Insights From John Fio on Invest Like The Best

Patrick O’Shaughnessy interviews John Fio

Link: https://www.joincolossus.com/episodes/86445795/fiorentino-creating-magic-for-consumers?tab=transcript

Patrick’s intro:

My guest today is John Fiorentino. John is a product inventor and entrepreneur who, in the space of a few years, has bootstrapped four products: Gravity Blanket, Moon Pod, Moon Pals and Birthdate Candles, which have collectively sold hundreds of millions of dollars of revenue.

Our conversation is quite different than normal. Alongside his successful brands, John has had a range of life experiences from starting as a Jazz musician to working for Justin Bieber that give him an original world view. I was especially interested in his points around product positioning, creating magic for consumers, not letting yourself become the product and how to build enduring brands. 


The following excerpts are notes I want to save. IT’s important to note that Fio’s insights are derived from his work in consumer brands and he makes no warranty of them applying universally. All emphasis are mine:

When marketing can’t be disentangled from the product

One of my favorite brand stories of all time. Sorry, if I’m butchering the story, but something like this happened, where Coca-Cola had hundreds of thousands of taste testers and they put the same Coca-Cola formula in a bunch of different bottles and cans and cups. And the thing that they realized was that when someone drank the same Coca-Cola formula from a white cup and then they drank that same Coca-Cola formula in a can that had the Coca-Cola logo on it, not only did different parts of their brain lit up, different parts of their brain that was triggered by taste buds lit up.

So positioning that product around, it literally changed the way that your brain experienced the taste. When people say that ideas are not valuable, the idea of getting to this place where you are just flicking someone’s brain 10% to make them imagine something different while they engage with the thing is a completely different product.
And that is competitive. You can compete on that. And if you own that positioning in the consumer’s mind, that is what I would like to call a real moat. Do not underestimate the power of the positioning and the ideas that come around how to position something the right way because, in my opinion, that is the product.

[Kris: Rory Sutherland explains a neurological theory for why this effect:  Prediction combined with Bayesian updating makes more sense as a data architecture than perceiving everything and then forging it into a whole. If this is true, it explains many oddities, like the fact that advertising changes the taste of a product.]

It’s no accident that Slow Productivity embedded is the chewy center of the woo

In history, I think if you look at these paradigm-shifting moments and ideas and creations, inventions and people, the through line is that there is a really fucking weird non-through line. You can’t get there by doing [their] morning routine, you got to go a little deeper than that. And if you look at Leonardo da Vinci, you read about how he used to spend his day, where I read his book, one of the craziest things that stood out to me was like he just spent six months taking notes on how the woodpecker’s tongue worked. I was like, “What? That is what got his attention?” And then the guy who invented Pokémon was just out collecting bugs. And James Cameron was just a truck driver that fell into taking over a movie that was about to fail. And then he just basically fucking invented Terminator. What are the things that are actually driving those people? It’s not some quantifiable thing. It is some undeniable spirit that they have this fearlessness where they are able and comfortable to just follow in a cheesy way. They’re following their heart. And they are so committed to that truth that it leads them down these windy insane paths that, that path actually ends up having these paradigmatic discoveries or inventions. What is the through line there? It is this unbelievable commitment, obsession, transcendent infatuation with, in my opinion, finding something that is true. And I think things that are true aren’t really quantifiable, which is why if you talk to most people and what they’re doing with their day, they’re trying to get money. They’re trying to make a lot of money. That doesn’t really stand the test of time. I don’t think money rules the world. I think this undeniable magic rules the world, and I think the people that are able to tap into that and shape that rule the world, and I think money follows that. Money is not the thing. Money is the measurement of the thing, and we’ve kind of forgotten about that. I call it money worship or number worship. We’ve become obsessed with this idea that truth is quantifiable. The point is not money. The point is to make incredible things for the world that then gets you money. That subtle difference is unbelievably important.

[Kris: This is reminiscent of so much of Cal Newport’s slow productivity ideas]

Products that are pulled not pushed

For 99% of consumer product businesses, if you need an investment, you don’t have a business because all of my businesses have been profitable on day one. On day one, there is enough of a demand for it, where if I show it to 1,000 people, 200 of them are buying it. If you don’t have that metric, you don’t have a business.

And if you can’t convince the consumer that the thing that you’re selling is so compelling that they should wait six months for you to deliver the thing that you are describing, you either don’t have a good product, you can’t describe it well enough or the market doesn’t give a shit. And I can tell that in 10 seconds. And that is something that makes people unbelievably uncomfortable and terrified because again, that’s scary. That is a path that you can’t tell me there is no step-by-step path to get you out of that

[Kris: again here’s Newport — If you feel like you have to rush to compete in something or race in some way, chances are you don’t have a great sustainable competitive advantage.]

The cardinal mistake — forgetting that your cult of personality serves the product not the other way around

Patrick: I want to dig a little bit more on this. Apparent fine line between genius, people able to create these elements of magic, let’s call — let’s stick with that word, and something opposite genius. I think five years ago, if you polled everyone is Kanye a genius, most people would probably say, yes. Now I think probably more people would say, he is a psychopath. He said awful and seems to deeply believe some really terrible things.

And then to invoke a name like P.T. Barnum, for example, who I’m sure was some form of a genius. But normally, if you hear that, it’s someone saying something negative about you, like you’re sort of a con artist. Even people like Elon, there just seems to be this fine line between these magic makers, having history write them one way or the other. Is Disney a con artist or a genius? In what ways is he different from P.T. Barnum, is he different from Elon?

There just seems to be this really delicate line. So maybe talk about that line.

John: There is a hierarchy and a formula that you spiritually have to stay within or you get crucified. My way of describing that is you need an idea, something bigger than yourself. And then you need to be the shepherd of that idea and then the way that you spread that message needs to have a product and then that product goes to an audience.

So this is a very real hierarchy in my mind where it makes a lot of sense where if you start to mess those things up, it either becomes extremely less valuable or it blows up. The cardinal sin where you can get really, really far really, really fast is if you turn yourself into the product, which then makes you the idea. And when you become your product and idea, you get crucified. It’s like a very causative effect formula for human psychology. You see the scapegoat thing. You see the story over and over and over again. The crowd turns against the hero and basically crucifies them, you see this. It’s the oldest story of all time.

You can really, really see that play out. And again, do these little tests. Around the world, do you think more people know Elon Musk or the word Tesla? There is a line where he’s crossing where it’s becoming Elon. That’s dangerous. Now you are the thing.

Look at what happened to Trump. If you break that order, you go quick. You can create insane momentum and you become this crazy passionate leader, but if you aren’t doing it for something bigger than yourself, you get sniffed out and you just get crushed. The audience is like, they don’t trust you and they throw you out. Trump got there really, really quick, unbelievably effectively, and then he’s done. Maybe that’s powers that be, maybe that’s the audience, maybe that’s people just got sick of him. My critique on someone that doesn’t get that formula right is like, remind me of the bigger thing. With Trump, it felt like he was for Trump. It didn’t really feel like he was ready to rebuild America and put heart and soul back into this country and unify us. It was like, no, no, no, I’m going to win. And you can see in his tweets, search query of how many times he says me or I or something, which by the way is a leading indicator of serious depression and suicide. If you start saying I and me, it is the highest leading indicator that you’re about to fall into depression.

You put yourself first, you go to hell. It’s just a law that I think exists where if you can use that as a guide of, like, it keeps everyone in check. No one wants to worship a guy. They want to worship a guy that is sacrificing himself for something bigger, and he is showing the world that it’s possible to commit himself to something bigger than yourself, which I think is a very human struggle. It’s a daily quest to find the ways in which to get outside of yourself and help someone else. For whatever reason, a lot of people are fearful of that. They don’t want to do it and they’re scared and it’s vulnerability or whatever, but when you do, you just automatically feel better. You don’t feel necessarily more powerful, which can be unbelievably addicting and intoxicating, but you definitely feel better.

Again, there’s a very real reason why our heart, brain and soul acts that way. And I think that when you tap into that and you understand that there is this real hierarchy of truth and value and you submit to that, now you can be trusted. And don’t get it wrong, consumers, people are unbelievably smart. Unbelievably smart. You cannot trick them.

So what is the role of the creator?

Patrick acknowledges “ it does seem like some of the most successful people have figured out that if the founder or the artist or something is a bit more a part of the story themselves, it’s like a force multiplier. Maybe say like if you’re advising, let’s say, your friends who are starting a company, how would you tell them to build and engage with an audience, if at all?

JohnI think this is where we’re heading to a really interesting time, where it’s like the things that are going to be valuable are the things that you can’t really teach or copy. And that’s just going to be like, how do you teach someone how to be someone’s good, best friend that’s entertaining? I don’t know. Can you?

I would say, if you are an intelligent, personable, funny, charismatic person, that is an unbelievably unique asset that is more and more rare in the world that we are headed in, and you better figure out how to insert yourself into the organism of the company that you’re building because that can be a very valuable force multiplier to get you attention in very unique ways that did not really exist.

But I would say caution, because if you let that get out of whack, you’re going to get killed. I think it’s a very, very delicate balance. And I also think it’s going to be really obvious when people are doing this with the intention of coming up with a formula of how to maximize shareholder value. It’s so obvious when someone starts a podcast because they think it’s going to help them build their audience. It’s just so obvious.

You’re one of the only podcasts I listen to. Why? Because you’re the best interviewer ever. You have a very, very unique ability to interview and make me feel incredibly comfortable to explore these things in my head and ask these very, very poignant questions that’s super rare from an interviewer, which is why you have one of the best podcasts out there. If you try to teach me how to do that, you couldn’t do that.

But because you can do that, I would say, holy shit, quadruple down on that. That will give you — because no one else can do this, this will give you an advantage on being everyone’s best friend that’s the best person at asking questions to the most interesting people. And oh, by the way, I want to meet X, Y and Z. Now you’re in that top 150 range that I was talking about, and you’re going to get that deal flow. [John has an idea he calls Fio’s Number that is similar to Dunbar’s number where you want to be one of the first people think of when they think of X]

Notions of personality typing or a focus on one’s own identity as a unique thing to be cultivated and cherished in contrast to others

I think these archetypal frameworks are interesting to create. I don’t think that they’re interesting to try to put on yourself. I think this idea of self and identity and self-love is similar to practicing schizophrenia. It is not real. It is not healthy, and it does not help you become who you become. You become who you become through movement and motion and following a set of beliefs that puts you in motion. You don’t get to become great by saying, “I’m great. I identify as great.” That’s not for me to decide.

