a sense of proportion around skew

Last week, we launched the Portfolio Visualizer in moontower.ai

It’s a tool for using vertical spreads to make directional bets.

Input: You enter a target price and expiration

Output: It shows you a matrix of every out-of-the-money strike combination up to the target in terms of what odds it pays.

A quick refresher on the utility of vertical spreads

I’ve written a lot about them but as a refresher, vertical spreads are clean ways to bet on a terminal price by a certain date.

  • You know your max downside so you can put them on without worrying about being shaken out of them by marks. I call this “risk budgeting” a trade
  • Spreads, especially tight ones, have largely offsetting greeks. When you use an outright option to bet on direction you are expressing a view on a basket of parameters in addition to direction — most notably volatility and its doppelganger time. You can be right on direction and wrong on the other parameters. Using options demands a view on volatility (ie the “volatility lens” I’m always droning about). Vertical spreads discard this requirement because the vol and time exposures are heavily neutralized.

The fussy reader will raise their hand, as they should.

“What about skew?

Doesn’t the implied skew impact the vol differential between the 2 strikes of a vertical spread?

How do I know if the odds are a good deal?”

These are awesome questions. Let’s get to work.

The goal: develop a sense of proportion about how much “high” or “low” skew impacts the odds

Payoff Visualizer

Let’s start with some odds.

We’ll look at the payoff odds for call spreads on SLV and USO etfs on trade date 2/25/2025.

We are looking at approximately .50d – .25d call spreads for expiry 4/17/2025.

In other words, buying roughly an ATM call vs selling a .25 delta call expiring in nearly 2 months.

SLV

Lower strike: $29.50

Lower strike implied vol: 24.9%

Higher strike: $32

Higher strike implied vol: 27%

Measured skew = .27 / .249 – 1 = +8.4% premium

The call spread is marked at $.57 vs a maximum value of $2.50 offering 3.4-1 odds if SLV expires above $32.

moontower.ai

💡Note that if the 32 strike’s implied vol increased, all else equal, the spread would decline in value, the skew premium would be higher, and the buyer of the spread would get even better odds. It seems counter intuitive but by increasing the skew and pumping up the 32 strike call, the market is saying 2 things at once:

  • the magnitude of the upside of the distribution is fatter (the call is expanding in value)
  • the probability or hit rate of SLV going higher is lower — you are getting better odds to be long this binary outcome

This seemingly offsetting sentiment makes sense. If the upside magnitude is higher AND the hit rate is higher then the stock price must also be higher. But if we hold the stock price constant and just move the implied skew, then we are adding clay to the middle & downside of the distribution AND the further upside BUT removing it from the nearer upside.

In sum, silver has positive call skew and the .50d-.25d call spread with 2 months to expiry offers 3.4-1 odds.

Now let’s look at oil.

USO

Lower strike: $76

Lower strike implied vol: 27.9%

Higher strike: $81

Higher strike implied vol: 26.9%

Measured skew = .26.9 / .279 – 1 = -3.6% discount

The call spread is marked at $1.59 vs a maximum value of $5.00 offering 2.1-1 odds if USO expires above $81.

moontower.ai

🔬What you should notice

USO vols are similar to SLV but the call spread .50d-.25 delta call spread is much more expensive (and pays less than 2/3 the odds of the SLV call spread). Skew is driving the disparity. In USO’s case, you are selling the topside call at discounted IV to ATM, but in SLV you selling a premium IV.

Weighing in on whether this is a structural mispricing of the probabilities is not where this post is going. That’s more of a research question. Knock yourself out, if you want to dig up the empirical distribution of returns. I can point to reasons why the skews look like this.

1) Spot-vol correlation

SLV vols tend to increase as silver rallies. Part of the precious metals as risk-off, fiat hedge rubric. Oil is a risk-on asset usually with demand for energy correlated with global demand growth. Like stocks, it has a negative spot/vol correlation. However in times of middle east geopolitical stress the spot/vol correlation can flip to positive.

2) Hedging

Producer hedging in oil markets tends usually involves buying puts or put spreads and selling calls. While consumers (ie airlines and refineries) are natural buyers of oil, their hedging requirements are typically swamped by producers.

[The vol inclined reader will notice that these reasons explain the skew but don’t rule out the call spreads being mispriced. The implied skew reflects the supply/demand for vol at various moneyness, but that’s not the same as saying the implied skew predicts the distribution. If you want to bet simply on directionality in a given time frame, taking advantage of the skew is a perfect use case for the risk-budgeted vertical spread. If you are not dynamically hedging, you are not concerned about the conditional behavior of vol as spot moves around.]

The key lesson of the discussion so far:

The level of skew, the percent premium/discount, is a major driver of the vertical spread price and therefore the payoff odds and implied probability.

An inferred lesson, that is not really surprising, is that different assets have different skews. Nobody is ever going to price a SPY surface with silver skews. Both the distributions and spot/vol correlations have different properties.

To develop a sense of proportion around how the range of measured skew affects payoff odds requires looking at assets idiosyncratic skew behavior. In moontower.ai, we display both time series for skew parameters as well as percentiles

Between knowing if the skew is “high” or “low” compared to history and seeing the payoffs in the visualizer we come to a practical questions that tie it altogether:

If .25d puts are in the 10th percentile vs the 90th percentile, how much is that going to change the odds offered on my put spread hedge?

If skew is at “average” levels what kind of odds should I expect on a 2-month .50-.25d call or put spread?

The remainder of the post will dive into these questions so you can walk away not only with a sense of proportion but be able to form your own rules of thumb so you can quickly handicap values like how much extra your paying for a put spread when skew is “low” or how much more your getting for selling a call spread when the OTM calls are cheap?

Here’s a few thoughts for everyone before we get to the paywall:

1) Tradeoffs

For a directional bet, I don’t really see which spread to buy as a question of “what’s optimal?” You’d need an very fine-grained view of the distribution to identify that. Instead, I see a menu of tradeoffs between hit rate and payoff which the matrix displays naturally. In fact, just looking at the screenshots above of the matrix is very educational.

The matrix is the view I’d construct ad-hoc when I want to take a shot. I didn’t map the whole thing but I’d I basically run the same payoff calculation in my head by eyeballing a bunch of strikes, perhaps according to which option markets were tightest or have meaningful OI for liquidity purposes. It makes life easier to just have it organized in a matrix this way.

2) The hips and the fist

In any fighting sport you learn that power comes from the hips. The fist is just conduit that channels the power. When thinking about a directional bet, the work really is upstream of the options. The options are just the fist. It’s the easiest part. Most of the alpha power comes from the directional analysis. Or sticking your finger in the air.

Developing a sense of proportion about skew

We need to do 2 things to answer the practical question of how much does “low” or “high” skew in name change the value of the vertical spreads in real-life:

  1. We need to see how much skew varies in a name
  2. We need to run extreme skew parameters thru an option pricer to see how the spread’s price range (and therefore payoff odds) varies with the skew parameter’s range

Skew Variation

I did a small study of 3 names with different skew properties. I looked at 3 years of data to find the .50d IV as well as the .25d put and call skew parameters for options with about 2 months until expiry.

🗒️Notes on method

a) I allowed a tolerance of 50-70 days until expiry (that means there wasn’t necessarily a qualifying expiry for each trade date but there’s enough data points to get the gist).

b) Skew parameter = .25d IV / .50d IV – 1 … you can interpret that as a percent premium or discount to the .50d IV.

If .50d IV is 30% and the .25d put is 33%, then skew = +10%

💡Sometimes you’ll hear the term “clicks” or “vol points”. In this example, a 10% premium corresponds to 3 vol points or clicks.

Let’s just jump to the data which I think is mostly self explanatory now that you know the definitions. For each name I show the scatterplot of skew vs .50d vol level for:

a) .25d put

b) .25d call

c) .25d put – .25d call risk reversal

Remember unless it says “clicks” the skew parameter is in percent of .50d IV

USO

QQQ

SLV

Substack’s not the greatest for delivering these charts but you can always right click on the image and “open in new tab”.

The charts are nice because you can see that skew can vary with vol level. That’s discussed in the “key observation” stickies. Those stickies also show how skew is not some abstract idea — its specific behavior matches the specific properties of the underlying asset. Sometimes oil panics up or down. The tech index doesn’t panic up (even if single stocks in the index might).

We can get lost in reflecting when our goal was to see how much the skew varies in a name. This table will make it clear:

We can ignore the risk reversal. I included it because it took no extra effort. Instead, let’s focus on .25 skew. Again, just eyeballing, we can see that the interquartile ranges for put and call skews are typically around 5% wide (silver is a bit wider). Meaning that from the median to the 75th or 25th percentile you are only talking about changing the OTM option’s IV by about 2 or 3% of the .50d vol.

So if median put skew in QQQ is 16.2% premium to .50d IV and skew blows out to the 75th percentile than it goes to 19% premium.

If QQQ ATM vol is 20% your talking about a put IV going from 23.2% to 23.8%

How if QQQ IV is in the 25th percentile?

If ATM vol is 20% then the put is 13.3% premium or 22.7%

If skew went from the 25th percentile to the 75th, the put vol increases from 22.7% vol or 23.8% or just over 1 click.

Is one click a lot?

That’s the question we’re after.

Put spread sensitivity

We can test this using a Black-Scholes calculator.

We can compute a 60 day .50d put at 20% IV vs a .25d put at 22.7% IV.

This represents “cheap” put skew in the 25th percentile.

We will do this on a hypothetical $100 stock.

The .50d put will be actually be in-the-money slightly as opposed to at-the-money.

[See Lessons from the .50 Delta option for an explanation]

We end up with the 100.50 strike vs the 94.50 strike. This $6 wide put spread represent the .25d wide put spread.

