coupon on October 1.

The coupon payment would be:

.75% x 102.838 for each $100 worth of bonds you originally bought.

  • As CPI-U increases the index ratio increases. The fixed-rate coupon is multiplied by this index ratio to compute your interest.
  • At maturity, you aren’t paid back $100 but the adjusted principal per $100 of bond you originally bought.

Quoting convention

As you can imagine, buying TIPs later in the secondary market means the security’s index ratio is much higher than 1 because of the accumulated inflation.

This 20-year TIPs was:

  • issued in 2009
  • has less than 6 years remaining until maturity
  • referenced a CPI-U index of 214.7 when it was dated

The bond will be quoted as a percentage of 100 par.

This is a snapshot of the bond at the close of 10/11/23 from my Interactive Brokers account:

Even though the bond is quoted as a percentage of par — we’ll use a last sale of 100.7255 — the outlay must be multiplied by the bond adjustment factor (ie the index ratio of 1.42581).

Outlay  = price x index ratio

It would cost 100.7255 x 1.42581 or $1,436.15 per $1,000 of face value.

Your coupon payments will be of course indexed to an adjusted principal value:

adjusted principal =face value x index ratio

adjusted principal = $1,000 x 1.42581 = $1,425.81

If October 11, 2023, was a coupon date:

coupon payment = 1.25% x 1,425.81= $17.82

Don’t forget at maturity, your bonds return the adjusted principal not the $1,000 face value.

Additional Considerations

On-the-run vs off-the-run

Consider 2 bonds:

  • A 10-year bond issued today
  • A 30-year bond issued 20 years ago

Both bonds have 10 years remaining to maturity. The new bond is call on-the-run and the old one is known as the off-the-run.

Off-the-run bonds will trade at a discount to the on-the-run (ie the off-the-run will offer a higher yield). Why?

If you buy a new bond with an index ratio near 1.00 you cannot lose if there is deflation. The bond’s adjusted principal cannot fall below 100% of par.

If you buy an off-the-run bond whose years of prior inflation have pushed the adjusted principal up to say 1.4x of par then if you have month-over-month deflation the CPI-U index will fall bringing the ratio and adjusted principal lower. That 1.00 strike put that is embedded in the bond doesn’t protect you from a falling price level the way it protects a newly issued bond.

All the TIPs on IB’s platform seem to be off-the-run except for the recent 30-year bond. The lowest index ratio on a bond with less than 10 years til maturity is about 1.40 which means there are no on-the-run 5 or 10-year TIPs on the platform.

ETFs

You can access TIPs via ETFs. State Street is an ETF provider so they remind you that TIPs ETFs avoid phantom income:

One of the complicating issues of using individual TIPS is that investors must pay taxes each year on the inflation adjustment to the principal even though the inflation adjustment isn’t received until the bond matures. ETFs avoid issuing this “phantom income” by distributing all inflation adjustments (classified as Treasury income) as they are accrued. This turns phantom income into realized cash flows.

I’ll add one more thought. ETFs offer something akin to a constant maturity exposure. So for example, if you buy an ETF targeting 7-10 year durations you will have constant exposure to that level of interest rate risk/sensitivity.

If you buy individual bonds, as time passes they become shorter-dated which reduces the exposure to interest rates.

It’s not a matter of what’s better, it’s just a question of whether you want constant exposure to interest rate volatility or if you like an entry point today and content to receive the carry while the exposure to rates dwindles away.

I saw a YouTube video comparing the performance of a TIPs ETF vs just owning an individual TIPs bond and then it moaned about how the ETF did worse in the rising rate environment. Well of course it would — it’s interest rate exposure never lapses. If rates were falling, the ETF would have done better than the individual bond.

If you are going to compare an ETF to individual bonds, you should compare the ETF to a bond ladder that is rebalanced to a constant exposure to the same duration.

Final observations

Inflation reporting

Inflation reporting denotes a trailing 1-year rate. The latest CPI index vs 12 months earlier. Just like you might prefer a shorter moving average to emphasize recent data you might want to just look at the monthly inflation index. You could even annualize the recent 3-month change if you thought that was more relevant. If you do that, don’t forget to consider seasonal biases.