[Kris: McConaughey from an outstanding commencement speech: if we stay in the process, within ourselves, in the joy of the doing, we will never choke at the finish line. Why? Because we aren’t thinking of the finish line, we’re not looking at the clock, we’re not watching ourselves on the Jumbotron performing the very act we are in the middle of. No, we’re in the process, the APPROACH IS THE DESTINATION… and we are NEVER finished. Bo Jackson ran over the goal line, through the end zone and up the tunnel — the greatest snipers and marksmen in the world don’t aim at the target, they aim on the other side of it. We do our best when our destinations are beyond the “measurement,” when our reach continually exceeds our grasp, when we have immortal finish lines. When we do this, the race is never over. The journey has no port. The adventure never ends because we are always on our way. Do this, and let them tap us on the shoulder and say, “hey, you scored.” Let them tell you “You won.” Let them come tell you, “you can go home now.” Let them say “I love you too.” Let them say “thank you.” ]

All of this shit that I’m saying, we’ll look back on this in 20, 30 years, and it will be super clear if I am actually a creator or if I just was a fan boy.

And I won’t be able to convince you. We both will just know. It would just be so obvious. And to me, that is identity. These things that people try to put themselves into, to me, it’s so much pent-up energy in the wrong direction. Don’t look inwards. Look outwards. Serve something bigger than yourself. Do not try to make yourself happy. Try to make someone else happy. And paradoxically, that is what’s going to make you the happiest. [Kris: notice how self-effacing this is]

You’re not going to find love by figuring out what love language you are and who is going to give you that love language. It’s like, no, you find that by making a choice to love someone every single day. I spent the last 5 years or so, as I’m getting to this point in my life, spending tons and tons of time finding people like yourself who I really, really admire who, in my mind, have it all. They have the family, they have the wife, they have success and they’re on this path that doesn’t look like it’s going to end. And they all say very, very similar things. Every 75-year-old billionaire that has their family together just sounds like the exact same person. Which is a contrarian view that I have, which I design and create for is that we are all the exact same. Everyone is the exact same.

We’re all playing the same game. We’re all trying to find love. We’re all trying to eat, and we’re all trying to survive. And when those incentives are at the core of our daily life, everyone plays very, very similar games. Think about how different everyone could act. Everyone is doing the exact same thing. If you’re focusing on these differences, you’re splitting hairs that are just meaningless. And if you start to create, you try to work every day around the core assumption that we are way, way, way more similar, if not almost entirely identical than different, in my opinion, you’re going to have a lot more success.

[Kris: Some related quips about when therapy-talk bleeds into self-defeating snowflakism. 

  • VGR’s take on the strong/weak meme cycle: a world talking itself to death where action would actually help
  • An exchange between the main characters in Tomorrow, Tomorrow, and Tomorrow:
    Sam: “The knowledge and experience we have—it isn’t necessarily that helpful, in a way.”
    Sadie: “It’s so funny you should say this, because if you were one of my students, you’d be wearing your pain like a badge of honor. This generation doesn’t hide anything from anyone. My class talks a lot about their traumas. And how their traumas inform their games. They, honest to God, think their traumas are the most interesting thing about them. I sound like I’m making fun, and I am a little, but I don’t mean to be. They’re so different from us, really. Their standards are higher; they call bullshit on so much of the sexism and racism that I, at least, just lived with. But that’s also made them kind of, well, humorless.
    “If their traumas are the most interesting things about them, how do they get over any of it?” Sam asked. “I don’t think they do. Or maybe they don’t have to, I don’t know.”]

Fio continues:

You’re kind of breaking rule number one: don’t turn yourself into the product. You can’t craft yourself. You can submit to something and serve that, but you can’t craft yourself.

Being in the Hollywood world, there was a lot of these conversations where it was like, the product should be a blanket. When I would try to manage my artist, it was like, I don’t want to make you the product. This is weird. I don’t want to tell you how to do certain things. That’s a weird thing. Like you are becoming the product. And that’s a super, super dangerous thing. And what you’re talking about with these things is like you’re trying to craft yourself. And that is essentially what celebrities do. And just really pay attention to a celebrity. How many people go on these crazy runs where they are that thing for like a year? There’s 50, 60 new names that come up every year where you’re like, oh my God, and then they’re gone. It’s like what is that guy doing? Was that really worth it? Was that the game that he wanted to play? Was that the game he should have played? Or should he have tried to do something a little different, a little bigger?

All these artists that ride these fame waves, they all crash until they come out with a hit again. So if they lose sight of that, it really doesn’t matter what the personality game is they’re playing. If they make a hit, they’re back on top. So does it really matter what games? I think like Frank Ocean and Adele do this really well. They go into a hole for 10 years, and then they just emerge. They drop literally generational-defining music and then they disappear. [Kris: Slow productivity again — this is Newport’s description of Grisham]

It’s like, wow, that dude is a light maker. That dude is making magic. And he’s not the product. He’s cool. I want to hang out with him. I was in L.A. the other day and I had lunch next to him. There was not a bone in my body that would let me go up to him and be like, “Dude, can I get a picture?” Because he was not the thing. He did the honorable thing of making himself smaller to a larger thing he believed, which is the art. And when someone makes that humble decision, I trust them and I treat them like a real person. And if he’s sitting there crafting these archetypal things of what he’s going to do to make himself stand out as a personality, this and this and this, I don’t trust him.

He might get my attention for a year, but I’m not messing with that guy on a 10-year time line until he comes out with a generational-defining hit. And the second he’s capable of doing that, he’s going to realize that the other shit doesn’t matter at all.


A general thought I had when listening to this and many other interviews:

Business is heavily theorized but there seems to be little truth. So much competing information. In a way the things I’m sharing are revealing my bias more than uncovering truth. But I suspect it’s more important to have a point of view and just get to work than hand-wringing about your theories in a wicked domain. It’s a parallel idea to why investing feels like astrology — everything that makes sense gets overbid and the only place to find an edge is where at first it doesn’t appear to make sense. You do and if you can retrofit a why well that’s just a luxury.

The GOAT’s Parting Wisdom

Just popping in on my writing break to share a 1 lot…

🎙️Stripe’s John Collison Recently Interviewed The Late Charlie Munger (Invest Like The Best)

Loved the rapid fire format. RIP Charlie, a true legend. I’m hesitant to put my favorite excerpts because it’s no substitute for listening to it, but I’m going to anyway to make it easier to quote from in the future.

Excerpts

Did you learn the big ideas in the various disciplines because you were just intellectually curious about them? Or because you thought they’d be instrumentally useful in the work?

Both. I saw instantly, for instance, when I was introduced to the math of Pascal and the elementary probability, I saw immediately how important this math was. My math teacher had no idea that he’d come to a part of the math that was very important in the regular world to everybody, but I saw it immediately and I just utterly mastered it. And I used it. I’m still using it. I used it routinely all my life quite intensely.

And when I got to study in the Harvard Business School, in the early days at the Harvard Business School, they were proudest of something called decision tree theory. And they taught it at the Harvard Business School, a lot of pomp and ceremony and many examples, all these graduate students.

Decision tree theory, it’s a Harvard Business School — in those early days, what they were teaching you was that Pascalian probability math works in real life. Here’s the Harvard Business School needing to do remedial high school math to a bunch of graduate students, and they weren’t wrong. They were right in those days to teach decision tree theory because other people hadn’t mastered probability math the way it should be mastered.

My teacher in high school, if you don’t pay attention to anything else, this stuff you ought to master. And he should explain how carny operators and casinos take advantage of ordinary people. It should have been taught, and it wasn’t taught right in high school, and it wasn’t taught right in college and it wasn’t taught right. Finally, the Harvard Business School got so they taught high school math to graduate students. And you can say how could that be correct? But it’s because the earlier education was so ineffective.

In Poor Charlie’s Almanack, you advocate the multidisciplinary approach and knowing the big ideas from all the different disciplines. And one of the ones that I particularly liked and stuck with me was the one from biology of stable ecosystems and understanding how entities prosper within ecosystems. And in particular how you don’t want necessarily to be in this robber baron, monopolistic, rent extraction position. But instead, businesses that sustain and endure over the long term are ones where they are not rent extracting.

Well, some of the robber barons last a long time. And there are a lot of real estate operators that are basically sleazy. And they don’t even think their business is sound unless they’re doing something sleazy. They’re doing something sleazy, they have a safe advantage. And of course, that’s exactly the opposite to my idea.

My idea is so simple, is that if you make your living selling things to other people that are good for them, that is safer and more profitable averaged out than selling them stuff that’s bad for them like gambling, drugs, crazy religions, all kinds of things that are terrible for people. And so of course, you want to sell things that are good for them. And it’s amazing the people who don’t pay any attention to that rule.

And I think it was sleazy products and investment banking has sort of you willing to sell and the sleazy stuff that compensation consultants are perfectly willing to sell. And I just decided I wasn’t going to do any of that. I was going to sell what kind of stuff that I would buy if I were on the other side. And I also wanted to work with the kind of people that I admired. And that’s a very important thing to learn to just search out the reliable people that you can trust and be the kind of person in dealing with everybody else that they can trust.

It’s just a huge advantage if you start doing that young and keep doing it consistently through life. It isn’t very hard, stay awake in high school math and deal with the good people instead of the bad people and sell what you would buy if you were the buyer, not what you can sell by misleading people. These are very simple ideas. But it’s just absolutely amazing how well they work for people who relentlessly follow these simple ideas.

On Investing

Has investing gotten harder?

Of course, it’s gotten harder, way harder. It’s gotten so hard that most of the people who are in wealth management have an almost zero chance of outperforming an unmanaged index like the S&P.

How has it gotten harder?

There’s so much more of this wealth invested in securities. And so we’ll get a whole lot of big sums to manage. And of course, it’s a long time to buy in, a long time to sell out, costs are higher. And so it’s way harder to manage a large sum of money to make a lot of money at high returns than it is to manage a small sum of money. And then way more brains came into the business. So it’s gotten brutally competitive.