When the skew is “cheap”, the IV differential between the strikes is 2.7 vol points (ie 22.7% – 20%).

The put spread is worth $2.03

[The 100.50 put is worth $3.50 and the 94.5 put is worth $1.48]

If we raise the skew to the 75th percentile, the 94.5 put goes to 23.8% IV and a price of $1.62

The put spread drops in value to $1.89

Again, notice when the put skew expands, the put spread drops in value! The left tail is getting fatter but the intermediate down move is losing distributional mass.

This is the put spread as a function of the vol differential between the 2 strikes. As the differential widens (the smaller put increasing relative to the .50d put) the spread gets cheaper.

What happens in odds space?

If the put spread is $2.03 and can be worth as much as $6.00 a buyer is getting 1.96-1 odds.

When the put spread gets cheaper, the buyer gets better odds of 2.17-1

In probability space, you go from 33.8% to 31.5% probability of expiring lower by expiry.*

The put spread changed in value by about $.15 on a $2 put spread as skew went from the 25th to 75th percentile all else equal. Given the variation of skew in QQQ it’s like every 3 cents in the put spread is 10 percentile points.

I won’t step thru it as slowly as I did with QQQ but here’s oil put spreads varying from 5% to 10% to 15% skew for the 100-91.5 put spread (.25d wide put spread):

 
$8.50 wide put spread

Context is everything

When I was trading oil, a giant move in skew would mean, on a delta-neutral basis, a $5 wide spread would move 3 cents. If you made a nickel wide market on a put spread you’d be accused of making a market the broker could “drive a truck through”. In percentile space, you can see why.

But then again, you could argue that the exchange fees and broker commission represented a few percentile points.

If you are an options market maker, translating what low or high means to actual prices is important. It gives your market width context with respect to the surface parameters that you track. It lets you estimate how much edge you need to pad your market compared to how wrong you can be about how the surface might reprice.

On the other hand, if you are a purely directional trader the the difference in skew being low or high might be immaterial to your decision to take the odds unless your are able to discern probabilities down to just a few percent.

Now when you see a skew time series for a fixed maturity you know you can put the parameters in an option model and see just how much it changes the spread value.

You can derive your own sense of proportion customized to the context you trade in.


I’ll wrap by emphasizing that I’m writing from the perspective of mapping skew parameters to actual spread pricing. Trading skew on a delta-neutral basis because you think realized or implied vol will out or underperform as spot price travels across various strikes is a different animal. That is less about distributional outcomes and more about dynamic vol behavior. You care about what IV does when your vegas expand and contract, and what realized does as spot moves through your dollar gamma profile. It’s highly path-dependent. The opposite of a terminal risk-budgeted bet. In fact, the 2 different approaches can prescribe opposite trades meaning the risk-budgeted trader and the dynamic hedger can happily trade with each other. A classic example is the 1×2 ratio spread. The directional trader might use jacked put skew to buy a 1×2 put spread creating a highly attractive payoff profile in most scenario, while a dynamic hedger might be happy to own the 2 options because they expect vol to scream higher as the stock goes down.

For fun: What the most you’d be willing to pay for a $15/$10 1×2 put spread? The least? If you paid zero for it, can you lose?

Update 8/2025:

I was asked if I had written anything on the impact of events on skew percentile measures in the Discord. Sharing widely:

I haven’t, but most events are just one-day pricing problems. The effect of skew from 1-day pricing is heavily diluted if you are looking at 1-month skew and beyond. If you are looking at percent skew in like 1 week options, well all kinds of measurement issues anyway:

  1. IV on 1-week options alone is a hairy topic since assumptions about how much vol time remains become impactful. Which is why if I’m trading near-dated, I really just think in terms of straddles and the price of vertical spreads. For the latter if a stock is trading 102.50 with 3 days to expiry you simply ballpark that the 100/105 call spread should be about $2.50 which is about the same saying the 105 call and the 105 put are equal (HW: prove this with put-parity). All the weird lognormal Black-Scholes math really melts away in the short term and you are in the realm of common sense handicapper.

  2. The vega of options gets small in near-dated options so…maintaining a sense of proportion if important. If the ATM vol is 20% and the skew is 10% (ie 22 vol) vs 15% (23 vol) and the vega is 0.005 you haven’t even changed the value of the vertical spread by a cent even though the skew is 50% larger. I have written about this “sense of proportion” stuff. People get caught up in metrics that when you translate back into price space matter on the order of “it’s like paying an extra commission charge to IB on the trade”. In other words, if the difference changed your decision to trade, then the rest of your infra better be medical grade accuracy bc you’re trading for slivers.

we’ll all be selling placebos in the future

A theme that’s weirdly come up in a few unrelated private conversations with various tech foIk is how it will become very difficult to make money in the future. Like the meme that says you have 2 years to get rich because by then anything you can imagine will be solved with compute (ie electricity) and therefore capital. Labor will be worthless.

It’s a comically reductionist view but its directionality occupies a pied-à-terre in my brain. It’s a messy mental apartment. The thoughts are scattered:

  • I remember when the threat of mass automation was contained to autonomous driving. “Truck drivers should learn to code”. Now it’s the hair stylists who are safe (at least until literal robots take over) and everyone with an email job looks cooked. During covid, I wrote about how it felt so unjust that high-paid workers who sit behind a screen not only kept their jobs but thrived while anyone on the front-lines of humanity got ravaged. It was a deeply regressive crisis. At least an EMP tragedy would have been progressive. It looks like the universe now wants to atone for its prior path.
  • Interest rates, stocks, and home prices are all at their generational highs. But odds are if you read this letter you live in a town or city where the median homeowner affords their 7-figure mortgage with a W2 email job. If automation is deflationary are the most widely held assets entirely mispriced?
  • Is the correct game theory response to loot institutions, pump bags, and discount the value of reputation? Are long-term thinking and “compounding” overbid ideas? (I don’t live as if they are because to believe this requires sociopathic nihilism but I weren’t being paranoid about being sucker I’m probably blind.)

     

I’m harboring all these strange notions. Then, as an example of confirmation bias in real life, Liv’s tweet interrupts my mindless scroll.

 

My interest in the tweet is the part which gestures at market efficiency — “better than any human at maximizing their own capital”. It echoes the theme I opened with — that acquiring substantial capital in the future will become nearly impossible against a master robot race.

(The whole part of creating a human-centric economy is really about political choices. Issues like H1B visas, maternity leave, or how the tax code treats various forms of incomes/costs are the rules upon which American capitalism rest. These are democratically determined even if markets themselves are not democratic consensus mechanisms. That’s not the subject of my musing.)

So this skynet stuff is just floating around my consciousness, then I hear something that sparks a total right turn (not a 180° to be clear). I’m driving back from Placerville last weekend (strongly recommend Marshall Gold Discovery State Historic Park!) listening to Dwarkesh’s recent interview with “two of the most important technologists ever, in any field”, Jeff Dean and Noam Shazeer.

[Some background on them:

Jeff Dean is Google’s Chief Scientist, and through 25 years at the company, has worked on basically the most transformative systems in modern computing: from MapReduce, BigTable, Tensorflow, AlphaChip, to Gemini.

Noam Shazeer invented or co-invented all the main architectures and techniques that are used for modern LLMs: from the Transformer itself, to Mixture of Experts, to Mesh Tensorflow, to Gemini and many other things.

We talk about their 25 years at Google, going from PageRank to MapReduce to the Transformer to MoEs to AlphaChip – and maybe soon to ASI.]

Most of this interview was above my head and I admit my knuckle-dragging self only got halfway through before switching to Marc Maron interview Wolfgang Van Halen but this one section caught my ear before giving up:

One of the big areas of improvement in the near future is inference time compute, applying more compute at inference time. I guess the way I like to describe it is that even a giant language model, even if you’re doing a trillion operations per token, which is more than most people are doing these days, operations cost something like 10 to the negative $18. And so you’re getting a million tokens to the dollar.

I mean compare that to a relatively cheap pastime: you go out and buy a paper book and read it, you’re paying 10,000 tokens to the dollar. Talking to a language model is like 100 times cheaper than reading a paperback. So there is a huge amount of headroom there to say, okay, if we can make this thing more expensive but smarter, because we’re 100x cheaper than reading a paperback, we’re 10,000 times cheaper than talking to a customer support agent, or a million times or more cheaper than hiring a software engineer or talking to your doctor or lawyer. Can we add computation and make it smarter?

This entire way of reducing signal to tokens and computation made me think of investment alpha. It made me think of how financial innovation*, the cycle of hunting for alpha, alpha decay, and efficiency works.

Professional investment managers with teams of salepeople pitch their funds “alpha”. They used to just say “look, how much money we made” but now they have to adjust for beta or some other benchmark. Allocators get smarter. The process is uneven but the waterline of basic aptitude does inch higher. If the market is mostly free of captive frictions then the need for return and the quest to provide it finds a clearing price.

But what does that equilibrium look like in the future? Well, probably something like the way it looks now regardless of how efficient it gets. The paradox of provable alpha is a stable attractor whereby the average person in pursuit of excess returns gets a random number distributed around a fair return so long as they avoid outright stupidity (like investing in levered ETFs for the long haul).

An efficient market feels random. Not to throw another paradox out there but this is exactly what Mauboussin refers to in “paradox of skill”. When the competition is evenly matched, luck determines the outcome. The funds and their marketers who survive all tout information ratios and charts which suggest their alpha, net of fees, is persistent. The best we can probably say about them is they might be good enough such that the claim is a coin flip. If they were deterministically better than a coin flip, they’d be inaccessible or would charge enough to skim the surplus.