  • For the past 3 years, inflation has been compounding at a touch over 6%
  • In the past year, we’ve seen inflation of about 3.70%
  • In the past 6 months, we’ve seen inflation of about 3.94% annualized

TIPs seem cheap relative to nominal bonds (ie breakevens are “low”)

Implied breakevens:

5 Year Breakeven Inflation = 2.26%

10-year Breakeven Inflation = 2.34%

Does this imply:

  1. Bearishness (ie inflation/economy is going to tank — this doesn’t seem to be reflected in equity valuations)?
  2. Flow anomalies?
  3. The breakevens are derived from off-the-run TIPs whose embedded put option is worthlessly far out-of-the-money?

Oh yea, one last thing…

I said in the beginning I tried to buy TIPs and failed. There were over $5,000,000 worth of bonds on the offer. I tried to pay the ask for $100,000 worth and got a message that the NBBO did not need to be honored for less than the displayed size. I don’t know how the heck the bond market works but that just smells.


Additional reading

Stay groovy ☮️

Moontower #201

Friends,

I published a large option post this week which drained my writing time. You can check it out in Money Angle. So here is just a quick take on Jack’s tweet:

I agree. Whenever I see “creator” my impulse is just say what you do. “I write words on the internet” or “I make videos on YT.” The internet is a frontier of wildcatters making ends meet in all kinds of ways but showbiz has plenty of precedents. Every time a Smartless host introduces a guest it’s:

“Please welcome actor/producer/writer/musician/comedian/origamist/trainer [famous person’s name]”

When Fabio accepts the “slashie” award in Zoolander, it’s satire. Now it’s just a Tuesday. What a great time to be many things. Why force yourself into an old box with a generic label “creator”?

I remember joining a HF after 12 years in the slop of floor trader land. I needed a business card but I didn’t know any lingo (I’d refer to edge as vig not alpha, PMs as traders, execution traders as clerks, and asset managers as punters. Shoot me for not having an MBA. Also sorry mom, I’m still not going back to school). I asked someone more senior about what the hell I should put on the business card and the response was “whatever you want, we don’t give AF”. I was like cool, that’s how I feel about it too. Labels are conveniences for others but if you would be better served by just making yours up, knock yourself out. Everyone is gonna have an opinion anyway. But “creator” does conjure a worker assembling memes on a conveyor belt.


Mother of ironies on this rec:

This interview with Justin Moore, aka the “Creator Wizard” is a great interview that caters to internet hustlers but is loaded with great business ideas. Justin is super transparent and the depth of his strategic thinking shines in his conversation with ConvertKit founder Nathan Barry:

🎙️Game-Changing Newsletter Sponsorship Strategies (podcast)

The title suggests a narrow discussion but the principles extrapolate well. Consider this [somewhat edited] section:

I’m a big fan of disruption, where instead of charging what everyone else does, I give it away for free. I’ve adopted this model with my newsletter and offered free advice during my early days to build credibility, helping people with DMs. Currently, I’ve never shared this publicly, so this is an exclusive insight.

I’ve incorporated a pricing calculator with my course. I added it because people kept expressing confusion about various aspects. The calculator has grown sophisticated, accounting for goal types such as conversion, brand awareness, and content repurposing, among others. It also considers different usage rights, exclusivity, and various factors. While it’s a part of my course now, I plan to release this calculator for free in the future. Many platforms charge for similar tools, but mine will be a free resource.

The idea is to use it as lead generation. If someone wants to determine sponsorship charges, they can use my calculator. For more in-depth insights, they can either enroll in my courses or hire me for consulting. This approach to offering free resources will be a constant in my ventures, especially because I have other sources of income.

Looking at the broader picture, diversification is essential. My wife and I already run a thriving business. I see my creator project as an extension, which has grown over time. I didn’t initially view it as a primary revenue source. For instance, I hired a content strategist a year and a half ago. The goal was to establish my reputation as the go-to expert on sponsorships across social platforms. I invested heavily in content, even before I had a direct monetization strategy.

Regarding the newsletter, I invest around 2,500 bucks monthly for its creation. Although it’s a free newsletter, I’ve begun to monetize through courses and consulting. From a creator’s perspective, this might seem like a loss. However, with a strategic vision and understanding of the future trajectory of my business, I’m willing to take that bet every time.

The sections in bold are great examples of

  1. giving away a low-margin product to upsell a higher-margin service
  2. diversification as risk absorption — the highest bidder for a risk premium is the entity that can best warehouse the risk. When you can warehouse risk you attract more business, that leas to more info which can be recycled to strengthen your position further by leading you to new product/service offering to sell to existing clients. Mathew effect in full force.