And then we have these manias that get — when things are hot and they’ll start running like the behavior gets almost crazy. It’s almost like a delusion. Of course, it’s harder. And in my lifetime, a guy who just bought the best common stocks and sat on his ass, would have made about 10% per annum before inflation. Maybe 8% after inflation. That is not the standard return that a man can expect from investment. That was a very unusual period in a very unusual place. And I do not anticipate that the average result is going to be nearly that good over the next 100 years.

Why was the results so good? Why was it 10% per annum?

Let’s call it 8% after inflation. The Great Depression so demoralized everybody, they were utterly despised and then the economic system improved a lot. And the combination of the investment climate, the economic situation together evolving, just made it unusually good. If you go back to what the rich people of England did back, say, in 1900, they bought consols (type of perpetual bond), 2.5%, no inflation. Two and a half percent return if you wanted to stay safe, you’d be satisfied with that. No rich people thought there was any safe way of getting 8% if you go back to 1880 among the rich people of England.

And so this is an unusual period. And now everybody who’s in investment management teaches everybody, you’ll get 8% after inflation by dealing with us because that’s the way it worked for the last 100 years. Just because it worked for the last 100 years does not mean it’s going to work for the next 100 years.

So it’s been a period of significant economic growth. I think there’s also maybe the U.S. stock market that has outperformed…

Yes, everything, United States, country prospered, a lot of good stuff happened at once that caused that very good result. It’s not always going to work that way.

What do you think of the SEC?

We’re a lot better with an SEC. The tendency to prosper through financial chicanery in all forms of wealth management is perfectly enormous. So of course, you need something to throttle that back and control it. So I’m glad we have an SEC. It would have been crazy not to have one. By the way, that came in as part of the Roosevelt, and I would argue that its main trouble is that it isn’t tough enough.

Tough enough on what?

Miscreancy. If I were running the SEC and had the power to do it, I wouldn’t allow people to publish a record saying, “Here’s what I did over the last 20 years, when I started with $2 and went up to $200 million.” because it misleads people. And of course, we will create mutual funds, create little ones to get a phony big record. I would forbid that kind of stuff.

I would force everybody who is a big-time money manager to report his investment record per dollar year instead of historical, and that would take the miscreancy out of it. And it would be so simple, and it would radically change the whole industry.

And how many people have you ever heard say it will be mandatory that all wealth management will report its results per dollar year, which would be easier to do mathematically? And it would totally change the way everybody is promoting their service in a way that fosters truth and excellence and a lot of the things.

What I just suggested is so goddamn simple and so obviously required in terms of honorable disclosure, that it ought to be automatic. And yet who has ever suggested — why is little Charlie Munger, 98 years old, think the SEC or the government ought to require that all investment professionals report results per dollar year instead of per historical? Nobody suggest it. But to me, it’s obvious it ought to be required.

And when you say per dollar year, you mean dollar weighted results, basically?

Yes. How much return — for every dollar year, what was your return? And of course, that’s a very different figure. I know of a case of a hedge fund where the proprietor made a lot of money, but per dollar year, the net return was zero. Because when he got a lot of money, he really made a lot of dumb mistakes.

He made a lot of money when this one didn’t matter much. And yet it looks like a wonderful record. But in fact, it was terrible. And why wouldn’t that be a fair thing to require?

The Principal-Agent Problem

It’s very interesting reading the book with the lens post the financial crisis. It’s also interesting to see you railing against derivatives in this a few years before the financial crisis.

That derivative railing was so manipulative and they marked the books like, “Two guys that make a big trade, they both recorded a big profit to their accounts, the accounts would less the profit on both sides.” It’s the same trade. One was reporting a profit, and the other’s reporting a profit. It couldn’t both be — if it gets too easy and too manipulative, and into that culture, the stock brokers, big banking, the guys who did the ordering, they take them to Las Vegas, they buy them a stack of chips, negotiable chips, and give it to them.”

“There was cocaine, they were prostitutes. It was not a pretty culture and kind of tolerated. What do you expect from a bunch of security traders? Everybody knew that his traders were behaving that way, but it was a mistake to let all that stuff to creep in. And it got pretty extreme. And then the bankers deal — that deal that Goldman Sachs did with Malaysia, that sovereign wealth fund…that guy obviously should have been avoided on moral grounds, and prudential grounds, too, but these get so intoxicated by the easy money.

It feels like a lot of the objections you have, sort of, say, professional money managers or Wall Street or whatever, can be summed up by people should be more cognizant of principal agent problems. Is that fair?

You can hardly imagine a field more full principal agents with their money than wealth management. Of course the wealth managers take care of themselves. That includes the foundation manager. A foundation manager basically wants to get $400,000 a year while a professor gets $110,000.

He’s got one way of doing it: picking money managers who get 3% off the top and in various forms of private equity. That’s the only way he justifies his big peso. It’s a principal agent problem. Of course you’re going to want to invest a lot of money with private equity. And of course, private equity is going to do all kinds of horrible things to try and get 3 points off the top. Imagine you get 3 percentage points off the top of somebody else’s money.

It’s a good business model.

You can only do that if you have some miraculous way of making money. By the way, the guys in your field, Jim Simons, Jim Simons is a world-class mathematician. Here’s what he did. He just used his damn computers to identify trading patterns that had deep human psychological background.

One of them was very simple. He took his computer data and he found that patterns in the market as a whole, there are 4 different patterns: win-win, lose-lose, win-lose, and lose-win. If it’s just random, then all 4 are going to be equal. And low and behold, he sifted the data and win-win was more common than win-lose or lose-win. And lose-lose was more common.

So all they had to do is use program at computers to make these modest moderate-sized trades, or big -by his standards were moderate compared to the market. On that basis, the business whirled and whirled, the money just poured out of it.

The tax shenanigans.

Billions poured out of the clearance system. And it was so simple and so elementary. And as a social utility of making money that way is about zero, so if I’d done that, I suppose I would be pleased that I was so clever, but I would have been a bit ashamed of not delivering anything to society in exchange for my big winnings. But luckily, I wasn’t enough of a computer science to even think about such things, and I don’t like short-term trading. And I don’t want to be hanging over some trading desk punching keys.

Why do you think Sequoia has done so well?

Sequoia got early into the game, and it’s a fanatic meritocracy. So they work very hard, all of them. And they’ve gotten big and successful way ahead of everybody else, and they kept writing it like some chip manufacturers, each generation of chips they get. And in the end, they have a file. We have an example.”

“In our apartment houses, we use some little computer program in adjusting the rents or something or other that somebody — and this one little guy, I had him check, Sequoia already had a file on this guy. So every little asshole with a little tiny computer program, they got an army of young guys out there finding every little guy and on big files and so forth.”

“So they see more — they see better opportunities sooner and more than other people. And they’ve got the reputation. So people who are usually successful, they want to go with Sequoia, not some lesser firm. And the combination is just unbeatable. But lately, were they right to go into big Robinhood, but no, they made a huge mistake for Sequoia there, and they shouldn’t have gone…

Morally or…

Morally and professionally, it’s a big mistake. Really stupid. But it got so much, we’ve got to be in every new thing that’s hot. They got to thinking like investment bankers, but it was a huge mistake for Sequoia to get involved with Robinhood and…

Is your objection to Robinhood that it encourages short-term trading and trading options?

Yes, they lie and so forth.

Do they?

Oh my God.

What do they lie about?

Anything that works. They try and sell it, hey, this is a new fraternity of freedom or it’s — the whole thing is a lie.

You don’t like the movement aspect of it.

Oh no, no. They’re trying to create mass hysteria. I don’t like luring people in and screwing them, basically. You’re successful with Sequoia and you’re identified with financing people like Apple and so on, why in the hell would you take Robinhood? It’s totally crazy. You don’t want to do all the business that’s legal for you to do. You want to exclude all kinds of things because it’s beneath you. This shows that you work at these things intelligently. It gets hard, but it doesn’t get impossible.”

But the other side of it is, if you take the — I have been very well located in life. But with minor exceptions, what do I have relative to investments in life? I’ve got Costco stock, Berkshire stock, Li Lu’s China fund and Avi’s apartments. So I have four investments, basically, after 60 years or something — by the way, I feel perfectly adequately diversified. Nobody teaches that’s adequate diversification.

And they’re dead wrong. Simple fact is that it’s easier to find four things that are above average than it is to find 40. It’s not that damned easy to find. You find something that’s almost sure to work because you figure — you’re asking to finding a gold mine in your backyard. When it works, is that easy? How many gold mines are you going to find in your backyard? You shouldn’t expect to have all that many opportunities that are clearly identifiable.

“It’s going to be very hard and you’re lucky if you get only a few in a lifetime. And then you have to be a combination of very patient and very aggressive. You have to sit patiently waiting, watching, surveying, hunting and pounce very occasionally. You get four pounces in a lifetime that really work big time, and that’s a very successful lifetime. And other people think — like that guy on TV, he’s an expert in every company every time. That’s crazy. He’s an expert in saying something that’s mildly plausible. That’s not being an expert investor.

Doesn’t it feel like the narrative on that is changing, where I think people are coming to understand the merits of concentration in positions that really work?

I had dinner with a whole crowd of Fidelity this very week, and they’ve got trillions under management, and they scrape only a modest amount off the top. And they’ve got a wonderful business, but they have the moral problem that they have no possibility at all of exceeding what an index man could do with their common stock investments.

Maybe they have an occasional analyst that’s a little better than average that works into the system. Basically, what they do is they force everybody to be a closet indexer because nobody wants to be an extreme outlier on the losing side because that can destroy your investment management business. But I would argue that the whole damn system is corrupt in investment management.

They take care of the agents way better than they take care of the principals, and they lie to themselves and they lie to others. And that’s our system. And everybody that wants a fair amount of easy money pretty fast. And that requires a plausible narrative. That’s what’s admired now. I regard modern venture capital as investment banking in disguise. Just a little different form of investment banking, same morality, same obsession with a lot of quick wealth. There’s nothing wrong with investment banking, properly done, venture investing.

David Senra on Invest Like The Best

Patrick O’Shaughnessey interviewed David Senra, the host of the outstanding Founders Podcast. I love David’s passion and storytelling. This interview was the best one I listened to this year. I listened to it several times and it was the first time I asked my son (now 9) to listen to an interview with me. It felt like one of those chats that could inspire an impressionable mind.