But it’s getting into the realm of a coin flip that is the answer to job security. If you’re good enough to have your results look random it comes down to story-telling and dinner. Your value here might not be in delivering true alpha, but if you find a buyer you have created value — by definition you have given someone what they want.

[There’s a piercing conversation to be had here about commerce in general. If I sell snake oil or astrology is my income compensation for creating value? GDP and capitalism say yes. Is profiting from misinformation value-creation? How far does this go? The conversation gets quite “nudgy” if you focus too much on “what’s efficient” vs what tradeoffs are we willing to tolerate and for what ends. There’s a continuum.

Disagreement about object-level policy is downstream of differences in where people lie on the philosophical continuum. Nobody says “you should be allowed to pollute for a profit” but should you be allowed if that’s what people want? You’d want a polluter, the one with the upside to bear the risk, but I doubt even that anodyne statement is universally acknowledged. I could just as easily imagine an uber-industrial view that the people asking for the product should be forced to live with the pollution. Feel free to use pollution as a metaphor for FUD, artificially constrained university admission, or whatever profitable hobby horse irks you.]

If capital-compute-fueled efficiency makes it harder to create alpha or more generally “value”, it still won’t take away the types of value that are not provable. Maybe the only jobs remaining will be selling figurative placebos.

Now are they gonna pay enough to cover junior’s riding lessons?

Fck if I know. Ask a robot.

I know I’ll still be listening to Van Halen like the peasant I am. There’s probably something to that.


[Expanding on the asterisk from above]

*Financialization is an innovation because slicing up risks to sell to their highest bidder increases liquidity. An liquidity is a “good”. Liquidity reduces the cost of capital for industry. You will finance more businesses if you believe you can sell your shares. Insurance and mortgages are concrete products of the abstraction known as “liquidity”. All of this liquidity is an instance of abstractions that sit even higher in the stack — specialization, comparative advantage, and the surplus we enjoy from trading, I mean “trading” in the positive sum cooperative sense, with each other.

This harkens back to the liquidity premium discussion in Why Investing Feels Like Astrology:

Liquidity Premium

@Jesse_Livermore’s work refers to an idea he calls “transactional value”. It is the value that permits you to pay more than intrinsic value for an asset because you know you could sell it back into a liquid market.

Here’s Jesse parsing intrinsic value from transactional value:

The intrinsic value of equities would be the cash flow stream of the equities themselves, which you can collect and they belong to you and you can spend them and do whatever you want with them.

The transactional value would be the value that comes from the fact that there’s this “network of confidence” in the market, that people have been doing this for hundreds of years and we know that when you wake up tomorrow, the S&P is not going to be at 500. It’s going to be near where it was yesterday and people are kind of anchored to where its price is…You can basically take all your money, 100% of it, and put it into the stock market and know that you’ll be able to get a lot of that out anytime you need to. That’s the transactional value, which is the premium.

The idea that liquidity commands a premium is not new. If you have any money in a savings account today, you are paying a liquidity premium in the form of negative real interest rates. The treasury market discounts off-the-run securities because they are thinly traded even though they mature to the same value as their on-the-run counterparts. But I don’t want to dismiss Jesse’s notion of transactional value because it’s not novel. His expression of it is illuminating. For example, currency is made entirely of transactional value. The fact that we can rely on it to trade warrants a premium entirely out of proportion to the value of paper that represents it.

Seasonal volatility

On Jan 28th, one of my favorite topics came up in the Moontower Discord: natural gas options!

I was asked why the VRP was so low.

Recall VRP is the comparison of implied vol (forward looking) to realized vol (backwards) looking. In this datapoint,

One month IV = 49%

One month RV = 86%

The strange datapoint is a perfect icebreaker for discussing:

  • seasonality (which happens to be most strongly expressed in natural gas)
  • a common pitfall (and potential correction) for VRPs

     

Background

Before discussing options, we need to understand the shape of seasonality and the fundamentals that drive it. I’ve said many times that I’m not a fundamental trader. That means I don’t position based on any views about fundamentals. But a basic understanding of fundamentals is necessary to make sense of why an asset’s vol surface looks the way it does.

Let’s begin…

 

A Brief Primer on Natural Gas Dynamics

Natural gas prices follow a seasonal cycle, with volatility peaking in winter due to heating demand and spiking again in summer due to electricity consumption.

Seasonality volatility

Winter is the most volatile season.

  • Heating demand: Cold weather drives demand
  • Supply constraints: Limited storage or pipeline capacity can trigger price shocks.
  • Weather uncertainty: Forecast swings can cause sharp market reactions.

Summer is the next most volatile season.

  • Electricity demand: Power plants burn more gas for cooling
  • Hurricane season effect on supply: Storms in the Gulf can disrupt production

The Storage Cycle

  • Injection Season (April–October): Gas is stored for winter, with October marking peak supply. If storage maxes out, prices can collapse.

    [In 2009, this was a major risk with the Oct $2.00 put price surging to an insane vols on extremely heavy volume. I remember feeling terrible for leaving my business partner to deal with that expiration on his own because I had to be in Mexico for my wedding week. He was able to join the festivities after making sure we weren’t going to need a cave to take delivery. I distinctly remember computing that the stretched IVs still never reached the extreme levels of realized vol that accompanied that expiry. On a hedged basis, every option except the ones where Oct gas expired were a buy. The market found the path of maximum pain.]

    Injection season is often traded as a package of futures of options known as the “J-V strip” based on their futures month codes. In trader language, the “ape-oct strip”.

  • Withdrawal Season (November–March): Stored gas is used to meet demand, with March marking peak depletion—low storage levels can drive price spikes.

    This season is also traded as a package — the “X-H strip” or “Nov-March”

…which brings us to the “widowmaker”.

 

March-April Spread: A Market Tightness Gauge

The March-April futures spread more affectionally known as the “widowmaker” or simply “H/J”:

  • High March premium: Indicates low supply and potential scarcity.
  • Weak or negative spread: Suggests ample gas and lower risk.

I’ve written at length about this spread and the options on it.

🔗What The Widowmaker Can Teach Us About Trade Prospecting And Fool’s Gold

You can learn a lot from its vol surface that can be applied to any asset with a “bubble” distribution. Moontower’s ever-so scientific definition: a price that most likely collapses but can reach any arbitrarily high price before it tanks.

🔗What Equity Option Traders Can Learn From Commodity Options

 

Supporting evidence in pictures

 

Exhibit A: Natural Gas Inventory 5-Year Seasonality Chart

Exhibit B: A historical snapshot of the gas futures term structure

Exhibit C: Realized vol by month

moontower

Exhibit D: Despite the strong realized vol seasonality the range of volatilities both across and within years is itself quite volatile.

Exhibit E: The March/April futures spread

The “widowmaker” expires this month. In commodity land, futures spread are usually quoted as near month – back month. So in a backwardated market the spread would be positive (ie March > April).

In equity markets the convention is reversed. The price is quoted as back month – front month. The charts below are from IB which uses equity market convention.

You can see the “winter premium” come out of the spread as April is now trading close to parity with March but the spread was negative (ie April < March for the past several months).

This is typical behavior. The spread usually goes to parity as the fear of a cold winter subsides. But it’s dangerous to short early in the season because the spread can go extremely negative (if you’re looking at the price using the IB quoting convention…which burns my eyes but whatever).

H/J 2025 future spread

Here you can see the spread for 2026. April is trading at about a 32 cent discount to /March (~10%). If next winter is mild, you’d expect the gap to close.

H/J 2026 future spread

In the below charts we respect tradition by using the quoting convention of March – April…you can see the destination of the spread is usually ~ 0:

This was the spread in 2007 when John Arnold became a legend stuffing Amaranth’s Brian Hunter’s attempt to squeeze H/J:

 

Option surface dynamics

Let’s see how these fundamentals influence the vol surface.

Skew Feature

🔀Inverted skew

Call IVs typically trade at premiums, often steep premiums to puts. Because gas is prone to squeezes it often maintains a “spot up, vol up” dynamic. On the downside, gas can find incremental demand via “coal-switching” whereby gas prices become competitive with coal as a input to electricity generation. This source of demand dampens vol as futures fall reducing the probability of a complete collapse in an oversupplied market.

This is a chart of Feb gas options (note that Feb options expire in January…in commodities the contracts are named after their delivery month not their expiry month). The curves represent roughly 2 weeks and 3 months to expiry. You can see the skew inversion.

💡Learning moment: Note how skew looks steepens when DTE is smaller. Much of this is an artifact of the X-axis being in strike space not delta delta space. Why does that matter? Because how “far” a strike is depends on time. If gas is $3.00, then the $3.20 strike is much further (ie lower delta) with 2 weeks to go than 3 months to go. Low delta options usually command premium IVs.

 

Term Structure Feature

📅Seasonality in the forward vols

We know that realized vols are higher in the Winter. Look at the vol term structure I pulled from the futures options via CME.

2 things to note:

  1. LNF6 and LNG6 slope upwards indicating a higher volatility than Q42025 vols. This makes sense those 2026 capture December and January coldness while LNZ5 December options only capture through Thanksgiving. This tracks, nothing weird.
  2. Those winter vols implied vols are LOWER than Spring 2025 vols (ie LNK5 or May). What the heck?!

You have 2 forces colliding from opposite directions.

a. We absolutely expect vol to be higher next winter than this spring

b. Deferred futures contracts don’t move as much as prompt ones.

In other words, the beta of those winter contracts to whats happening now is low. Today’s supply/demand balance for gas has only modest impact on future prices. This is actually a universal effect in commodity futures. This is easy to deomonstrate if we consider a long duration between contract months.