This actually reminds me of the option business. Banks will “put up trades” with some clients at terrible prices because the option trade is really just a loss leader. The bank makes money on a holistic investment banking relationship with the client. As an option market maker, watching your primary business become a throw-in sweetener that a larger entity just gives away is disheartening.

The bank is just more diversified and therefore the highest bidder for the risk. It’s a profound idea that means most investments, when viewed in isolation, are overpriced. You typically need a synergetic reason(a reason why you can capture adjacent value) to compete with the highest bids.

[h/t to my buddy

for turning me on to Justin]

Money Angle

I was hanging out with my homie Josh this week as our boys shot hoops. Josh gave me a couple great recs. The Danny McBride episode of Smartless and the show Vice Principals which is slaying my wife and I. McBride and Walter Goggins are live-action cartoons, I have no idea how they stay in character. [McBride steals multiple scenes in This Is The End (seriously NSFW). The rest of the cast say he’s the guy that makes them laugh. They struggle to hold it together in their shots with him].

But the 3rd rec is proper Money Angle material. Bill Gurley’s eye-opening and amusing talk:

Money Angle For Masochists

A big new option post:

👿The MAD Straddle (Moontower)

This post explores the relationship between an option straddle and volatility.

You will learn:

  • The relationship between MAD (mean absolute deviation) and standard deviation
  • how to approximate a straddle value without a model
  • see how the straddle is the MAD
  • gain an intuition for how skew and fat-tailed distributions distort the relationship between straddle prices and volatility
  • see practical situations where ATM straddles and therefore volatility misrepresent risk

It’s broken into 4 parts with sub-posts:

  1. Measures of Volatility
  2. Interpreting the Straddle
  3. Distortions
  4. Practical Discussion

If you’re reading this section you have probably seen the ATF straddle approximation: .8 x S x σ√t

Here’s the Visual Derivation which is pretty neat because we use basic geometry instead of calculus to get to a tidy approximation that you can compute mentally.

How does the approximation perform?

Image

Graphically:

Image

3 Observations

1. The approximation works well at “reasonable levels” of volatility.

Image

2. Straddle is capped at 200% of S no matter how high volatility goes

Image

3. Time and volatility work the same way.

Image

Enjoy your straddles 😏

Stay groovy ☮️

Moontower #199

The undisputed heavy-weight champ of finance writing is Matt Levine. I’m 4 bid on how many chuckles you’ll get per letter. I wouldn’t sneak-read his stuff during a meeting — there’s always literal LOL risk.

But it’s not just the humor. Matt Reustle and Dom Cooke, hosts of Making Media, put their finger directly on Levine’s appeal in their recent interview with Levine.

Matt. R: [00:53:12] He has basically carved out this category where when you see certain things hit the tape, you say to yourself, I can’t wait for Matt Levine’s interpretation of this. And that’s such a symbolic thing that I think many people probably strive to have, and he clearly has achieved them. I love that.

Dom: [00:53:30] I think it’s stronger than that as well. It’s not even like I want to hear what he’s going to say. It’s, I need to know what I should be thinking about this topic. And he’s the guy that I trust. Tell me what I should be thinking about it. And there are a few people in that account in different topics or verticals, and he’s definitely there in finance for a lot of people.

The interview is a lot of fun and the hosts stand out for asking great questions. Stuff you really want to know.

🎙️Matt Levine – Wall Street’s Art Critic (Making Media)

A couple of my observations:

1) The nerdcall. Matt recognized that weird, complex deals and concepts appeal to technical people broadly — whether they are in finance or not.

Very early on, my sense was that there is an expectation that weird complicated niche topics have only weird niche audiences and that doesn’t seem true. I think my readers, some of them are people who work in fairly technical areas of finance are like finally, I get to read about this fairly technical or like, I get to read about this adjacent technical area of finance that I find interesting because I work in a different technical area and I like technical stuff.

A lot of my readers work in tech and they’re like, “I don’t share anything about finance. I share about finance, I’m not that interested in it, but I like when you talk about complicated things. It’s like the aesthetic appreciation of systems and complexity and the moving parts of the economic drivers of deals.

My impression is that there are a lot of people in the world who want to read about structures and there is not a lot of writing. So they go, great, I get to read about the derivative, fabulous. So I don’t know, that’s sort of the answer to your question. If I were to explain a complicated thing it is going to be fine, like those are going to be good.