They discuss the premise, motivation, and lessons from David’s podcast. The premise of Founders is David studies famous entrepreneurs, scientists, artists or really any creatives that made a large impact and distills pitfalls and lessons from their stories. It doesn’t sound novel, except David’s personality and enthusiasm make you feel like you are hanging out listening to a friend tell a crazy about another friend (except that last “friend” is a historical figure)

The following notes are what stood out to me.

My son Zak also took notes (we made this an exercise because in 4th grade this year he’s learning to take notes). It was fascinating to discover where he wanted to pause the interview to jot something down that stood out to him. One of the reasons the episode might have been especially fun for him is we just finished watching The Men Who Made America series on the History Channel and Senra discusses many of the “captains of industry” or “robber barons” featured on the TV series.

Link: https://www.joincolossus.com/episodes/85503387/senra-passion-pain?tab=transcript


Books as mentors

Senra came from a challenged family. He wasn’t only the first male to graduate HS, he was the first to not go to jail! When he studied Warren Buffet, he recalled that Buffet said, “One of the best things ever happened to me is I picked the right heroes.” I think that is extremely important. So that is the role that books play for me.  I don’t have access to these people, I didn’t have mentors. I didn’t have anybody.

Senra’s career is the embodiment of what I described as The Engine Model

  • There are four passions in my life, entrepreneurship, reading history and podcasts, so Founders sits in the middle of that.

  • People say “Founders is podcast, Founders is business.” Yeah, but it’s an obsession first. It’s an obsession disguised as a podcast in a business.

  • The reason I’m so obsessed with just studying people that got to the top of their profession is because one third of your life is going to be spent working. Half of your conscious life, half of the time you’re not asleep, is going to be spent working. For a certain personality type, to not excel at that, to not be really good at that means that life is not going to be an enjoyable experience for me. If I had to guess, which comes up a lot, I think there’s some kind of deep-rooted fight against a sense of inferiority that is underneath it.

  • It’s interesting, this comes up a lot, there’s a line in the Francis Ford Coppola biography that I read, because I really love reading biographies of filmmakers, that’s the closest analogy to what I’m trying to do at podcasting. I read their words and I’m like, “That’s how I think about podcasting. That’s fascinating.” And there’s a line in the Francis Ford Coppola biography where, embedded in the story of the son is the story of the father. And his dad was this guy, he wanted to be a musician. He never made it, was super bitter. So he raised Francis Ford Coppola and they would just talk shit, his dad would just talk about anybody that was successful. And Francis is like, “Well, I don’t want to be the person criticizing the successful person, I want to be the successful person.”

  • And I think a lot of that came from how we started the conversation, some people have to say, “Hey, I want to be like that guy.” Other people have, “I don’t want to be like that guy.” And those are equally powerful motivators.

[This reminds me of Ambition As An Anxiety Disorder]

Originality and ego

  • To be an investor, to be an entrepreneur, it doesn’t work if you can’t trust your own judgment. So what kind of person who’s willing to take that risk? I know a ton of entrepreneurs that could even make more money, if they went to go work for Google or something like that. They’d rather make less money in their own business, than work for somebody else. But there is something bizarre that I don’t think you can explain. All you can do is notice it in other people, and then seek those people out like, “Oh, I’m not weird. There’s a ton of people just like me.”

  • But Edwin Land said that there’s no such thing as group originality or group creativity. He goes, “I do believe wholeheartedly in the individual capacity for greatness.” And he says, “Originality are attributes of a single mind, not a group.”

  • I actually don’t think that you build a great company without a giant ego. I don’t think that exists. Sam Walton has a good idea about that. He’s like, “Listen, your ego should use to drive you, but you should not be on public display.” And he’s like, “I hire people at Walmart with big egos, that know how to hide it, because there is some weird thing where it drives you.”

Confusing people liking the work for liking you

We talked a little bit about ego before we started recording, where it’s very prone to let your ego get the best of you. People admire you because the work. What happens is, you usually isolate yourself. You’ll work really hard. You’ll do a lot of work. That work draws the attention of other people because it adds value to their life. And then suddenly, over time, you confuse us. It’s like, “Oh, they don’t like the work. They like me. And then I could just show up without having to do the work and everything will be fine.”

[Reminds me of the Asimov line: Past glories are poor feeding]

On constant learning

The reason I say that Jordan’s biography changed my life is this idea of practice. How many people want to get to the NBA? A ton, millions. How many get? 400 maybe. How many people get to the Dream Team in Barcelona in ’92, which might be the greatest basketball team of all time? 15 people. A subset of a subset of a subset. Michael’s tired. He’d been playing nonstop, back-to-back. He’s like, “Man, I really want to take some time off. I don’t want to spend my summer for the Olympics, but I’m going to go.” He goes, “I want to see their practice habits. We’re all the best of the best, what am I doing that’s different than what they’re doing?” What happened was he goes, he watched the way they practiced compared to the way he practiced. The main theme of Jordan’s book is I believe in practice. I would rather miss a game than miss practice. That’s insane. He said something that gives me chills to this day. He goes, “I watched their practice habits,” and he goes, “they’re deceiving themself about what the game requires.”

Obsession and endurance

“If anything is worth doing, it’s worth doing to excess” – Edwin Land, Inventor

  • On my phone, my lock screen, is a picture of Ernest Shackleton, the famous polar explorer, who looks like hell. He’s got a huge beard covered in ice. He looks like he’s about to die. And his family motto was, “By endurance, we conquer.” Which is why I told you earlier, I’m only interested in people who do things for a long time. Because at every single step, these people are presented with opportunities to quit and they don’t. So he’s like, I don’t have to be the smartest. I don’t have to be the best. I don’t have to be the talented. This is what I believe in myself. I don’t have to be the best. I don’t have be the smartest. I don’t to be the most talented…if you do something for three or four or five hours every day that most people don’t do, you’re going to develop a value for other people in the world, and that’s all a business is. The best description of a business I ever heard came from Richard Branson. He’s like, “All businesses, it’s an idea or service that make somebody else’s life better. If you make other people’s life better, you’ll capture that value in return.”
  • I’m not a fan of moderation. I’m attracted to extremes. What do you want your life experience to be? Do you want to be exceptional? Do you want to push the boundaries of your capabilities? Do you want to walk around in a fog butting up against your potential but never actually realizing it? Then knock yourself out. Be moderate. I’m not interested in that. (Zak loved this!)

Understanding what you want — the soul of a business

I read this great book called Masters of Doom, which is obviously about the video game Doom. There’s John Romero and John Carmack, and John Carmack said something in what causes the rift of their partnership. He’s like, “Romero wants an empire. I just want to make great games.”

Senra relates to Carmack:

Founders is like a handmade product. And I was like, thank you because that’s what I think about. It’s a handmade product at scale because of the miracle of podcasting. I can do everything myself. I don’t have anybody helping me…role of the founder is the guardian of the company’s soul. There’s a cult around In-N-Out because the expression of the founder’s soul is manifest in the product. People have In-N-Out tattoos. Who are your entrepreneurial heroes? Everybody copies somebody, dude. You’re a human. I always have a maxim by saying in my podcast that the mind is a powerful place. What you feed it affects you in a powerful way.

The culture of a company as a reflection of the founder

The quote that comes to mind when I think of the founder as the guardian of the company’s soul is actually a quote about Steve Jobs. It’s in one of the books I read about him and he says he made and remade Apple in his own image. Apple is Steve Jobs with 10,000 lives. That gives me goosebumps because that’s exactly what a founder should be doing. It’s impossible to build a company, to spend all your life energy on it, and not have it imbibed with your personality, with your ethics. Everything that you think about your business and your life is going to seep into it. The good and the bad parts.

Patrick: It reminds me of a conversation I had with Tony Xu who started DoorDash. Tony’s a very mild-mannered, very humble, almost quiet person, which is why this quote from him stands out in my memory so strongly, which is I asked him something about culture.  How do you think about constructing the culture of a company? His answer is basically, “I think a culture of a company should be like 80 or 90% just the personality of the founder. That’s it. It should be the extreme characteristics of the personality of the founder. Because if you try to make it generic, nothing stands out and there’s no progress and inertia dominates.

Process as art (and marketing)

Patrick: It sounds like a common theme in all these stories, is process as art by revealing the process behind the product, because they’re so obsessed with that. That is a common marketing story. Do you see that over and over?

There’s no such thing as a business that is boring. Listen, it’s boring to you because you do it every day. If you explain to the customer the process, they’ll find it interesting. If there’s any part of your product that seems banal or ordinary to you, I promise you, no one is thinking about your business as much as you. The favorite business of mine in the world, you think about it less than probably five minutes a week. Nobody is thinking about it. You have shit in your brain that is interesting to customers, and then you could package that up and use that as marketing to get more customers.

The most recurring theme in Founders stories

  • We may or may not have talked about the most important, and that’s the best maxim in the history of entrepreneurship was said by the founder of Four Seasons, that “excellence is the capacity to take pain.”…Anybody that’s ever done anything difficult, whether it’s a company, anything, knows the euphoria and terror. It’s the entrepreneurial emotional rollercoaster. The reason that I think it’s so important to talk about is because it is supposed to be hard. There’s not a book you’re going to pick up where the guy or woman’s like, “Hey, I had this idea. I started it. Everything went great,” and the end of the book. It doesn’t happen.
  • James Dyson. It’s hard to find, but if you can get a copy, order it. He says, “Listen, it’s easy for me to celebrate my doggedness now. I made $300 million last year, but I’d be lying to you if there wasn’t times where I went inside my house, had my wife look at me in the face like I’m a failure and I’d cry myself to sleep, and I got up and did it again anyways.” [Dyson made over 5,000 prototypes in 14 years before landing on the bagless vacuum that made him a household name]

Because excellence is the capacity to take pain:

  • I apply this to like, “I don’t really feel like working out right now. I don’t feel like doing cardio.” I don’t give a shit, David, how you feel. How you feel is irrelevant. That’s an idea I got from Henry Ford. You read his autobiography, he goes, “I feel sorry for these soft and flabby men that can only do great work when they feel like it.” Essentially, Henry Ford is saying “fuck your feelings.” Henry Ford’s point was a business exists to serve other people. There are going to be days when you get out of bed and you cannot wait to get to work, and that’s great. There are going to be days when you don’t want to go to work, and that is irrelevant because the business is not about you. The business does not exist for your pleasure. The business exists to serve other people. [Kris: this is why you should probably care about the customers]

The kindest thing anyone has ever done for David

The kindest thing anybody’s ever done for me happened a few decades before I was born. My grandfather on my dad’s side was living in Cuba. He was just 38 years old. He had a wife and a newborn baby when the Cuban Revolution happened and Castro took power. He didn’t understand the language, had no money and no education, and yet took the gigantic risk … and the complete correct choice at that time in his life … to flee Cuba to go to America, to give his family a better chance and a better opportunity. That one decision changed the entire trajectory of my life. None of my interests that I happen to be naturally born into, the passions that chose me, that I did not choose, would make a lick of difference if I grew up in Castro’s Cuba as opposed to America. As somebody that studies dead people for a living, it really resonates how our decisions not only affect our loved ones now and our family now and our friends now, but they reverberate through the generations. If you think about it not in the context of what’s going to happen in your life this year or next year, but how the decisions you’re making will affect people that aren’t even born yet, you’ll make your decisions differently.