The price of oil today has little impact on what the 5-year future does. Which makes sense. Near term drivers of oil could be weather, refinery outages, shipping logistics, and the current economy. Longer term, oil prices depend on drilling projects, regulations, and the state of economy which is anyone’s guess from our current seat. A price spike today, can lead to more investment in oil, which would increase supply in the future. Nobody thinks that a near term squeeze should have an equal response in the deferred month.

The quantitive observation that deferred months have lower realized than near months is called the Samuelson effect. Stated otherwise, contracts become more volatile as expiry approaches

💡This is a strong effect as a contract travels from being a 12 month contract to a 1 month contract but effect is smaller as a contract goes from being 10-years to 9-year or from 20 days to 1 day. The schedule of how variance decreases as DTE increases looks like a curve. Hold this thought.

The stronger the Samuelson effect, the more downward sloping you’d expect the term structure. The fact that the deferred months are only slightly lower vol and the curve is flat actually implies an ascending term structure if you adjusted for Samuelson effect.

The schedule of how Samuelson unfolds has a tremendous impact on what you believe the term structure actually says. If there was zero Samuelson effect, then the term structure you see is the actual term structure which you are then free to extract forward vols from. That’s the case of equities where all the options are struck on the same underlying as opposed to each expiry referencing a different deferred future.

The stronger the Samuelson effect, the more true term structure and forward vols ascend. If your 1 year future trades at the same implied vol as your 1 month future despite the fact that the 1 year future is moving less, means that the market is implying more variance in the coming months. If there was no Samuelson effect than you’d assume a flat forward vol not an ascending one.

Armed with this knowledge, I present the UNG vols.

The bottom panel shows UNG vols ascending thru 2025, not descending like the futures options were.

UNG options are struck on a single underlying just like regular equity options, but that underlying ETF maintains exposure to the front month natural gas futures.

In the futures options, the January expiry references a deferred future and expires in December. It is an option that references a contract that will not be moving very much for the next few months, but will be whipping around like crazy near the end of its life.

The January UNG option is referencing a prompt future that moves around a lot and will converge to the futures option in the month of December when the ETF is holding the same contract January futures option references.

The key to translating the futures options vol into a UNG equivalent vol is a schedule for the Samuelson effect. This creates a model that allows market makers to relative value trade the futures options vols vs the ETF vols. (This was central to my strategy which required normalizing commodity vols into something that can be coherently compared to other vol surfaces).

Some food for thought:

✔️Instead of designating a Samuelson schedule, you can invert the problem. What Samuelson schedule needs to be true to make futures options and UNG options be relatively in-line?

✔️How does that schedule compared to how vol unfolded in prior years?

✔️In what ways is the fundamental context of this year different from prior years?

I’ll close this section with one more picture.

That is the forward vol matrix from UNG courtesy of moontower.ai on 2/4/2025

Recall this chart:

Winter vols average in the low 50s. The forward implied vols are pricing upper 50s. That is a normal premium and if you track the forward vols every day you’ll notice that winter vols 6-12 months out will price somewhere between mid 50s to mid 60s in the case that the upcoming winter supplies look tight.

💡Winter volatility is right-skewed so if the realized avergaes low 50s the median can be assumed to be lower but sometimes the vol is much higher than the 50s. You can see the “polar vortex” in Feb 2014. You can also see just how low the vol can be in the winter:

That chart shows how deferred forward vols are like fair point spreads but have giant error bars compared to the range of realized outcomes.

 

Additional thoughts

✔️Circling back to the question that launched the post: why was the VRP (ratio of IV to realized vol) so low on January 28th?

Like looking at VRPs after earnings it’s an instance of a VRP failure mode — you are comparing a forward-looking numerator to a backwards-looking denominator. As we change seasons, nobody expects the recent bout of volatility to repeat in the next month.

✔️An example of a trade I did in the mid 2010s

I don’t remeber the exact year but in the early spring, summer vols were getting smashed as producers were selling calls as part of large hedge programs, They were bombing summer call strips. For example, if they sell 5,000 J-V $5 calls they are selling 5,000 calls in each of April, May, June, July, Sep, Oct.

30k call options in total.

I don’t remember how many total calls were sold or how long the program lasted but at some point the vols looked quite tasty.

I eyed July 4 calls which a broker was offering for 10 ticks. 10 ticks = 1 penny. So to breakeven gas had to go to $4.01

A natural gas tick is worth $10 so each option cost $100. I bought 10k for $1mm of premium. Gas was trading in the low $3 range at the time. I decided the best way to manage the trade was to risk budget it instead of delta hedge it. The options were a very cheap vol but I didn’t want to invite the path risk of selling deltas on a grinding rally where a summer risk premium started to emerge if it was looking like a hot season. Instead, I would play for a spikier move. I remember pulling up some historical charts and figuring based on an admittedly low sample size that the chance was somewhere around 20% but if it happened I’d conservatively make 9-1 on the calls. I also asked some sell-siders about whether there was anything in the fundamental context that differentiated this year from prior years.

[There’s a concept I call “analog” years where some years look like others. “In 2007 corn plantings were at this stage by this time of year and everyone thought that summer was going to be hot and the vol surface liked like this”, etc.

I didn’t check on these things so much to ideate a trade as to just check if I was missing something baked into the common knowledge the underlying market when I’m reacting to a trade.]

All told, it was reasonable to risk $1mm in premium, all-or-nothing.

So did the calls hit?

No. But, I was right about the vols being low. It was still early spring and the futures weren’t going anywhere, but the calls stayed penny bid for the next month. A month elapses, spot goes nowhere which means the IV on the strike clearly increased.

From there I had choices, I could re-asses if I thought the vol was still cheap. If not I could roll the calls up, or sell some closer-to-ATM vols and still be long vol-of-vol. If I thought the vol was still seasonally cheap, I could roll them down and have more gamma as the futures started to roll up the Samuelson curve (ie move around more). The point is there was a new set of decisions but they have nothing to do with the original trade which was “buy the cheap vol, decide how to manage it”.

In the end I was right but didn’t make a sum of money that stands out in my memory. This is not especially unusual. Trading be like that.

Extensions to think about

✔️Earnings seasonality

Market-maker’s starting point for thinking about earnings straddles will be:

  1. How much has the stock moved on prior earnings dates
  2. How was the earnings straddle priced going into those dates

I expect they also consider earnings seasonality. If a retailer makes most of its money in Q4 then the process for pricing earnings won’t be uniform every quarter. The sample size of relevant earnings history will be even smaller as each year maybe there’s only 1 day that is a true analog for appreciating how many days of volatility should be baked into the earnings straddle.

I’d totally expect that the market handles this well. I’m just relating the idea of seasonal volatility to assets outside commodities.

✔️Ags and softs

It’s not surprising that I took the nat gas framework and pointed it at cotton, cocoa, sugar, coffee, soybeans, corn, and wheat. Each of these markets has its own idiosyncrasies. Examples:

  • peculiar option to future expiry mapping
  • seasonality drivers
  • concepts like “old crop” vs “new crop” which means Samuelson curves are discontinuous
  • import/export features => currency correlation considerations
  • unique natural flows

As a vol trader you are doing some mix of modeling and qualitative adjustments to estimate the implied forward vols in these markets.

💡It’s critical to understand how the distribution of variables that roll up to those numbers effect how the forward vol estimates are distributed…the weaker you think the Samuelson effect is the more you will be inclined to buy time spreads. Are you buying time spreads while your modeling of Samuelson is on the low end of its range? Then realize that your position is more vulnerable to near term stress than your headline greeks would suggest.

If you use percentiles to measure skew, vol or any other metric are you conditioning them on season?

Would it make sense to condition on the degree of backwardation or contango in the market?

Ok, I’m going to leave it there.


If you are interested in commodity vol stuff either directly or just to expand your own option-thinking toolbox check out:

the right bogey: trades that seem compelling but aren’t and vice versa

In value over replacement, I explained a handy feature of option theory or really derivative pricing broadly is it models important aspects of decision-making explicitly. Especially opportunity costs:

In options, the opportunity cost can be thought of as the risk-free rate. But the risk-free rate is an instance of a category we call benchmark.

Professional investors separate alpha from beta by benchmarking to an index. We can get fancier into benchmarking by using factors. Private investments can be subject to hurdles. All of these ideas are focused on the same question:

What is the marginal contribution of an action or intervention?

This is important because that’s what we compare the marginal cost to.

I discuss later in the post that structured products appear to have a compelling pitch by a sleight of hand. They prey on our “VOR blindness” when they announce that they can’t lose money. It’s a sales tactic that ignore opportunity cost. If I return 1% in a world with a 5% risk-free-rate or even 3% inflation I’m just falling for a real vs nominal illusion. My capital has lost ground despite the 1% gain.

[If you would buy these structured notes but be unwilling to spend your bond coupons on index calls you either don’t understand that you are doing the same thing in principle or you are saying I’d rather pay someone to do this. Either is ok to admit, just have your eyes open.]

In that example, making opportunity costs explicit neuters an otherwise compelling pitch. But this can also work in reverse. We can make an uncompelling pitch favorable.

I’ll give 2 examples from the trading world.

✔️Zero or negative edge trading strategies

You’re running a large delta-neutral vol book. It spits off tons of deltas as stocks move around and gamma varies. You need to continuously hedge. Assume your explicit and implicit (ie slippage) hedging costs are 10 bps.

Imagine you came up with a mean reversion stat arb strategy that had zero pre-transaction cost expectancy. Hell, pretend the strategy has -5 bps of expectancy.

Instead of facing the “street” on all these delta hedges you could internalize them by allocating them to the stat arb book. The book is nominally delta-neutral but might lose less in expectancy over some assumed holding period than constantly turning your deltas over on the exchanges.