This overlaps with my observation of game nerds. I pulled this from an interview with game designer Raph Koster:

Finding real world systems and abstracting them or boiling them down to their essence isn’t actually a very common skill. Games can teach people how to do this. The idea involves setting constraints, modeling real systems, and allowing people to experience them within a game context to understand them deeply. It provides an opportunity for individuals to experiment with these systems, unlike in real life where, for example, you only get one shot at lifetime earnings. Playing a game that emulates this system offers lessons.

I believe that game-playing trains your systems thinking and reading Matt Levine does too. It’s a lot of “how would you expect this to behave at equilibrium and under what assumptions, but we actually observe X so what assumptions are broken or what did the model fail to consider that is true now but wasn’t before”. I give a few game examples in Lessons from Game Designer Raph Koster.

2) Matt explains the benefits and costs of the growing trend of “creators” becoming the farm team for the journalism world. He namedrops a great example —

(fun fact Kyla’s newsletter is the single largest Substack referrer of Moontower subs. Thanks Kyla!)

Levine:

I was just reading Matthew Yglesias this morning, talking about how the journalism career path that used to be, like a small town newspaper to a big city newspaper to The New York Times. And now you started a blog covering national politics and you move to The New York Times.

And I think from my entire time in media, the old model had been replaced by the model of you start at Gawker or Gawker, in particular, became like the feeding ground for media organizations. And now blogs have declined and creator stuff has increased and like Bloomberg works with Kyla Scanlon who’s this great financial content creator. And yes, totally, that’s the future.

I just think it’s easier for people now to just go to a place, you can talk about whatever that has a national or international platform and then they do stuff. And if this stuff gets traction, they’re like, we don’t need to work your way up. Obviously, there is something lost there. We’re like the advantage of being trained at a small town newspaper is you learn to report.

I find it helpful in my career that I started by doing law and banking. So that what I came with when I started writing was not just attitude and style. And there’s a risk, if the training ground for media is starting a YouTube channel when you’re 18 or starting a TikTok when you’re 18, then people will come in with less training, either in reporting or in a substrate that they’re talking about. The upside is that then you come in with the skills that are helping you to building an audience, there’s a trade-off there. I don’t come in with reporting skills, really.

Levine is validating a trend that traditionalists ignore at their own peril — public proof of work is a gate-keeper bypass. [Mark Andreesen discussed the nuance around this in the context of whether one should go to college.]

The trend is not without trade-offs but it’s also not going away. I’d bet on it accelerating. If a resume and references are your only proof of work that’s effective because there are plenty of opportunities that don’t require more. But writing, building, and creating publically are a lot of additional “interview-like” data points that expand the surface area of opportunity. But it’s work. There are no shortcuts anyway, you work one way or the other. (Reminds me of maintenance costs for a home — you can defer them and one day you’ll pay for it with a lower selling price or you can accrue them as they come).

If you’re drowning in info, a trusted source, curator, and really, a second brain, like Levine is saving you time and attention. Media companies understand the value of this. Many brands understand this. The marketing departments of the remaining companies will catch up. And in a world drowning in info, everything is sales. More value will accrue to trust. Feels like one of those big trends that is happening in the background that you can align with to your advantage.


Money Angle

I’m working on some investing education stuff for some friends and family. That led me to resume work on MoontowerMoney.com, a series where I explain how people should approach investing. The target audience I keep in my head is a fictional friend who has accumulated some savings, is not in finance, and has no process. Someone who keeps bouncing from one stock tip to another. Or doesn’t have a cohesive understanding of what the “investing problem” even is.

The goal of the series would be to either help them realize they can manage their own savings in a way that is mentally organized or maybe just realize they should hire a financial advisor.

I’ve shown many people in the past 6 months how to log onto Vanguard to simply buy t-bills. They didn’t know this was a thing. This ignorance is normal and understandable. Many people with savings don’t know how finance and investing work and many others find thinking about it a chore they’d rather ostrich.

This series is a 101 for understanding the nature of markets and risk and ultimately taking the reins in a coherent way that doesn’t require much maintenance.

This week I published the next section:

❓Where do investing returns even come from? (Moontowermoney)

 

Money Angle for Masochists

Just a few screenshots for your ponderance:

By @EMinflationista:

I’ll never be allowed on a crony committee:

 

Stay groovy ☮️

Moontower #198

I saw this tweet from David:

Everyone understands this feeling.

I heard an interview recently that discussed the psychology behind this behavior.