My 9-year-old Son’s Takeaways

  • David only had books as a kid. NOTHING ELSE
  • David’s extended family is all EVIL
  • “Many people can run a company but not many can create one”
  • In every one of Rockefeller’s biographies, J. Gould always pops up.
  • Jordan joined the Dream Team just to see how other countries practice.
  • ” I’m not a fan of moderation. I’m attracted to extremes. What do you want your life experience to be? Do you want to be exceptional? Do you want to push the boundaries of your capabilities? Do you want to walk around in a fog butting up against your potential but never actually realizing it? Then knock yourself out. Be moderate. I’m not interested in that.”
  • “Nobody can think clearer than Steve Jobs”
  •  “Hey, those are good ideas. Human nature doesn’t change. Let’s use them.”
  • David reads his highlights 5 times.
  • What I like about podcasting is it is completely permissionless.
  • Dyson:  “Listen, it’s easy for me to celebrate my doggedness now. I made $300 million last year, but I’d be lying to you if there wasn’t times where I went inside my house, had my wife look at me in the face like I’m a failure and I’d cry myself to sleep, and I got up and did it again anyways.” Excellence is the capacity to take pain. I apply this to like, “I don’t really feel like working out right now. I don’t feel like doing cardio.” I don’t give a shit, David, how you feel. How you feel is irrelevant. That’s an idea I got from Henry Ford. You read his autobiography, he goes, “I feel sorry for these soft and flabby men that can only do great work when they feel like it.” Essentially, Henry Ford is saying “fuck your feelings.” Henry Ford’s point was a business exists to serve other people. There are going to be days when you get out of bed and you cannot wait to get to work, and that’s great. There are going to be days when you don’t want to go to work, and that is irrelevant because the business is not about you. The business does not exist for your pleasure. The business exists to serve other people.
  • In every episode, Patrick asks “what is the kindest thing anyone has ever done for you?” [I told Zak that fact, I guess he thought it was worth writing down]

Notes From Invest Like the Best: Brian Christian

Link: http://investorfieldguide.com/christian/

About Brian: Author covering humans’ relationship with technology and AI


Q: What advice would you give to people, building careers. We’re in a political cycle now where things like basic income are being discussed. In your view, what are the most defensible areas of human activity, whether that’s some sort of creativity or asking great questions coming up with the objective functions that you then feed the machines? What would you recommend people focus on as they think about either early or late in their career, adding value?

A: There are sort of two ways that I can approach this question. My second book is called the Algorithms to Live By and it looks at things like career decisions from an explicitly algorithmic perspective.

1) Explore/Exploit Trade-off

Description

There’s this paradigm, called the “explore/exploit” trade-off, which is: How much of your energy do you spend gathering information vs how much do you spend committing based on the information? There’s a number of decisions that we face throughout life, that take the form of a tension or a balance between trying new things and committing to the things that seem to be the best. Where to go out to eat, go to our favorite restaurant and we try a new restaurant. Reach out to a new acquaintance we’d like to get to know better or spend time with our close family or best friend. The same thing is true in investing, the same thing is true in managing your time and your career.

Generalizing the Problem

The structure of this problem is an iterated decision that you get to make over and over again. Do you continue to put energy into the things that seem promising, or do you spend your energy trying new things? A clinical trial can have that same structure, and indeed the FDA has been increasingly interested in looking over the disciplinary fence at the computer scientists and saying, maybe those algorithms that you’re using to optimize ads, could also be used to optimize human lives. The way a computer scientist, approaches this question is through something that’s called the multi-armed bandit problem.

The Multi-armed Bandit Problem

Background

In the multi-armed bandit problem you walk into a casino that has all these different slot machines. Some of them pay out with a higher probability than others, but you don’t know which are which. What strategy do you employ to try to make as much money in the casino as you can. It’s going to necessarily involve some amount of exploration trying out different machines to see which ones appear to pay out more than others, and exploitation, which to a computer scientist doesn’t have the negative connotation that it has you know in regular English exploitation meaning, but just leveraging the information you’ve gained so far to crank away on those machines that do seem to be the best. Intuitively I think most of us would recognize that you need to do some amount of both, but it’s not totally obvious what that balance should look like in practice, and indeed for much of the 20th century, this was considered not only an unsolved problem but an unsolvable problem, and sort of career suicide to think about. During WWII, the British mathematicians joked about dropping the multi armed bandit problem over Germany in the ultimate intellectual sabotage. Just waste the brainpower and nerd snipe all of the German mathematicians. To the field’s own surprise, there came a series of breakthroughs on the multi-armed bandit problem through the second half of the 20th century.

Solution

Now we have a pretty good idea of what exact solutions look like given a number of constraints, but also what sort of more general flexible algorithms look like. The critical insight into thinking about this problem is that your strategy should depend entirely on how long you plan to be in the casino. If you feel that you have a long time ahead of you, then it’s worth it to invest in exploration, because if you do find something great, it has a long horizon to pay out. On the other hand, if you feel that you are about to leave the casino, then the return that you would get on making a great new discovery is going to be much smaller, because you have fewer opportunities to crank away on that handle once you find it. We should naturally transition from being more exploratory at the beginning of a process to more exploitative at the end. I think that’s an intuition that makes sense, but the math bears that out very concretely.

Observation of “Explore/Exploit” Trade-Off in Real Life

Psychology

It’s interesting to see this idea that emerges in computer science in the late 50s through the 70s getting picked up by psychologists and cognitive scientists who are interested in human decision making. For example, Alison Gopnik at UC Berkeley who studies infant cognition, has been thinking about the “explore/exploit” trade-off as a framework for how the infant mind works. If you think about how children behave, we have all these stereotypes about children are just kind of random, they’re generally incompetent at things, and there’s a huge literature that shows that they have what’s called a “novelty bias”. They’re relentlessly interested in the next thing and the next thing and the next thing. Rather than viewing that as a kind of low willpower or attentional control issue, you can view it as the optimal strategy. It’s as if you’ve just burst through the doors of life’s casino and you have 80 years ahead of you. It really does make a lot of sense to just run around wildly pulling handles at random. The same is true for being in the later years of one’s life. We have a lot of stereotypes about older people being set in their ways and resistant to change. There’s a psychology literature that shows that older adults, maintain fewer social connections than younger people, and it’s tempting to view that pessimistically. In fact if you build an argument from the mathematics, you can see that older adults are simply in the exploit phase of their life and they are again doing the optimal thing, given where they are in that interval of time. You have psychologists like Stanford’s Laura Carstensen appealing to the “explore/exploit” trade off to make this argument that older adults know exactly what they’re doing and they’re very rationally choosing a strategy that makes sense given where they are. They have a lifetime’s exploration behind them, they know what they really like, they know the people and the connections that matter to them, and they have a finite amount of time left to reap the fruits of some new connection or new discoveries so they’re very deliberately enacting the strategy. The math should predict that, on average, older adults are happier than young people. Despite our preconceptions, and her research bears this out, that appears to be the case.

Business

In business, the problem is very dynamic, which will classify it in the domain of the “restless bandit problem”. Since the research here is cloudier, researchers can invert the thinking to infer the conditions that lead to the business strategies we can observe.

Q: Interesting how this maps on to the life cycles of businesses. In the business context, “explore” might be innovation and “exploit” might be to run the same playbook to earn high returns on capital or something you know works. It seems like you always want to be handing off to a next batch of exploration or innovation, while thoughtfully maintaining something that you know works if you want to survive for very long time.

A: There’s a couple of things that I think are interesting in a business context. One is that implicitly the casino framing that I’ve described assumes that those probabilities are stable and fixed. Of course, we know that the world is not stable and not fixed that things change over time. This is true in our personal lives as well. Your favorite restaurant gets a new line cook and the burgers are not as good. These things shift. This is known as the “restless bandit problem”. How do you play this game when these probabilities are drifting on a random walk?

This is a very interesting case where the theory is not yet consolidated but humans, in practice, seem to have no problem. If you put people in a lab and give them a restless bandit problem, they have no trouble making choices within that environment but we don’t yet know what the mathematics of the optimal solution looks like. So here’s the case where the computer scientists and the mathematicians are asking the cognitive scientists, what are your models for how humans are actually approaching this because there may be some insight that we can use from the theory side. One of the implications of thinking in this way that is particularly relevant in a business setting is if the interval of time you perceive yourself to be on determines the strategy that you should employ, then it should be the case that if you observe someone else’s strategy, you can infer the interval that they’re optimizing over.

Inferring The Explore/Exploit Strategy in a Restless Bandit Problem

Let’s give an example from Hollywood. Most people have noticed, it feels like we’re living through this deluge of sequels, such as Marvel movies. It turns out that this is objectively true. There’s a sea change in Hollywood. In 1982, 2 of the top 10 grossing films were sequels. By 1990 it was six. By the year 2000, it was eight, and I think most recently it was all ten. From that, we can infer that Hollywood has taken a very hard turn towards an exploitative strategy. They are milking their existing franchises, rather than investing money speculatively to try to develop new franchises that will last them into the next few decades. From that, it’s reasonable to infer that movie ticket sales are declining, which turns out to be the case. Hollywood correctly perceives itself to be at the waning time of the golden era of cinema-going. If that’s true, then they really should invest all of their money into just squeezing everything they can out of the existing franchises. More broadly, so you can look at different industries and different corporations to see if they cut their r&d budget. If they’ve given that money to marketing that’d be an indication that they feel that the area has matured or plateaued.