In other words, a strategy that would be a non-starter from an alpha POV is worth doing because it loses less than the alternative. The bogey is not “we need to make positive edge” but the explicit cost of otherwise paying 10 bps.

By properly benchmarking our decisions, we have turned an uncompelling pitch to a favorable one.

[Real-life observation: Index Trader A is short QQQ gamma and Trader B is long AAPL gamma going into earnings and the stock has a big move down. Trader B needs to buy AAPL and Index Trader B needs to sell it. AAPL is 9% of QQQ so if the index book is 11x bigger than the single stock book and they have matched greeks, then the buy and sell orders would happen to pair off. But even if they didn’t the deltas between the 2 books would be virtually paired off and the firm would hedge the residual in the open market. This saves transaction costs and slippage on gross position sizes.]

✔️Option “dissection”

In the clip below (excerpted from the large screencast), I explain how market makers use synthetic and arbitrage structures like condors and butterflies to “chunk” risk by themes. They can then remove such well-defined strategies from their main risk view so they don’t have to hedge the greeks they spit off.

It’s not alchemy as far as edge. It’s simply splitting your risk into those that can be safely cordoned off vs ones that need more management (open ended exposures to vol or higher moments of the distribution).

In a large options book you have all this open interest because you got paid to buy or sell it at one point. But now it’s just stale inventory. You have no view on it. It’s effectively random risk. But it’s expensive to flatten it all.

[Actually it’s incoherent to do so. The whole reason you have a business is because someone needs to warehouse the risk that arises due to a mismatch in timing and desire — hedge fund A wants to buy puts on Tuesday and mutual fund B wants to sell calls on Thursday. Your role is to trade with both of them and manage the vertical spread they’ve effectively foisted on you. Sequentially to boot. You were forced to be short vol for 2 days in the interim.]

Your risk management logic looks like:

a) I need to hedge

b) Hedging is expensive

c) Can I reduce hedging costs proportionally more than the risk of being less hedged adds?

In other words, your risk management criterion is against an inevitable cost. The hedge is not positive expectancy, it just needs to reduce risk at reasonable cost or reduce costs without adding risk.

Dissection reduces costs without adding risk (although it changes the shape of risk. If you are indifferent to the new shape it gives you choices and those choices need not have anything to do with being profitable — they just need to lose less.)

Moontower “Blaster” Tool

We talk quite a bit about how options are about volatility and looking at them with only a directional lens can lead to nasty surprises. Like buying puts, getting the stock’s collapse correct but still getting rinsed because you paid too much for vol.

Unhedged vertical spreads offer much cleaner ways to use options for directional trades.

Spreads:

  • involve buying one option and selling and other so you can sterilize much of the vol risk and greeks.
  • have defined risk and payoff allowing you to size the trade to a max loss budget. I call these trade expressions “risk-budgeting”
  • are distributional bets that are loaded on the probability of an outcome (as opposed to their opposite…a naked tail option which is less about probability and more about the distance the stock and travel and vol of vol). Spread bets can be thought of like sports bets. Binary or discrete scenarios while outright option trades are a 3D plot along 3 axis: timeimplied volatility, and stock move.

I explain them in both theoretical and practical terms in:

a deeper understanding of vertical spreads (10 min read)

After reading that you can expect to automatically start translating the price of vertical spreads into implied probabilities.

[By comparing the cost of the call spread to the max payout based on the distance between the strikes we can compute the probability of the stock expiring above the midpoint of the spread.]

Today, I’ll show you the mockup of a tool we are shipping to moontower.ai in the next week or so. Calling it the Blaster for now. Subject to change.

The Blaster provides a quick answer to a practical question that takes the form of:

“What’s the best bang for my buck if I think IBIT gets to $100 by Jan 2026 expiry?”

[IBIT is the spot BTC ETF and with a current BTC/IBIT ratio of about 1740, $100 IBIT corresponds to about $174k in BTC.]

On 1/28/25 I fetched the Jan2026 options chain for IBIT (price ref = $57.97).

We look at every combination of OTM calls up to the $100 target price.

“Buried treasure” pricing

The tool aims at the simplest trade prospecting idea — what risk/reward is the option market offering me on betting on an outcome? I’m going to bury the chest in my backyard and dig it up in a year and see if all the premium rotted away inside or if it multiplied.

The tool quickly reveals the tradeoff between hit ratio and payoff. In the highlighted cells you can see that both the 80/95 call spread and 76/100 call spread would pay 5-1 if IBIT expires at $100.

The 76/100 call spread costs more than the 80/95 call spread but also has a higher probability of salvaging some of the premium spent. No free lunch. But the tool highlights the frontier of tradeoffs between payoff and hit ratio so you can be surgical about which spread suits your need. For any pair, you can specify the premium your willing yolo and it will tell you how many spreads to buy.

Butterflies and implied distributions

If vertical spreads imply probabilities butterflies, which are spreads of spreads, imply distributions by imputing a probability density at each strike.

Covered in multiple places:

  • a deeper understanding of vertical spreads (10 min read)
  • What The Widowmaker Can Teach Us About Trade Prospecting And Fool’s Gold (10 min read)
  • Path, VIX, & Hit Rates vs Expectancy (14 min read)

In practice, it’s uncommon to have a beautifully smooth vol surface looking at mid-market prices. The calls on one strike could be leaned down, the next strike leaned up compounding errors when you measure spread prices from bid to offer. Snapshotting option chains and jagged data artifacts be like pb&j. That said, it’s not a major issue unless you’re a market maker who trades for ticks by ironing out kinks. Since I grabbed the spread prices I figured why not look at the butterflies and cumulative distribution based on that Jan 2026 option chain.

Because of the artifacts I’m not suggesting there is any opportunity in the below chart. However, if this was a reflection of tradeable prices down to the penny I can at least demonstrate what a kink in the surface looks like in price space (as opposed to via an IV skew).

The cumulative distribution suggest that the probability of IBIT expiring above 73 is a bit higher than what a smooth curve fitted to the call spreads would suggest. It actually looks like 70 thru 73 strikes are relatively expensive compared to the 74 strike which is pulling up the implied probability of S>$73.

In the butterfly density chart, the butterfly with 74 as the meat (ie the 73-74-75 fly) is jacked. What does that mean?

The 73-74-75 call fly = 73 call + 75 call – 2 x 74 call

If the fly is “expensive” that means the 74 call must be “too low” algebraically. If the 74 call is too low then call spreads that “sell the 74 call as the higher strike leg” are relatively expensive.

All of these observations translate to the probability of the stock being above 73 strike is relatively high compared to the probability of the stock being above 74. The probability dropoff is not “smooth”. It’s discontinuous.

So if the 74 call is low, then on balance you’d prefer legging spreads that “buy the 74 strike”.

Note how the 72-73-74 call fly is worth zero on the chart. Again, fly algebra — the 73s are “too high”. The meat is expensive in this case. 2x the meat is worth the same as the wings? Makes no sense…the least a call fly can be worth is 0. Buying the 72s and 74s to sell the pumped 73s to leg the fly for zero or even a credit is an arbitrage.

Again, I’m not presenting anything truly actionable to a retail trader. This is the realm of vol surface computations and bot orders done on high performance hardware. You’re not click-trading into these things. But it might connect the dots between how relative value trading relates to flow inflecting parts of an option chain. All these little point spreads and parlays getting whacked and lifted because they’re off by a penny.

[For those of you who had the chance to play StockSlam I think you might have gotten a more visceral feeling for arbitrage trading but at a human speed].

💡How payoff is calculated in the cells

[distance between strikes]/[spread cost] - 1


Wrapping up

The tool will be available to moontower.ai subscribers under the Pro plan. The screenshot above was my Excel prototype.

[Puts on a suit and tie]

Ahem:

The Moontower Community is a Discord (launched on Jan 1) and as a reminder all Pro subs get free access to the Substack paid posts.

Eagle-eyed chart reader

Benn posted a great question:

First, there are many responses in the thread that bring up terrific points regarding how taxes and transaction costs would treat these strategies very differently. Those were the caveats I thought of too.

But there is a glaring issue that’s very hard to spot. It did not pop out to me nor many others.

Try to find it yourself.


Alright, I’ll hand it off to Nick, one of the few who saw it right away:

What’s tricky about this comes back to what Benn says…it’s not an intentional chart crime. We probably get fooled by this all the time. As Nick and Benn explain in the thread, the trick is to use log scaling on the y-axis because we are dealing with a compounding (ie exponential) process.

Let’s do that.

Step 1: Extract the returns at annual intervals using plotdigitizer.

I pasted the chart in the app, labeled the axes, and simply click on a date in early January each year. The app returns the x and y coordinates for export. (It’s tedious because I had to do it for each line separately but I think you can buy the software and it will auto-trace it.)

Step 2: Chart in Excel

I simply charted the tables starting from the start of 1998 when the lines were about to start diverging (I re-denominated all the data back to the start of 1998). Here you can see both the 1998-2023 chart on the original Y-axis and on a log Y (base 10) axis:

The log scaling reveals that the early lead of the call overwriting-strategy does not widen over time as the original chart suggests. In other words, all the gains were in the beginning.

This is not surprising to option traders. Vol selling has been wildly in vogue since the current millennium became a teenager. The asset management world noticed that it performed well and then created a ton of product based on those results.

Using the same data, here’s a rolling 5-year CAGR which shows the story. The yellow section is the outperformance/underperformance of call-selling vs buy-and-hold.

 

The broader lesson: your eyes will be more trustworthy, if you plot compounded returns with log scaling.

 

💡Learn more

years worth of option education in under 90 minutes

A few days ago I got the idea to do a screencast where I use an option chain and greeks explain a bunch of vol trading concepts.