I’ll cut to the link:

🔗David McRaney on EconTalk

Episode description:

To the Founding Fathers it was free libraries. To the 19th century rationalist philosophers it was a system of public schools. Today it’s access to the internet. Since its beginnings, Americans have believed that if facts and information were available to all, a democratic utopia would prevail. But missing from these well-intentioned efforts, says author and journalist David McRaney, is the awareness that people’s opinions are unrelated to their knowledge and intelligence. In fact, he explains, the better educated we become, the better we are at rationalizing what we already believe. Listen as the author of How Minds Change speaks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about why it’s so hard to change someone’s mind, the best way to make it happen (if you absolutely must), and why teens are hard-wired not to take good advice from older people even if they are actually wiser.

The best teaser for the interview comes directly from it when McRaney says:

The incepting point of this book was someone in a lecture came up to me and asked about their father who had slipped into a conspiracy theory and they said, ‘What can I do about that?’

And, I told them, ‘Nothing.’ They said, ‘How do I change his mind?’ I said, ‘You can’t.’ And, I really felt, the second I said it, that: I don’t know enough about this to say something like that. I don’t even know if I believe what I just said, but I know one thing I don’t like this attitude I have about this issue. I should at least learn more about it.

And, if I was in that same situation today, I would actually be able to say, ‘Oh, here’s what you should do. Here’s what you should say.’ I no longer believe anyone is unreachable. I no longer believe anyone is unpersuadable.

In conversations that don’t work out the way we think, we blame the other side. We say, ‘They’re dumb. They’re mean. They’re evil. They’re ignorant. They are unreachable, unchangeable, stuck in their ways.’ These are all things that we are using to forgive ourselves for failing.

Listen to the interview. My excerpts are just what I wanted to keepsake. My notes covered:

  • motivated reasoning for social acceptance
  • the process of radicalization
  • reactance (or what I call “reflexive contrarianism”)
  • shaming
  • specific approaches that work to unblock discussions
  • “street epistemology”
  • cognitive empathy

If you do nothing else, zoom in on the “reactance “section which I titled this post for — that feeling of “F you I won’t do what you tell me” is ingrained and worth understanding.

If you know the reference, you know RATM. And just in case you’ve never seen it — the video below is a recording of one of their first public concerts. It was filmed in 1991 at Cal State Northridge. It’s a bizarre scene juxtaposing a routine day on a sunny campus quad against the band’s angry energy. An ice cream social with an a cappella group like Chorus against The Chaos would have drawn a crowd faster.

Zach is unfazed. By the end of Bullet In Your Head, the audience starts noticing. If you consider the state of rock just coming out of the 80s (Nevermind was released only 3 months before this performance) and the relative infancy of hip-hop this performance must have been pretty alien.

They would go on to release their debut album a year later and play a side stage at the second Lollapalooza.

They’d play the main stage one year after that.

[Unclassified personal thought: I like watching old concert videos. I’d waste one of my 3 genie wishes to have the power to peer into the present of the audience members I see in these old clips. It’s an escapable thought every time I watch them. Like knowing that skinny, shirtless viper with the long hair slithering to the groove is now bitchin’ about Blackrock makin’ his truck expensive to fill up. Mind you he’s a landlord in Laguna where he bought his first bungalow in 1972. Discovered the town after catching the Dead at the Newport Pop Festival a couple miles down the road a few years before that. A show he hitchhiked to from Indiana while running from the life the ”squares” back home had envisioned for him.

The brightness of youth casts a shadow — the finer rays suggest their own sorrows]


Money Angle

Last Wednesday in Investing With Your Hands On The WheelI beat my old drum that trading isn’t really something one does “on the side”. Trading is a business. And I am quite skeptical about the reward per unit of effort for playing Nostradamus in your investing portfolio. I know there are people who disagree with me on this. I’ll happily grant them their track records at face value but wave the plane with zits at them:

via Wikipedia

The quote:

I’m pretty much in the camp of “get a job where you can do this full-time if you really want to”. If you can’t do this but still want to explore strategies, then fence out some capital to play/learn/experiment…

For the rest of your assets stick with some kind of permanent portfolio implementation depending on your risk tolerance. You can follow folks like Corey Hoffstein, NomadicSamuel, Jason Buck, Lily for that stuff. InvestResolve guys too. All these tweet about it too and it’s all quite solid. I recommend this series by the InvestResolve team.

My gut feel is return-stacking/permanent portfolio for long-term DCA is probably the efficient frontier of work/return/risk triple axis.