My thoughts

    1. Ahem, asset management, cough
    2. Reminds me of a great Peter Chernin interview where he suggests that every business must be trying to grow new opportunities faster than the the old ones die out. While you must do your best to milk the old, it’s imperative to develop the new.

2) Predicting the Impact of Automation

The second avenue is totally different from this way of thinking, which is just what will the impacts of something like AI or UBI be on the economy. I’m reminded of a McKinsey report on which jobs they thought would be the most robust. The big picture thing that was interesting to me is that it cuts across the traditional class lines. It is not a white-collar versus blue-collar thing. It’s not an upper middle class versus lower middle class thing. It’s very sector dependent. The most resilient or robust jobs at the top end was gardener, legislator, and psychotherapist. I thought that was very fascinating that it’s this eclectic mixture of things. I don’t think of myself as a prognosticator about these sorts of things but my way of thinking about it is that there’s a lot of kind of human machinery around how capital moves and how laws get made. How licensing and permitting happen. It’s still done at a human negotiation level. “I know a guy. I’ll talk to Joe and we’ll sort it out.” I think humans will maintain oversight of these kind of flows of power and capital, even if the actual value is being created by software. So position yourself closer to the flow of that value than the actual creation of the value, which may be counterintuitive.

As far as the question of UBI, I don’t have a great intuition for that. There is already a restlessness in the labor force. A lot of the careers that employ some of the most numbers of people are the most vulnerable. People who drive cars or trucks, people who work in warehouses. A lot of those jobs are just one innovation away, and it’s not clear to me that there’s going to be a political response as well as just a pure economic response. I grew up in New Jersey where there was a robust toll collector union yet they had machines where you could toss your change in a bin and it would automatically sort your change and give you whatever you needed back from that. There was an effective effort to unionize the toll collectors so that you still had a human being in the booth counting out your quarters. That’s an example where it’s not for lack of technology. We had a coin sorting machine, but there was a political process that was directing the actual level of implementation. People will fight to use licensing requirements and regulations to maintain those things. Despite the actual technological capability having radically changed, it’s very hard to know which areas will look shockingly different than the world looks today. Which things will be in some ways shockingly backwards for their time because we’ve had for political reasons to hold the line.

(Reminds me of how rent flows to the owner of a relationship in a competitive market that has been flattened by technology)

Algorithms to make other types of decisions

The mathematics is very instructive, both in a specific way but also has a broader set of principles.

Optimal Stopping Problem

Difference from “explore/exploit” trade-off

One thing that comes to mind is the idea called “optimal stopping”. The multi-armed bandit problem in the “explore/exploit trade off” presumes framing that’s highly iterative. You can pull the handles again and again and again. You can go from one machine to another and back. There are many decisions in life where you are forced to make a single binding commitment that could be anything as banal as pulling into a parking space. It could be something like purchasing a house or signing a lease. It could be something like marrying your spouse. There’s a separate mathematics of cases where you need to find the right moment in time to go all-in, commit to an option, and no longer gather any further information.

37% Rule

There’s this very famous result called the “37% rule”. Let’s say you’re looking for an apartment. And it’s a really competitive marketplace. You’re in a situation where you encounter a series of options one by one. And at each point in time, you must either immediately commit, and then never know what else might have been out there, or decide to walk away and keep exploring your options but lose that opportunity forever. What do you do to try to end up with the best thing possible, even though you, you won’t necessarily know at the time, whether you found the best option that might be out there? There’s this beautifully elegant result that says that you should spend the first 37% of your search non-committally exploring your options. Don’t bring your checkbook, don’t commit to anything No matter how good it seems you’re just purely setting a baseline. After that 37%, whether it’s 37% of the time that you’ve given yourself to make the decision or 37% of the way through the pool of options, be prepared to immediately commit to the very first thing you see that’s better than what you saw in that first 37%. This is not just an intuitively satisfying balance between looking and leaping, this is the mathematically optimal result.

Broader insights on algorithms

Elegant solutions under a range of narrow assumptions about goals and acceptable risks

There are strategies like that that I think are wonderfully crisp in the recommendation they give, but they, of course, rest on this bed of many different assumptions about exactly how the problem is structured and exactly what your goals are. This rule, presumes that your entire goal is to maximize the chance that you get the very best thing in the entire pool, but it comes with a 37% chance of course that you have nothing at all, because you’ve passed. Many people would find that unacceptable. We can go down the rabbit hole of how do you modify this and the solutions get less and less clean as you wiggle the assumptions around.

Intuition for how complex decision-making is can be strangely comforting

More broadly, one of the highest level takeaways for me, from working on the book and just thinking in computational terms about decisions in my own life, is some decisions are just hard. The classical optimal stopping problem, due to a weird mathematical symmetry, is that if you follow the 37% rule you will only succeed 37% of the time. The other 63% of the time you’ll fail, and that is the best possible strategy you could enact in that situation. In a weird way, that’s some measure of consolation because often, in real life, we find ourselves not getting the outcome we wanted. While we can rake ourselves over the coals or try to reconstruct our entire thought process, I think it’s some comfort that computer science and mathematics can, in effect, certify that you were just up against a hard problem. There is some measure of comfort that if you have the kind of the vocabulary to understand the type of problem that you’re facing, and you have some intuitions about the general shape of what optimal solutions look like, then even when you don’t get the outcome that you wanted you can in some sense rest easy because you knew that you followed the appropriate procedure or the appropriate process for dealing with that situation.

Notes from Invest Like the Best: Ali Hamed

Link: http://investorfieldguide.com/ali/

About Ali: Partner at CoVenture fund


His approach

  • He looks at new asset classes that can be hard to value.
  • Alternative financing like asset-backed loans (loans against fruit inventory, app for fast-food chain which allows them to clock employees in and out and allow them to pay employees whenever they wanted for a slight pay haircut)
  • Fee structures depend on the dispersion of manager skill.

Coventure recognized many seed companies never get to Series A

  • Fail to build the planned software to get to market. So Covenutures helps them.
  • Software types who don’t understand the industry they are building a solution for
  • Don’t understand the team they need

How does CoVenture fit into this?

The lesson is that the capital was easier to find than the people who can execute so :

  • Giving young businesses guidance and connecting them to the personnel they need is very valuable.
  • Having a service which serves common needs to many prospective startups is how to scale this idea.

Thoughts on cost of capital

  • If one VC fund can convince its LPs to accept 1/2 the going return because it has the clout to get the best deals that’s another way of saying it has a lower cost of capital. Sequoia can offer lower rates of return because they are less risky than an upstart fund
  • These relative differences in costs of capital sustain significant advantages.
  • A fund may offer a startup cheap financing in exchange for warrants (similar to a convert). This is a bad strategy b/c the performance of the instruments is inversely correlated. If the company takes off and does well, the warrants will perform but a larger fund with a low cost of capital like Blackrock or Apollo will refinance the debt piece for cheaper. In the case where the debt is not refinanced the warrants will be worthless.

Conundrums for seed funds

  • They are expected to “stick to their knitting” and be contrarian. This is practically impossible since being contrarian requires you to exit the seed company in a year or so to a Series A fund which is by definition consensus.
  • Any seed fund of quality naturally wants to raise more money but will find itself capacity constrained so it will drift towards Series A deals which are outside their expertise
  • Pre-seed round is about trying to methodically uncover if you are creating customer value. Revenue can be falsely equated to customer value. For example, you can spend money marketing which will lead to more revenue but this is not the relevant KPI (“key performance indicator”) to test the hypothesis that you are increasing customer value. The seed round is then about trying to find out if the improvements to KPI can scale.
  • Important to have a strong understanding of the role of the round you are in
  • Judgment vs Empathy at the core of a solution
    • Empathy reflects a true understanding of the practical trade-offs that lie within a business problem.
    • Judgment is typically what an arrogant or ignorant outsider looking at the problem prescribes when crafting the solution
  • Technology has made starting companies cheap but scaling is more expensive.
    • Trade-off when raising capital: balancing getting off to a fast start to acquire customers and scale versus discipline and overleverage.

A link to another post with takeaways from this podcast: https://thewaiterspad.com/2018/01/24/ali-hamed/

Notes from Invest Like the Best: Jesse Livermore

Link: http://investorfieldguide.com/livermore/

About Jesse: Jesse Livermore is a pseudonym for the financial blogger behind philosophicaleconomics.com.


3 Methods for Drawing Meaningful Inference

  1. Intuition
    • Benefit: Low cost and readily accessible
    • Costs
      • Downside is noisy especially in ‘wicked’ learning environments
      • Not transparent
    • Traders are high in ‘cognitive reflection’ and stronger intuition
      • Careful deliberation is a hallmark. Studies have shown that people who take too long or too little to decide do worse.
      • Intuition is necessary to pull triggers, but deciding too quickly without careful deliberation leads to poorer inference
  2. Analysis
    • Benefits
      • Don’t need to gather data
      • A model of how something works can handle regime change by having a transparent mechanism from input to output
    • Costs
      • They are always incomplete and “so easy to be wrong”. The fact that we are prone to stories compounds the danger of analysis.
    • Using it responsibly
      • Leave margin for error
      • Validate

3. Data Analysis

    • Benefit: It is rooted in reality
    • Costs
      • Without context can be misleading
      • It is more costly
      • Requires sufficient “trial size” not just a naively high sample size
        • If your samples are highly correlated than your effective trial size is much smaller than you think. For example, all financial data drawn from a single regime or independent coin flips with an unfair coin
      • Data mining and multiple comparison
        • Patterns emerge randomly so this can occur in subtle ways, not necessarily because of fraud or nefarious incentives
          • Suggestions:
            • “Call your shot”
            • Out of sample test
            • Avoid overfitting by testing outcomes against variables that you know should not matter (for example, changing the day of the week an investing strategy occurs on should not change the result meaningfully)