None of my front-ends really look like what I had in mind so I spent Wednesday building a minimal viable version to allow viewers to look over-my-shoulder as I explain some stuff.

On Friday, I just turned the camera and started blabbing. No prep. I had an open afternoon so no time constraint. I just let it rip. On a Twitter livestream.

I hear it was helpful. I decided to call it Years worth of option education in under 90 minutes. That was the most click-baity title I could give it and still live with myself.

I re-watched it to chronicle what you actually can learn. Turns out it’s a lot of stuff that’s pretty hard to come across if you haven’t spent time on a prop desk.

Give it a gander. Love to know what else can help.

Modeling a vol curve

  • Computing a forward
  • Specifying a vol curve with standard deviation gridpoints
  • Computing the gridpoints
  • Inputting skew parameters at the points to fit the market
  • Using Excel’s linest function to get the coefficients of an n-order polynomial
  • Using the curve to estimate IV for any strike

Option valuation

  • Implementing Black Scholes for European-exercise style options
  • Includes greeks and N(d1) and N(d2)
  • Numerical methods for estimating gamma and theta

Interpreting skew

  • How large skew values lead to counterintuitive probabilities as the implied distribution balances probability with magnitude
  • Using vertical spreads to see the implied distribution
  • Changing skew parameters to watch the spread prices change and the distribution shift
  • How skew “corrects” the Black Scholes distribution to match empirical distributions
  • Comparing implied distributions to “flat sheet” distributions

Understanding vol changes day over day

  • The difference between fixed strike and “floating” strike vol changes
  • How fixed strike vols change arise from the interaction of spot moves and skew parameters change
  • Why fixed strike vol changes drive your p/l

Dissection

  • How market makers actually use classic option structures and synthetic relationships
  • Option traders “chunk” their positions to understand them just as seasoned chess players don’t see random configurations of pieces but see “mini-themes” that they understand deeply. For option traders these themes are structures like butterflies and condors
  • How market makers “take structures out of the position” to minimize hedging costs

Decomposing vol p/l from greeks

  • Learn how to use your gamma and theta to estimate the realized vol portion of your p/l
  • Learn how to use your vega to estimate the implied vol portion of your p/l
  • See how delta p/l comes form options and share positions
  • Understand how the tug-of-war between gamma and theta relates to the stock’s move on the day

Uncategorized

  • Pulling market data into Excel
  • why the late 90s tech bubble was not irrational and how option markets understood that
  • bubble distributions from the lens of the option market
  • Put-call parity
  • An intuitive way to estimate gamma p/l from middle school physics math: delta = velocity, gamma = acceleration, price change = time passage, and distance = p/l
  • This shows why p/l is a function of the stock move squared

how an option trader extracts earnings from a vol term structure

Earnings are a highly concentrated source of volatility for public companies because besides reporting results they give guidance on the future, discuss what they are seeing across business lines, as well as risks and opportunities for growth. Earnings reports are a rich source of information and in the Claude Shannon sense of the word, information is volatility.

As expected, option prices that include the earnings date command a premium implied volatility as the market expects the stocks to move on the burst of new information. The observation of a premium earnings IV leads investors and traders to important questions.

  • How much is the premium? In other words, how do I disentangle the amount of volatility that is “normal” vs the amount coming from the market’s expectation of how much the stock will move?
  • If I am a volatility trader focused on the relative value of options between names or I am a dispersion trader who cares about the relative vol levels between and index and its components how do I compare the volatility between a name with earnings (or a event specific to the name) to other names?

Our task is beckons. We must extract earnings from the vol surface.

That probably sounds like a tedious, quanty operation. But it’s not. It’s actually a pretty simple procedure once you understand the building blocks. In fact, the procedure is an implicit review of 2 main topics. Because this topic encompasses* the prior topics it acts as a test of your knowledge as well as a step forward.

Prerequisite Building Blocks

I won’t review the building blocks here but I’ll point you directly to the relevant calculators which document the procedures.

1) Implied forward volatility

Given 2 expirations we can effectively subtract the volatility of the near dated expiry from the later dated expiry to imply a forward volatility or the amount of volatility implied in between the 2 expirations.

2) Event Volatility Extractor

When the market anticipates events like a stock’s earnings date, it often factors increased volatility into the affected option expirations.

Traders analyze this implied volatility by separating it into the volatility for the event day itself and the typical daily volatility.

To do this, a trader estimates an expected move size for the event.

The unintuitive impact of events

It’s worth emphasizing how important events to understanding an option surface. It’s one of those things that intuition is a poor guide to. The arithmetic is worthwhile.

Consider this situation.

A straddle has 40 business days until expiry. The name typically moves 1.5% per day. We’ll just use trader math to estimate a fair annualized volatility of 24% (1.5% x 16 because 16 is approximately √251).

However we get 2 new pieces of info.

  1. The IV is actually 36%
  2. Earnings occur in 35 business days.

We can estimate an earnings vol by acknowledging that term vol includes 39 “regular” days and 1 “event” day.

We presume that a regular day has 24% annualized vol. So what “event vol” makes the term vol worth 36%?

We are basically solving for what event vol reconciles these facts given that we know the average vol (the term vol) and the “regular” vol.

[Keep in mind variances are additive but not volatility. Variance is simply vol squared.]

Term variance = regular variance + event variance

.36² * 40 days = .24² * 39 days + X² * 1 day

Solve for X.

x = event vol = 171%

The event is a 171% vol event for a single day but this is in units of annualized volatility.

Convert back to daily volatility by going in reverse — divide by 16. (I’m resisting a reference to the Spaceballs vacuum scene).

171%/16 = 10.7%

Remember that’s now a daily vol (aka standard deviation). We should convert it to a straddle as a percent of the underlying because that corresponds to the what people actually talk about — “expected move size” on earnings.

Just multiply by .8 since a straddle is the same as the mean absolute deviation.

.8 * 10.7% = 8.6%

[To review, see 😈The MAD Straddle]

Let’s take inventory.

  • The stock moves 1.5% per day which would correspond to a 24% vol name.
  • However, the vol is 36% implying that on earnings it’s expected to move 8.6% on that single day.

The variance coming from all regular days is 39 * .24² ~ 2.25 (unitless, unintuitive number)

Event variance is 1 * 1.71² ~ 2.94

Despite earnings being 1/40 or 2.5% of the weight in day terms, it’s 2.94/(40 x .36²) ~ 57% of the total variance until expiry. That day has more option premium associated with it then all the other days combined. The bulk of the straddle decay occurs on that day.

This also means the theta of the preceding days is lower than you think. In practice, what happens is the vol creeps up every day offsetting some of the model theta. You can think of a glide path where as you get closer to earnings the average vol per day increases as “low vol days” peel off and the earnings day drives bulk of the straddle. This same mental image can help you understand why an event very far in the future doesn’t show up so strongly in the terms structure — its impact is diluted by the sheer quantity of regular days before it.

[These concepts underpin the trading strategy known as Renting the Straddle.]

* See educator and MathAcademy architect Justin Skycak’s explanation of encompassing vs prerequisite graphs as well as Principles of Learning Fast


Now you are convinced that this is some part important, some part interesting and you already have a taste of the most complicated math it requires (6th grade). We just need to pull it together.

Extracting earnings from a term structure of implied volatility (as opposed to a single expiry) requires using our building blocks in conjunction. The same technique can be extended to multiple earnings as well as any kind of event.

This is a good time to remind you that much of the trading is about making apples-to-apples comparisons. Normalizing data so that the comparisons are relevant is so much of the work to be done. It’s more grindy than sexy. But it also shifts the focus from what novices think investing is about to the work that actually needs to be done — measurement not prediction or “seeing the present clearly”.

As we step through an earnings extraction, I will point to real-life examples of what I mean by measurement not prediction.

A few selling points on this post:

  1. The building blocks do the heavy lifting so this won’t take long.
  2. The yield is insane — this is one of those topics that opens lots of mental doors.
  3. I provide a link to a spreadsheet so you can play with the ideas yourself or extend them as desired.

An “ugly” term structure

I fetched .50d IV’s for NVDA at end-of-day 1/17/25.

 

This is an ugly term structure.

There are 2 primary reasons.

  1. Market widths and leans in option bid-ask will shop up as artifacts in your surface fits.
  2. There are events in the option surface. Most notably there is an event embedded in the 2/28/25 expiry. We know that because the IV jumps 10 points from the prior week.

Option market makers are like blue-collar household help. Their job is to “iron out the kinks”. Buy the cheap IV and sell the expensive IV when they see a wrinkled term-structure.

But if you did this by looking at the graph, you’d be selling the following expiries:

  • 2/28/2025*
  • 6/20/2025*
  • 9/19/2025*
  • 1/31/2025

You’d be buying:

  • 2/21/2025
  • 1/24/2025

Here’s the term structure again but we simply change the x-axis to DTE instead of expiry and annotate our naive buy and sell axes.

The forward vol matrix is a granular way to get the same idea.

I’m obviously using leading words like “naive” to indicate something important is missing which is creating all these kinks.

We are going to address the most glaring kink, the 2/28 expiry which jumps 10 vols from the prior expiry and showing up as a 1 week forward vol of 80%. The other kinks are naturally handled from the transitive logic of how he handle the big kink. Always handle your big kinks first ;-P

Accounting for events

Your reflex when you see a bump in the term structure is “what known event is happening between the expiry dates?”

In this case, NVDA report earnings on Wednesday, 2/26/2025. The 2/28 expiry “captures” earnings most acutely. The earnings vol is embedded in every expiry from 2/28 and beyond it’s impact is attenuated as DTE grows. That earnings even becomes a smaller percentage of the total variance in the term. If you are looking at a 5 year option, the earnings vol will be invisible whereas the 2/28/2025 expiry has the bulk of its variance coming from that single day.