If you insist on being active, there is a totally acceptable framing too:

But there’s no doubt that many people want to put their hands on the wheel and that has innate personal value (and that’s true whether it’s misguided or not). So in short I think it’s a tree:

  1. DCA permanent portfolio variant if you want autopilot
  2. If you want to put your hands on the wheel what does that efficient frontier of effort/return/risk look like where return also includes some illegible component of DIY satisfaction?

I should probably pull together a new Moontower wiki of permanent portfolio content that I like. It might be an insurance policy against me never writing the Implementation portion of moontowermoney.com

[I have all the material that goes into it collected and sorted but it’s a small book-level project that’s on the back burner]

In the meantime, I’ll dribble out some things that really resonated in this column. Today, I’ll point you more closely to the InvestResolve series I referenced in the above quote.

Adam Butler and his team at InvestResolve did a wonderful 12-episode Masterclass on the topic of portfolio construction.

  • I took notes on the first 8 episodes. I didn’t take notes for episodes 9-12 as they get into the weeds of quant methods, backtesting, and ensembles. I was more interested in a conceptual primer to risk parity as a portfolio construction method for diversifying across unique edges.
  • The notes include a link to the episode as well as a transcript

💡Most important ideas

  1. A more diverse portfolio has a higher expected risk-adjusted performance over time.
  1. Asset allocation is useful because it maximizes the number of independent bets in the portfolio.
  1. Those bets are independent are sustainable because they’re directly linked to fundamental economic properties.
  1. A risk parity portfolio is the most efficient portfolio if you believe major asset classes are fairly priced (ie their Sharpe or other measures of risk/reward are the same)

🔗InvestResolve Masterclass On Risk Parity (Link)

If you are short on time focus on the first 3:

Money Angle For Masochists

I saw a tweet:

Let’s set aside the obvious “just short bonds” response to a crystal ball that tells you mortgage rates are going to roof. While I’m not sure how volatile the 10-year note/MBS basis is, just shorting bonds would seem like the most direct and reliable trade.

The rest of the crystal ball portfolio underwhelms expectations. Ahh, a recurring parable in the “trading is hard” bible. Like if you knew what a stock’s earnings were going to be would you be able to make money? How do you know what the “whisper” number is or if the market is focused on guidance more than income for this quarter?

It also reminded me of 2 adjacent reads that cut to the heart of “how would you trade if you knew the future but not the path?”

  1. In Financial Hacking, a puzzle is presented:Assuming you could not trade options, how much would you pay to know the closing price of SP500 in one month?

    🧩Excerpts from the discussion

  2. Even God Would Get Fired As An Active Investor (AlphaArchitect)

Alexis reminded me of cringe times from my NYC days. Almost as cringe as referring to probabilities as deltas. As in “I’m 75 delta to meet you for drinks after my work dinner” 🤮

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Also, if you were never cringe about anything you have the heart of a dead fish and you should get that checked out.

@yayalexisgay

it’s not “banking” per se but… I mean, it’s all “banking,” really……. right? 🥴 🎥 edited by @Alex Moudgil #finance #comedy #dating

♬ original sound – Alexis Gay

Moontower #197

Just one link before we hop into investing topics.

For his 100th essay in his series “We’re Gonna Get Those Bastards”, Jared Dillian tackles the question:

How do you live a happy life?

It’s short and sweet.


Money Angle

Top of the Food Chain

There are lots of videos online of orca pods feasting on white sharks. What rattles the imagination is how they go straight for the liver. The liver’s bounty is a dense nutrient-rich oil called squalene that can account for up to a third of a shark’s weight.

Hopping over the semantic curiosity that benz and squal just adopt an “ene” to become oil words, I’ll skip straight to ruthless analogy. The pod shops in investing are top of the food chain in asset management. It’s said on the internet, so I know it’s true, that a single shark liver can nourish an orca for a “whole day”. First of all, if that’s supposed to be a jaw-dropping amount of nutrition call me underwhelmed. If a white shark a day keeps the doctor away, I’m left to think Shamu’s cursed appetite has no end — this is an aqua-treadmill of blood without a killswitch.

Which serves the analogy perfectly.

Squalene is alpha. There’s not a ton of it out there and the hunt for it mobilizes the top of the academic food chain. In 2000, I made $50k including signing and year-end bonus my first year out of college. That figure is 8x today for top grads accepting prop shop offers. Talent war.

The trading world’s ruthless focus on squalene — risk-adjusted returns while staying market-neutral to print money in any environment has been adopted by the investing world. And the allocators have noticed. The pods, like the orcas, are eating everyone’s lunch right out of their bellies. And those inflows are arming the war for mature talent too. Giant guarantees to proven managers. The kind of money that can get even the most ambitious manager to re-think starting their own firm.