Earnings are a distorted measure

  • Current strict accounting standards around depreciation understate earnings relative to history
    • Old accounting standards did not adjust depreciation for inflation effectively understating inflation and overstating earnings. The market is wise and understood that earnings were overstated and assigned lower multiples during a period of excessive inflation
    • Difficult to compare multiples over time because of this change in standards
    • Depreciation is not just about physical decay of an asset but the competitiveness of an asset. E.g: Inventory of Kodak cameras become obsolete much faster than their physical decay when digital cameras emerged. Any typical depreciation formula would have vastly understated the depreciation of the assets and overestimated the book value.
  • Inflation overstates earnings
    • He calculated the book value of the entire market and keeps track of retained earnings
    • The earnings being overstated means that the retained earnings that remain to actually be either re-invested or paid out to shareholders are understated once adjusted for inflation and compared to history. This means that published return on equity is likely understated because the money being re-invested is actually understated.
    • This is a known issue
      • Studied by prior economists
      • Big corps like Sears in mid-1900s argued for inflation adjusting depreciation because the overstated earnings were weakening their position in labor negotiations
  • Free cash flow handles many of these distortions more accurately
    • Free cash flow “plunges” during high inflation periods validating the distortions caused by inflation on earnings
  • P/IE Ratio (price to ‘integrated equity’)adjusts for all these shortcomings
    • outperforms all measures of valuation including many permutations of CAPE in correlating to future returns.
    • Highly correlated itself to CAPE and tells us that market is on the higher end of valuation which Jesse thinks is structurally justifiable
  • If you want to  dig deeper, OSAM published their joint findings

Why is it plausible that markets get permanently more expensive?

  1. Valuation is a function of the required rate of return to which liquidity is an input. Imagine a pre-Fed wildcat bank. You would not accept such meager real rates of return because you do not have the confidence in the liquidity of your deposit. So much of our required rates of return come down to confidence. The progress of finance has been towards greater networks levels confidence which creates downward pressure on required rates of return. The Fed put is an example of this.
  2. With low growth and inflation (demographics follow Japan, Europe), volatility will be to the downside but the Fed can also act more aggressively without fear of inflation. Higher structural valuations may be reflecting this market understanding.
  • Implications
    • Trend: we are seeing less trend formation and more whipsaws. Speculative but possibly due to Fed put. This has led Jesse to try to restrict his trend strategy to when it is most likely to work (ie fewer whipsaws). Historically, trend’s alpha has come from times of large market drawdowns. So he uses the trend strategy when it coincides with fundamental recession indicators. He admits the sample size is small so the research is thin and probably overfit. Best recession indicators:
      • Retail sales
      • Earnings
      • Unemployment trend
      • Housing starts
      • Industrial Production
    • He is agnostic on trend. Thinks it works but is worried about it.

Valuing the Market

  • CAPE and other statistical attempts to correlate valuation with future returns suffer from small trial sizes. Markets cycles so multiple years in succession are really just a draw from the same regime (overlapping data sets)
  • An alternative method of using the relative supply of assets to predict future returns. Derived from his work. My own notes on his full post are here.
  • Interesting inefficiency which hints at the validity of this: There are some egregiously overpriced preferred stocks carrying low yields, are callable, and sit in inferior positions in the cap structure. The only reasonable explanation is they are in relatively short supply. It’s a “rare baseball card”. The explanation issuance of preferred stocks has declined faster than investment demand for yielding securities. In other words, the demand for asset allocation in relative proportions has not changed as much as the composition of supply has changed.
  • Being biased towards flow-based explanations of pricing myself, I find this idea very compelling
  • His conclusions without proof: supply matters and there are inefficiencies. The presence of the inefficiency doesn’t surprise me since constrained supply means fear of squeezes and lack of scalability. Arbitrage or relative value trading is less likely to close the mispricing.

How using OSAM data, he tried to gain insight into how factors work

  • Value and momentum work very differently
  • His “Factors From Scratch” work with OSAM (O’Shaugnessey Asset Management)
  • My own notes on his post as well as the related OSAM work on “Alpha Within Factors”

Notes from Invest Like the Best Podcast: David Epstein

Link: http://investorfieldguide.com/epstein/

About David: Best-selling author of The Sports Gene and Range: Why Generalists Triumph in a Specialized World.  A former journalist at Sports Illustrated and ProPublica, David is also known for his talks on performance science and the proper use of data across many fields including sports, medicine and natural sciences.

Transcription: Otter.ai


Epstein’s Research Process

  • 10 journal articles a day for 1 year; hire translators for foreign journals
  • Consults with statistician 

A weaker  10,000 hours idea (Tiger vs Roger Problem)

  • Contrary Research Favoring Breadth

Showed elite athletes did not require a head start in deliberate practice. More likely specialization was delayed. A long sampling period exposed them to many sports which allowed them to better match their abilities to the sport.  Evidence: Success of Olympic talent transfer programs in other countries

Why?

Lots of variation in how people respond to stimulus. True of medicine. True of training. You baseline ability is uncorrelated with your ability to improve with training, which makes extrapolating difficult. “So much to gain from fitting people into the right sport”

  • Supporting research flaws
    • “Restriction of range” problem with the study of 30 violinists. When you squash the range of a variable that is correlated with the dependent variable you risk understating the correlation with the restricted variable. In this case, the sample was violinists who had already been accepted to a famous academy. We have squashed their innate talent even though it likely has a wide range. Likewise, if you studied the correlation of height to points scored in basketball for NBA players you find a jarring negative correlation but that is because you are selecting from a sample of abnormally tall players, to begin with. You’ve squashed the height variable, which would lead people to think that height has no impact on points scored. 
    • Inconsistent numerical data, no estimates of variances on variables, poor statistical inference

Learning

  • When to be like Tiger?
    • Kind learning environment
      • Fast, accurate feedback
      • Discrete turns
      • Well defined rules
  • When to be like Roger? 
    • Wicked learning environment
      • “Martian Tennis”: You see people out there playing, something’s going on, you don’t know the rules, it’s up to you to introduce them. And they could change at any moment without notice. And that’s the situation that we’re actually in for most of the things, the complex things that most of us care about.”
  • Most surprising study in Range: air force study is a natural experiment. Professors who were the best at causing students to do well in their own class do well on the test, (ie overperforming compared to the baseline characteristics they came in with) systematically undermined those students “deep learning” (performance in the follow on courses).
    • Professors taught narrow performance to optimize for their own exam to their detriment for overall learning. They undermined the students “making connections” framework. Professors failed to learn themselves because the students who would feel rapid progress would rate them highly. “really wicked feedback”
    • Professors themselves are incentivized to maximize for short term evaluations which have impaired their ability to teach frameworks that students can apply in novel situations.
    • Professors who did not teach to the test taught broader concepts relying less on “using procedures” knowledge. This type of knowledge is most effective in kind learning environments where possible tasks and choices are restricted. 
  • “Closed skills”: techniques that you can teach very quickly and see an advantage. these are temporary advantages as people with broader frameworks eventually catch up but have brought wider understanding as well.
  • Around the world, we are performing better on “culturally reduced tests” (meaning tests that are not influenced by formal learning). Our collective performance should stay stable on this portion of tests but in fact, our performance is increasing. Known as the Flynn effect. Flynn speculates “we have moved to a world where we are used to classifying things to grouping things instead of being stuck with lots of concrete knowledge and, and factual knowledge.” Pre-modern people did not have much need for classification, but the modern world relies heavily on this ability since we’re constantly laterally translating knowledge to different areas we’ve never seen. This ability to have knowledge that we don’t have from hands-on exposure is really important.

(Me: Don’t be fooled by a sense of progress when the task you are excelling at is not varying. Being able to match abstract models to a correct strategy is a more valuable goal and benefits from practice in dealing with variation. )

  • Learning hacks supported research but ignored by the media (3 out of 5)
    • Testing: Test people before they have a chance to study. It primes your brain and exploits the “hypercorrection” effect — our tendency to remember the correct answer to a question you tuned out to be wrong about
    • Spacing: Intervals between practice make learning stick longer. A useful technique is to learn several subjects at once. Switching provides natural breaks.
      • “Difficulty isn’t a sign that you’re not learning but ease is”. To maximize stickiness you actually want to re-learn something just after you have forgotten it! Your steepest learning occurs when the task is difficult.
    • Interleaving: Mixing types of problems will extend the time it takes to learn one type but improves broader ability to match approach to the type.

Grit is Misunderstood

West Point study: the survey which measured grit was more predictive than the conventional metrics for predicting who would complete Beast Barracks (physically demanding module of training). This grit survey was applied to other domains like the Spelling Bee championship contenders. Grit appears to have a measurable, effect independent of other variables. 

  • Problem with these studies is they suffer from the same “restriction of range” problem
  • The measured effect is significant but small. Much smaller than what companies are interested in testing for. 
  • Sample of people is dedicated to a short term task like winning a spelling bee or completing their training. Very difficult to generalize to a wider measure of this individuals’ determination when the task is less well-defined
  • When zoomed out, we find that attrition is a poor proxy for ‘lack of grit’. Attrition is occurring in a time when people in these studies are going through periods of rapid self-discovery and personality change during their early 20s (this is the peak change period in our lives) and re-assessing as they search for “match quality”. The degree of fit between work, interests, and ability. 
  • Grit is not necessarily stable. It seems to vary within the same individual depending on the context or task.
  • In general, the study of grit is has been contained to very short term, narrow environments

Avoiding Premature Optimization

Paul Graham admonishes against working towards some projection of future self when you are young since what you can conceive is too limited because your experience is limited. Too risky to throw yourself on a path based on such a limited hunch. 

  • Our personality is only .23 correlated between teen years and middle age
  • We learn by doing then reflecting, rather than introspecting to form a theory about ourselves. Frequent trial and error is a better way to decide which direction to go.
  • Harvard’s Darkhorse Project studies how people match careers. The students who matched best excelled in short term planning.
  • Economist Robert Miller refers to the “2 arm bandit process”. Metaphor on a gambler pulling levers in a casino, getting feedback, before focusing on a game. He advocates jumping into high risk, high reward fields early because you learn the most from them. That informational signal is a faster input into your decision path. 

Opportunity to recombine

Information including specialized information is disseminated more widely and quickly than ever and at an increasing rate giving people greater opportunity to recombine from all the available information. 