Here’s the plan.

1) We use the event volatility extraction formula which takes in DTE, IV and a guess for the event straddle (ie move size) to translate all the vols with earnings into “ex-earnings” vols. I’ll use the terms “ex-earnings vols” and “base vols” interchangeably.


💡A note on nomenclature

I’ve heard “ex-earnings vols” called:

  • clean vol
  • base vol
  • regular day vol
  • non-event vol
  • non-earnings vol

The point is that you are looking at a surface where known events have been removed. This allows higher fidelity comparisons between names. The event that is extracted is an implied or consensus move size. If you buy a vol with an event inside it you might be betting on the base vol being too low OR you believe the consensus move size is “too cheap”. Isolating what your betting on comes down to trade structuring. Maybe it’s a calendar spread, maybe it’s a “rent the straddle” glide path trade.

Depending on your trading lineage, even this nomenclature can be confusing. In my background I also referred to vols using a 365-day tenor as “dirty vols” and vols implied from a custom tenor as “clean”. For example, if you treat holidays and weekends as a 25% variance day your tenor will be about 280 days. I don’t want this post to encompass too much, but if you’re a glutton see Understanding Variance Time.


2) We can now chart the term structure of the base vols and feed them back into the forward vol matrix!

The goal of the guess is to see a smoother chart and matrix. Smoother. Real science-y stuff here.

Based on simple guess-and-test (which is easy to do with the spreadsheet I’ll provide) I came up with an earnings straddle of 6.5%.

The matrix looks much better (the smaller kinks are still present since we only dealt with one, albeit large event, but I’ll address that later. It’s easier to focus on one major thing at a time.)

Notice how the 2/28 expiry, stripped of earnings, now follows a gentle up-sloping term structure instead of stickin’ up like a sword from a stone.

[Bonus observation: power law functions handle vol term structures well. Remember a power function can be converted to a line using a log-log transformation where your variable Y is vol and X is DTE so you can fit a linear regression. You can start to imagine a wider infra where you have a well-defined event calendar, extract implied events sizes everywhere, and fit base vol term structures to identify kinks, ie buy and sell signals. As it dawns on the reader what relative value vol trading looks like. Throw in layers of execution topics and you can see the basic truth — there isn’t any magic sauce it’s just fastening a thousand submarine doors before the thing can go anywhere. And every day the state of the art of little door details inches up.]

Let’s see the chart if we try 5% and 8% earnings move respectively. The first chart keeps the dirty earnings curve and ex-6.5% earnings curves for reference.

The second chart zooms in.

And the matrices:

If you assume an 8% earnings move, the 2/28 expiry looks cheap. If you assume 5%, it looks rich. The first step is to find what makes the curve look well-behaved and then based on your view on base vol, earnings vol, or both you can isolate how you should trade it.

Beyond a single event

Even with the adjustment, I’d readily admit the term structure is pretty kinky. But the ugliness is useful because it’s an opportunity to step-through what actually happens in practice. Let’s talk about how to iron the kinks that remain and see what’s left over.

Let’s step through some notable points on this chart. I’ll be clear in my explanation but I’ll do them a bit out of order.

Point #1: This doesn’t stand out as being too cheap relative to the rest of the curve because there’s no reason to assume that upward sloping-term structures are “wrong”. But there’s a technical reason it might appear so low…these vols use a 365 day model. This snapshot is taken on Friday. Vols “appear” to go down on Fridays and shoot up on Mondays but its a sawtooth artifact of a model which treats every day equally. This is explained thoroughly in Understanding Variance Time.

Point #2, a thru c: The 1/31/2025 expiry is a busy macro week — inflation data, jobless claims AND an FOMC meeting. If we extract event straddles from this expiration the base vol will fall to line up much better with the power function. The expiries behind it (b and c) also contain that busy week but its effect will be diluted while contains the brunt of it. So will be higher than a but less than c which will fall the least. See how it’s creating upward steps!

We’ll come back to #3 and #5.

Points #5 and #6: June and September expiries. Notice June has a bigger bump than September. Have a guess?

Earnings! Although the earnings dates are in May and August they fall AFTER those expiries and are captured by the following month!

via Wall Street Horizon

September has a smaller bump than June is because it’s further out in time. The impact of a single day move is proportionally smaller for a longer-dated option than a shorter-dated one.

Back to #3: This is the 2/21 expiry. This one is interesting. If we impose a lump of variance for FOMC week while it definitively has a larger impact on #2 a thru c, it will still have some impact in the 34 DTE 2/21 expiry which means as low as it looks, it’s even cheaper than it looks. If the snapshot is accurate, 2/21 looks like a candidate to buy vol. If you thought earnings vol looked “expensive”, you could sell 2/28, buy 2/21, then cover your 2/28 short as 2/21 expired. When I say “you” this is pros who’d kick their grandma down a flight of stairs for a tick of edge. You can throw trades like this onto the pile of tiny edges. I doubt the juice is worth the squeeze for retail. However, if you are looking to buy or sell options outright, then understanding this can help you on the margin. It’s a “I’d go for it on 4th and 3 but not 4th and 5” type of knowledge.

[An alternative thought…does the week before earnings structurally deserve a lower vol because the chance of the company saying anything material is close to zero? It’s good hygiene to wonder what you’re missing whenever something looks cheap or expensive. If you cleaned up all surfaces for events would you find the week preceding earnings to look cheap across the board?]

And finally #4: The 3/21 expiry looks expensive even after adjusting for earnings. Again, you’d want to doublecheck the vol returned by your snapshot.

If you thought earnings were expensive, a more oblique way to express it would be to buy #3 (2/21 expiry) and sell #4 (3/21 expiry) which corresponds to a 51.5% forward vol NET of adjusting for earnings. Most of that “value” does seem to be driven by 2/21’s cheapness rather than 3/21’s expensiveness (something you can notice by observing how the 2/28-2/21 forward is more stretched than the 3/21-2/28 forward despite us thinking when we anoint 2/28 as fair. This can inform your weighting of a calendar — you sell 3/21 maybe you buy twice as much 2/21 if you think that’s the best leg. This is where having additional info about the flows that are pushing options around and the general “art” of trading is apparent.)

Pretty pictures

If you clean every event, iron out all the kinks you might just find a well-behaved curve. “Listen” to the market carefully It’s a call and response:

You: “Look a kinky opportunity”

Market: “Nah, there something coming up. This is what people expect.”

You: “Ah, thanks for the heads up, I’ll incorporate it”

Market: “Aren’t you gonna cast your vote?”

The response is up to you, but see the present clearly. Remember, measurement not prediction.

I’ll leave you with a spreadsheet so you can play with an event size and see how it propagates through the term structure. Smooth curves = smooth forward vol matrix.

💾Moontower Event Vol Matrix

Spreadsheet screenshots:

 

Final thoughts

Trading vol around events is a major topic.

At scale, quants will have more “proper” methods for doing this but I can tell you that a significant portion of my career earnings have come from understanding this stuff. (It was 20 years ago, about 2005, that I was starting to build this infra. All in Excel by the way.)

The techniques improve. I’m not a quant as I’ve said many times. I don’t know the state-of-the-art but with some simple math and yea a lot endurance, observing, noticing you can go quite far.

Is this gonna turn you into SIG or Jane? Hell no, but these are the ant trails that take you to the questions. To a frame of mind that measures for and seeks contradiction. Notice how little broad opinions matter. Instead, you are trying to turn market prices into mini-hypothesis. Trades are tests against hypothesis.

But it starts with measurement.

Here’s a few questions that option traders are asking every day.

How does the surface/consensus synthesize knowledge about:

  • prior earnings moves?
  • seasonal earnings moves?
  • time-series of implied earnings moves?
  • how earnings vol is cross-sectionally priced broadly and by sector?
  • how implied correlation is priced during earnings season?
  • how VRP’s look ahead of earnings? after earnings? if we clean implieds to get to base vols, do we clean realized vols after known events have passed to have base realized vols?

These are all active areas of inquiry. They are not solved problems. They will be eventually but then the conditions of their solving will have meant another set of opportunities will emerge.

If you are an aspiring pro, insert yourself somewhere and just start chopping wood.

risk rules that ignore p/l memory

I wrote this tweet a while back that bears repeating because I’m not sure if there’s any topic that seems to come up more when I’m asked about risk management.

Risk management continuum very bluntly stated:

1. Rules for cutting risk when you lose (P/L memory)

2. Rules for how big you can be constrained by aggressive portfolio shock assumptions (ie no P/L memory but positions that can lose X% AUM not allowed)

I’ll just say from option trading context #2 is preferable because the best opportunities likely occur when everyone else is constrained by #1

But that framework is not typical, harder to implement and will often make you feel like you are leaving $ on the table

But you don’t lose your business on an idio risk. There’s an irreducible amount of systematic risk already. Don’t make idio something that can take you out.

how to become the main character on voltwit

A reliable way to have Nassim Taleb come through your window to call you an iiiiidiot is to see a stock crash and say something like “That was a 10-standard deviation move!”

On #voltwit, the corner of fintwit with an option fetish, a surefire way to get QVR’s Benn Eifert to QT you is to quote VIX changes in percent terms.

The topic resurfaces every time VIX makes a large move, voltwit predictably reacts so I figured Grok (X’s LLM chatbot) must know about this.

I asked Grok some questions and sure enough it seems like it’s been paying attention.

“Is it wise to quote VIX changes in percent terms?”

  • Volatility of Volatility: The VIX itself is inherently volatile, so small percentage changes might not always reflect significant shifts in market sentiment or conditions.
  • Misinterpretation: Large percentage changes from a low base might exaggerate perceived market fear or complacency. Conversely, small percentage changes at high levels might understate the market’s condition.
  • Contextual Information: Percentages without context (like the baseline level of the VIX) can be misleading. A 5% increase in VIX might mean different things at different times.