With that intro, I’ll point you to a podcast:

Patrick O’Shaughnessy interviews Will England (Invest Like The Best)

Will is the CEO/CIO of Walleye’s $5B multi-manager hedge fund. I’m familiar with Walleye because they started in the mid-aughts as an option market maker. Several friends and ex-colleagues have traded for them. But this podcast is about their hedge fund, not the prop biz. It’s the best investing interview I’ve heard this year.

First of all, if you are unfamiliar with the multi-manager or “pod shop” pass-thru hedge fund model then this interview is a great primer. The big 4 managers in the space are Citadel, Balyasny, Millenium and Point 72.

Will’s language, tone, and thinking will be deeply familiar to folks who have done tours of duty at prop trading and option firms. My take on this interview is “damn, that was honest”. Will is in Minnesota but shoots as straight as a Chicago pit trader. Heck, he addressed the alignment issues with the “back book” — I’ve talked to pod traders about this idea before and couldn’t believe he broached the topic in this call). His voice was like a lullaby from my younger years.

Patrick asks the right questions. Everything from the knowledge to the story is worth an hour of your time. It confirmed a lot of what I thought I knew and taught me even more.

A few thoughts of my own

Will says 25% of their business is still options trading but a significant chunk is now fundamental equity. The PMs are trying to earn a 3% spread between longs and shorts after stripping away beta and factor tilts. Just like other pod shops, these guys are farming pure alpha or “idio” (for idiosyncratic) and levering it to get to about a 30% return which the investor hopes to see half of after implicit/explicit fees.

It has always struck me that this is the natural progression of active management. A barbell where you pay up for pure alpha and get your beta for free.

The closet beta active management world is a melting ice cube. But the incentives and stickiness of legacy relationships both from allocators and story-telling managers will try to keep the freezer door closed as long as possible.

But I can’t say I know where the equilibrium will shake out. If you have pure alpha, you can choose your investors either by fees or by preference. You have all the bargaining power. But I’m not sure what the capacity of alpha even is. Will didn’t mince words about the competitiveness. He thinks the number of PMs that possess both the chops and psychological profile to play this game is on the order of a thousand people maybe. The pods are flush with cash and signing talent with big upfront deals like athletes. (He admit the model could be in a period of froth at the moment). Will’s belief in market efficiency sounds like “efficiently efficient”. Yes, there are 10 Sharpe strategies. They are also low-capacity. Any strategy with an obnoxiously high Sharpes is basically arbitrage counting down to extinction. But that new species pop up and then disappear is a general truism. A never-ending game of whack-a-mole.

[Aside: Anyone reading Moontower for a long time knows I don’t wade into the market-efficiency debates because they sound like academic masturbation. I have my own version which rhymes with what Will talks about — The “No Easy Trades” PrincipleWhen I encounter someone who disagrees with this I hear one of these possible confessions:

  1. “I got rich on a highly concentrated risky bet and have never considered what the outcomes would be if I re-ran my life 100x”
  2. “I have no idea what I’m talking about”

I was out with a friend recently who ran a high-volume options trading business for 25 years. We talked about how nearly every time they would “exploit” some weird rev/con financing opportunity they found a way to get f’d by the borrow market. He could rattle off example after example of interesting set-ups and yet the outcomes were consistent. You’re literally paying to discover new failure modes but the way each setup arrives you feel like you can see why the opportunities are real.

Almost every time I did a trade and felt good about it afterward, I was in the pre-glow of a bad beat. The trades that feel scary are the ones that pay. And this makes sense — the price is compensation for doing what nobody wants to do. The job-to-be-done is finding a way to manage the risk until everyone who is transacting to satisfy their greed or pain is filled. The removal of that pressure is what begins to turn the trade in your favor.

Trading profitably is painful. It must be or there is no reason to be paid for it. what’s worse — just because you feel pain, doesn’t mean you will make money. The pain is the cherry on top of doing everything right. You can have pain even if you do things wrong and it will be in vain. The difference is when you do things wrong, you feel good about it in the interim because you don’t get how this works. And that fleeting satisfaction is what keeps you from learning.

I’m sorry but trading profitably means being constantly paranoid and finding a way to live with that. I suspect a subtle aspect of what makes the pods so smart is they have codified and automated the risk management in a way that guarantees the PM’s paranoia.