  • Parallel trenches: “everyone’s in their own trench and not usually standing up to look over at the next trench even though that might be where their answer is” (this is why he hires translators)
    • Gunpei Yokoi — Nintendo employee who used lateral thinking to recombine older, cheaper, “withered” technologies to create products including the GameBoy. The GameBoy competed with more advanced products on the basis of its ease and durability.
    • Yokoi viewed cutting edge technologies as zero-sum arm’s races fought by specialists. “Many more opportunities to take this stuff that was already well known that everyone was looking past and recombine them in new ways”
    • We are in an age where its feasible for a generalist to crowdsource specialists in novel ways which allow them to outperform specialists themselves (Kaggle has been able to solve problems that have stumped NASA)
    • Specialists perform better when the next steps are clear and the path is more obvious. The right mix of generalists and optimists depends on how well characterized the problem is. 
    • 3M has many interesting examples and lateral thinking is entrenched in their DNA. They maintain a “periodic table of technologies” so its teams can use their awareness to recombine. 
  • Superman or Fantastic Four
    • Metric that best predicted a comic book creator’s potential to write a blockbuster was the range of genres they covered, not reps or experience. 
    • In addition, they found that a team of writers with combined experience in diverse genres outperformed a single writer unless the single writer was fluid in at least 4 genres. “Individual in some ways is the best unit for integrating information” although a diverse team is next best. 
  • To a specialist with a hammer “everything looks like a nail”
    • Specialists continuing to administer procedure in face of evidence that it doesn’t work
      • Scandinavian meniscus placebos undermine the benefit of surgery 
      • Practices that make intuitive sense (“bioplausible”) but poorly supported by evidence
        • When outcomes are poor surrogates for health: stents for otherwise healthy people with a narrowed artery do not reduce their heart attack or mortality rates. A wider artery is not a perfect proxy for the desired outcome because “There’s a clogged artery, how could opening it up not work. It’s got to work except it turns out the body’s much more complicated than like a kitchen sink, and we didn’t design it. And it’s the disease is much more diffuse.” (Me: any counterintuitive but effective remedy that works by using a seemingly oblique strategy is at risk of confusing surrogate markers for the outcome. Hormetic processes, body’s use of iron, etc).
  • A better way forward
    • Need generalists to work with the specialists for a more zoomed out view which better aligns practice with objectives. Medicine seems especially prone to the errors and resistance to reform that can result when an inordinate amount of specialists populate a “wicked” learning environment
    • Medicine and similar “wicked” environments are “devilishly” hard. It will take generational change as the entire approach to “how information is evaluated and how scientific thinking works”. Need to de-specialize a bit and increase breadth. Statistical understanding requires more than “hitting buttons on a statistical program”
    • Freeman Dyson has said we need more birds in medicine. “Frogs are down on the ground looking at like a very narrow area of the ground, the birds are up. They don’t have a good definition on the ground, but they see the bigger picture. And I think we need to make the medical ecosystem more friendly to some of these birds who are looking at the outcomes we actually care about, not just those surrogate markers or did I fix the meniscus?”

Invest Like the Best: Andy Rachleff

Link: http://investorfieldguide.com/andy/

About Andy: Partner at Benchmark Capital and CEO of Wealthfront


Benchmark Capital started in 1995 by 5 equal partners (including Bill Gurley)

Strategies 

  • Turn your opponents biggest strengths to weaknesses
    • The biggest competitor at the time was Kleiner Perkins and ‘the best venture capitalist that ever lived’ John Doerr. Benchmark would woo portfolio companies using a team approach since not all Kleiner Perkins companies had access to Doerr.
    • The second strength of KP they flipped was the promise of doing business with other portfolio companies. Benchmark painted this advantage as an obligation they were free from if they joined Benchmark. Benchmark took a backseat to the portfolio companies management and did not demand to be the chairman of the board.
  • The other interesting thing they did was not allow the partners to ‘suck up the economics’ in the room. As soon as partner’s felt it was time to relax they needed to step aside for the younger team to be able to step up.
  • “Putting the gun in the other person’s hand”
    • Partner Bruce Dunlevie philosophy of trustfully dealing with people and if the person took advantage of him he would not work with them. This technique would usually engender trust and good faith in others

Product Market Fit

  • Products that are ‘bought not sold’. Delighted customers demand the product.
  • Running a business with such a product leaves lots of room for operational error and explains how a “25 year old can run a billion-dollar business”
  • The first book on the topic was Steve Case’s “The Four Steps to the Epiphany” which his eventual student Eric Ries would update and improve with “The Lean Startup” These books used the scientific method to approach business
    • A ‘value’ hypothesis needs to be proven
    • A ‘growth’ hypothesis is validated if growth is exponential and organic (ie word of mouth).
      • Growth hacking via experiments and A/B testing.
    • Typical businesses focus on the who, where and what and iterate on the what. Great technology companies ramp a new technology by finding the ‘who’. This is often not obvious and leads to non-consensus outcomes. This is now commonly understood (Me: reminds me of ‘theory of demand aggregation’)

His role as operator vs investor

  • Now as Wealthfront of CEO vs an investor a few points:
    • The skills aren’t necessarily transferrable
    • He speaks less on boards realizing how little perspective he has compared to management
  • “Crossing the Chasm” by Geoffrey Moore first book that discussed product adoption cycle and diffusion of innovation

Wealthfront features that grabbed my attention

  • Peer reviewed rules based strategies
    • Tax loss harvesting (added 1.8% pa). Automating it in software allows more consistent application of decades-old strategy (Me: Twitter discussions suggest this is highly overstated)
    • Tax loss harvesting within an index adds 25-50 bps pa. This includes selling index components that had losses and buy correlated names to maintain exposure
    • Portfolio line of credit leveraging risk-based margining. For accounts >100k this provides access to cheap loans
    • No hedge funds or expensive alts bc of the Grouch Marx “I don’t want to be a member of any club that will have me”. The best institutional investors are long term, not performance chasing (ie endowments and charitable foundations). The worst of the funds can’t access them so they would be the only ones open to listing on retail platforms. Classic adverse selection.

Business strategy not always best self strategy

  • In business, amplifying what you excel at has a better payoff than improving weaknesses. He asserts that this is also professionally true at the career level since differentiating expertise is a large determinant of a person’s value-add. He mentions that this is not the same strategy one should employ in their personal life, where boosting your weaknesses as a person is very valuable. In professional life, learning from success can certainly be more important than learning from failure. “I’m not hiring you because of what you can’t do. [I’m hiring you] because you have learned some tricks!”
  • Well-rounded people are interesting to talk to but not necessarily the best teammates in a business.

Invest Like the Best: Brad Stulberg

Link: http://investorfieldguide.com/brad/

About Brad: Performance coach and author of Peak Performance


Findings

  • Studying brains we find that people can summon extreme abilities if they have core beliefs which override the fear responses in their brain (is lifting a car off of a person trapped underneath). The importance lies in having core beliefs or purpose.
  • The Growth Equation: Stress + rest = growth
    • Need the right amount of stress/stimuli. Too much stress is overwhelming, too little leads to no adapting.
    • Just manageable challenges are those which are just outside your comfort zone. It’s self-defeating to onboard too many of these at once.
  • Mechanics of creativity
    1. Immersion: this work is stress
    2. Incubation: stepping away (this is the rest)
    3. Creative insight…this tends to happen after a period of rest…end of a vacation, in the shower, taking a walk.
  • Studies show deep work cycles are most effective in 45 to 90 min blocks followed by 15-20 min breaks.

Practical Tips

  • Whether you perform better in the am or pm is largely biologically determined. Manage your energy not time. If you are better at focused work in the am, then reserve that time for that.
  • Time in nature or outside is shown to improve stress, physical, cognitive markers.
  • Study of air force cadet squadrons showed that group performance was more influenced by the lowest common denominator as opposed to the leading performer. The group has more to gain from eliminating bad attitudes than from enhancing leadership.
  • Fatigue happens in the brain, not the body. Your central nervous system slows you down. How to overcome this? When interviewing peak performers you find that they are thinking about a larger purpose than what they are doing. So marathoner thinking of his family can override his brain’s fatigue signals.

Invest Like the Best: Jason Karp

Link: http://investorfieldguide.com/karp/

About Jason: Founder and CIO of Tourbillon Capital Partners


Growth of private markets

  • Smaller supply of scalable opportunities and increased competition
    • Less companies going public and staying private for longer. 50% of listed companies compared to 20 years ago (mostly M&A and lack of IPOs as opposed to bankruptcy)
    • Unicorns able to get unprecedented amount of private funding
  • Increasingly competitive public markets for short term performance.
    • Data from prime brokers shows that over 90% of flows driven by non-discretionary accounts (CTA, systematic, quant, passive).
      • He argues that this has caused large dislocation opportunities in past 5 years in valuations when historically values typically take no longer than 3-5 years to converge to fair valuations.
    • Short term pressures on advisors (quarterly performance, fee compression) incentivize move away from mark-to-market and costs of wooing performance-chasing allocators.
    • Information edges are gone or not scalable
      • Data points include the sheer number of funds and books referencing ‘value’ investing.
      • Growth of quant platforms like Quantopian.
      • The growth of data sets favors short term trading which is the domain of quants.
      • Ratio of sell side analysts to public stocks is at an all-time high
      • Reg FD neutralized many active managers’ edge b/c large commission paying funds could no longer get privileged info

How to compete in a competitive, expensive market

  • Look for real business growth. If a company is growing faster than it’s implied multiple there is a margin of safety that can ensure an investment in the event of multiple contraction
  • The deep value game is difficult since it’s a basket of adverse selection. A small minority will turnaround their distressed situation. It’s easier to look for ‘value’ names that are growing than it is to pick ‘deep’ value names to revert
  • Align investors with long term horizon as a structural edge. The only way to profit from longer-term dislocations. The current environment has a historic high correlation of growth to momentum which is a trend that continues to pay off, in turn, reinforcing the exit of value flows and increase in quant/momentum flows setting up a historic relative value opportunity.
  • Understand cyclicality and stickiness- He calibrates the riskiness of a business with the nature of its sales. Stickier businesses are less risky (ie high consumer daily engagement)
    • Fashion is unpredictable
    • Cyclical’s are dependent on GDP
    • Staples are more dependable