Do vol traders dunk on tourists who quote VIX percent changes?”

In the trading community on platforms like X, there’s often a playful or critical banter between experienced volatility (vol) traders and those perceived as “tourists” or less experienced traders.

  • Misinterpretation Risks: Vol traders often emphasize that quoting VIX in percentage terms without additional context can lead to misinterpretations. For example, a 10% increase from a very low VIX level might not be as significant as the same percentage increase from an already high level.

     

Benn’s primary gripe with VIX percents is the behavior of VIX is level-dependent. Its distribution is not congruent at high and low levels of vol.

Notice how the Y-axis is VIX vol points not percents.

In chatting with Benn about this article he pointed out a basic mechanic that makes vol level-dependent:

Volatility is inherently about squared returns, so you can have a very low base level of realized vol but all it takes is one big-ish sized return and because we’re squaring it (along with all the other little returns in the window) it’s going to have a massively outsized impact on window realized volatility. That makes vol very jumpy from low levels.

Another vol manager, Kris Sidial of Ambrus, explains it simply. Note my response below it.

There are multiple contexts in which it is quite useful to measure percent changes in volatility. There are tradeoffs, as you’d expect with any measure. But I’ve always been forceful about the need to slice things from different angles. It’s a healthy way to identify mixed signals, but it’s also affirming when sufficiently different angles agree.

A good example of this “multiple angles” idea is the 2 part series:

Let’s get into a few reasons to measure vol in percent changes.

Cross-sectional comparison

As a relative value options trader, I would typically have an “axe list”. These are vols in various names in various parts of the surface I thought were relatively cheap or expensive.

[The idea of an “axe list” is covered in the Moontower Mission Plan]

Armed with my opinions, I would then buy the options I thought were cheap on days when their strike vols were underperforming, and sell the expensive ones on days the strike vols were outperforming.

Because I’m looking at vols cross-sectionally it makes sense to look at the percent changes in the vol. A one-point move in SPY is much larger than a one-point move in TSLA.

[See Understanding The Vol Scanner for a full explanation.]

Notes and caveats

1) Measuring percent changes in vols work well “locally”.

For example, it was common in modeling spot-vol correlation in oil to assume that as oil futures went up 1%, that vol declined 1%.

[This dynamic corresponds to a “constant ATM straddle regime”. It is easily visible from the straddle approximation formula.]

But nobody believes that doubling the oil price will suddenly lead to a halving in vol. The model only works “locally.”

2) Percent vol changes can be further refined by normalizing for “vol of vol”

If SPY vol changes from 20% to 21%, a 5% change in vol level might still be more significant than TSLA vol changing from 60% to 63%, also a 5% change, because TSLA vol of vol might be higher. After all, it might be common for TSLA vol to move 5% per day.

The analogy to regular investing would be the difference between a dollar-neutral position and a beta-weighted position. If you are long $100 of TSLA and short $100 of SPY, your portfolio will act like it’s long even though in dollars it’s flat. You are long beta because TSLA is more volatile.

[I’m ignoring the correlation aspect of beta because it’s not central to the argument.]

3) An extra note on “vol of vol”

If you measure vol of vol based on changes in ATM vol you are getting a confounding reading. Like if you measured your pulse with your thumb.

Why?

ATM vols are “floating” strike vols. If SPY drops 1% and ATM vol increases by 1 point, that might just be movement along the vol curve. The vol on the 99% strike might have simply been 1 point higher than the prior day’s 100% strike. On a fixed strike basis, the vol didn’t change. In this case, the appearance of a vol change merely reflected a change in the underlying.

For vol trading purposes, you usually care about fixed strike changes (ie curve shifts not movement along the curve) because that’s what drives the vega p/l of the attribution.

Risk and P/L measurement

The second reason to care about percent changes in vol only applies to vol traders. Vol traders defined as traders who run a delta-neutral book and make their edge from isolating cheap and expensive vol.

That said, the discussion should be highly educational for anyone trying to learn options or as a useful self-test for traders who might be interviewing and expected to talk about managing a book.

Let’s back up to consider vol risk. Specifically, vega, the sensitivity of your option p/l due to changes in implied vol.

We start with a scenario. Assume the ATM and at-the-forward (ATF) strikes are the same.

You buy 100 December ATM straddles in stock A and short 100 December ATM straddles in Stock B.

Stock A and Stock B trade for the same price.

Stock B has 2x the implied vol of Stock A.

Are you vega-neutral?

Are you theta-neutral?

[You can look at the greeks from an option calculator to help but if you are an experienced option trader you shouldn’t need to.]

Ok, let’s get to the answers.

You are vega-neutral. Recall the straddle approximation:

Since vega is just change in option (in this case straddle) price per 1 point change in vol, then:

vega = .8 * S * √t

Look at the formula — ATF vega has no dependence on vol level!

Since S and t are equal then your long and short vega perfectly offset.

[Note: OTM option vega DOES depend on vol level. They have volga or “vol gamma” which is what fuels vol convexity.]

Ok, you’re vega-neutral.

Are you theta-neutral?

Again we don’t need an option model. If Stock B is 2x the vol as Stock A its straddle is 2x the price. If both stocks don’t move until expiry, all options go to zero. Necessarily, Stock B experienced 2x the decay.

If you are short the straddle in Stock B, your portfolio collects theta. It is NOT theta-neutral.

Vol traders will often think in terms of vega. “I bought $50k vega in ABC today”.

At the same time, they often try to run a roughly theta-neutral book.

[See Weighting An Option Pair Trade for a discussion about vega and theta weighting and how the weighting should be matched to the expression of your bet — proportional vs spread].

In the riddle above, being vega-neutral did not mean theta-neutral. But we can actually transform vega so that a vega-neutral position is correlated to a theta-neutral position!

Another way to measure vega: “vega per 1%”

Let’s say the vega per straddle was $.50

If you buy 100 straddles your vega is 100 x $.50 x (100 multiplier) =

$5,000

If vol increases by 1 point you make $5,000 from the change in implied vol.

Assume that the implied vol of the straddle is 25%

Multiply the vega by the vol:

$5,000 x 25% = $1,250

Watch what happens if we raise the vol by 1% or .25 points instead of 1 point:

Vega p/l: $5,000 x .25 points = $1,250

Remember when we raised vol by a full point from 25% to 26% (or a 4% change in the vol) you made $5,000 or $1,250 x 4)

By multiplying the vega by the vol itself we have created a new measure:

Vega per 1% measures the vega p/l per 1% change in the vol.

Let’s return to the original riddle.

We now assign implied vols to the straddle. You are long 100 straddles of Stock A at 25% vol and short 100 straddles of Stock B at 50% vol.

While this is vega neutral, it is NOT vega per 1%-neutral

Stock A “vega per 1%”: +$5,000 x 25% is +$1,250

Stock B “vega per 1%”: -$5,000 x 50% is -$2,500

You are net short $1,250 vega per 1%

This perspective is useful for a few reasons:

1) Linear estimate of p/l with respect to percent changes in vol

If vol is up 3% your p/l is simply 3 x vega per 1%. If you are using a view like “vol scanner” to see all the percent changes in vol cross-sectionally the changes will map easily to your vega per 1% risk

2) Vega per 1% proxies a theta-weighted position which is how vol traders often think about their risk and the idea that they are betting on relative proportional vol changes.

If you are short vega per 1% you are collecting theta

Multiple angles

Looking at vega in both the conventional way (p/l sensitivity per 1 point change in vol) and vega per 1% reveals features of a position.

If you are long vega per 1% but short vega, what does that mean?

Any combination of the following:

  • You are short time spreads,
  • You are long high vol options and short lower vol options. Owning skew or vol convexity are both examples of this.
  • Cross-sectionally you are long high vol names and short low vol.

[Note in all these case it’s possible to be paying theta and short gamma locally. But if you shocked the position in a scenario analysis you likely make a ton of money. The relationships between Greeks are all clues as to what is lurking in a complex portfolio.]

In the riddle scenario, to be flat vega per 1%, you must ratio the trade and be short 1/2 as many high vol straddles. Note you will be net long vega. You will win if all the vols parallel shift higher (ie they all go up 10 points), but if they maintain their .5 relationship the p/l will be flat, consistent with the meaning of flat vega per 1%.

Understanding your greeks means understanding what you’re rooting for. You’d be surprised to know that sometimes option traders don’t even know what they’re rooting for.

When you get down to it, any large percentage change in vol is going to require multiple angles to understand. Your p/l isn’t going to line up because vega itself will change as the underlying changes and vol changes interact. Measuring percent changes on small numbers is usually a bad idea and requires transformations to find divine anything worth mentioning.

Does it make sense to talk about a 75% change in VIX from a base vol of 8%? Of course not. One of the reasons you know that is because it can’t fall 75% from 8%. That’s a clue right there that “standard deviation”, a concept we learned about from symmetrical pictures in HS math texts, is not in charge.


In sum, percent changes in vol can be useful measures but you have to know how to wield them and where they break down.

Unless you want to be the main character on voltwit for a day (and have to fix your broken window). But if you’re ok with that at least go the extra mile and do some technical analysis on VIX.

Final caveat

When you use vega per 1% you implicitly assume that both assets have the same vol of vol. In other words, if a 15% vol name’s IV bounces around 1 vol point per day, then a 30 vol name bounces around 2 vol points per day. This may or may not be true but it’s a better guess than raw vega weighting, which would show being long 100 straddles in A (25% IV) and short 100 straddles in B (50% IV) as flat.