This is an aside because I think you need a lot of reps to grok what I’m saying and honestly most people will just go on pointing to things that don’t make sense and breathlessly exclaim “See the market is inefficient”. You don’t have a right to say that unless you tweet it from your yacht purchased with lots of receipts.

Strategically, in a game where the skill level is extremely high and evenly matched, then variance will drive a lot of the separation. So the counterintuitive response for someone dead-set on being rich but knows they are overmatched is to take a giant, high-variance bet and hope this was the lifetime it panned out.]

Sorry, back to the body.

In short, I don’t consider what these pods are doing to be investing. They are trading but on a medium time horizon. It’s called “fundamental equity” but let’s say the holding periods are under 2 years and probably more like 1 (if someone knows the stats please share) then this isn’t about “realized” fundamentals. This is about anticipating change in sentiment around expected fundamentals. This feels like a game of nearer-term info, flows, positioning, and game theory. A re-rating gameA game that was much more similar to what I did (although it sounds more complex than vol trading which has more to do with flows and is yet even smaller capacity) than what I imagine value investors do.

My thoughts on value investing are mixed. And I’m being liberal with the word “value”, recognizing that cookie-cutter implementations of “value” are the equivalent of accounting fails (like not updating the meta-principles to handle object-level changes in importance to things like goodwill or brand equity). I assume there are value managers who can spot high-multiple value names because they have a “g” column in their Pandas dataframe (just kidding — I meant in their spreadsheet — we are still talking about value investors here). The problem with these managers and their “long-term” theses is they want you to buy the brand name vitamin instead of the generic and when you ask for the quarterly bloodwork to see if it’s making a difference they say you won’t see the benefits until you retire. The blood results are just “noise” they’ll tell you.

On the other hand, if the manager’s signal reliably swamped the noise then they wouldn’t give that away. They’d try to get pod shop fees. Market efficiency is fractal — there’s a market for the assets and for the labor that moves the assets. I’ve alluded to this before in The Paradox of Provable Alpha and Will’s interview made me think it’s only going to be a more relevant paradox going forward.

Learn more:

🧵BEAT THE PODS: A 7-POINT RECIPE FOR SINGLE MANAGERS (Brett Caughran)

This is a long but good thread by @FundamentEdge

This pairs well with Ted Seides’ interview with Jason Daniel and Porter Collins, 2 of the investors made famous in The Big Short from their work with Steve Eisman:

🎙️Big Shorts and Big Longs (Capital Allocators)

These guys had a stint at Citadel where they learned the intricacies of the pod model. It didn’t resonate with them and for reasons that confirm my own interpretation — pods are more like traders than long-term investors. They had 2 big insights:

  1. The pod model is so prevalent (and it is smart) that if you don’t understand the dynamics they impose on the market, you’re playing with one eye closed. They have respect for the model (and how Citadel implemented it) even if it’s not their game.
  2. They realized the model left some forms of edge behind because of its nature. They could make picking that up part of their own niche. This is touched upon in Caughran’s thread above.

 

🔗Multi-Manager/Pod/Hedge Fund 101 (7 min read)

Byrne Hobart’s primer from his evergreen Capital Gains Substack

 

Money Angle For Masochists

I published a big post this week. Big enough that it warranted a map. You will get technical knowledge, some trading bits, and ideas that are worth assimilating into how you think about investing. In fact, you’ll even see opportunities that arise because of the different lenses investors and traders bring to markets.

The map:

Outline of the Risk Neutral Probability Lessons (Moontower)

And if you want to jump right in:

Understanding Risk-Neutral Probability (Moontower)

The post was the culmination of connecting lots of dots. I started thinking about it after watching a short YouTube clip on my flight to Vietnam back in March. I hope you enjoy it. I’m biased but think the points are underappreciated (or at least that’s how I justify the 30-40 hours I put into it).


A nice affirmation

I hadn’t looked at my website analytics in a while (it’s a bit more annoying to do so since a lot of the posts I wrote this year are these longer technical ones that I host on Notion).

When I logged in for a gander I found that several trading and brokerage firms are linking my material through their internal wikis or intranets. When I write these posts, I often see them as a useful aide for a senior trader who doesn’t feel like explaining some concept to a trainee. “Ahh, there’s some stoner blog called Moontower that wrote about this, just search for it on there”.

Anyway, it’s a nice affirmation. I probably won’t be thrilled when the LLMs are quoting me but ya know, it’s America — corporations are people, computers are people. Maybe only people aren’t people.