Transcript of Kevin Muir on Intentional Investor

Matt Zeigler interviewed Kevin Muir. The interview is 5 stars so I am memorializing the transcript so I can easily refer back to it.

Watch the Full Interview: Kevin Muir – The Intentional Investor

My top highlights

  • Analysis of Monopoly Properties
    Kris: I remember discussing exactly this topic in a SIG interview. When you come out of jail, the most likely properties you land on are the tan ones.
  • “Why Can’t You Just Enjoy Things?”
    His wife’s question (paired with a great Scrabble story) underscores a key lesson: Do your best, work hard, but eventually just throw it out there and see what happens—then move on to the next one. This is reinforced by his unpredictable success with writing.
  • Getting His First Job and His Dad’s Advice
  • The Luck of Being a Computer-and-Markets Guy
    Reminds me of Marc Andreessen’s advice about how if you are 90th percentile in each of 2 domains, you are 99th in join probability space (.1 * .1). But Kevin’s story also shows the importance of luck—his joint skills perfectly matched a short window in time before specialization took over technology.
  • The Pickoff Story: Honor, Ethics, and Reputation

Then these 3 parts which I bring special attention to:

  • Leaving Corporate Life
  • Romanticizing the Past
  • The Secondary Effect: Norwegian Art Story

Leaving Corporate Life

The emphasis is mine. 🔥

Anyway, we have our first kid when I’m 29. I’d been at RBC for six years or so. At that point, the bank was slowly overtaking the dealer. It started as an entrepreneurial place, but over time, the bank got more involved. Rightfully so—I look back at some of the stuff we were doing, and I’m like, “I’d never let some 27-year-old punk do this.” It was irresponsible. We made tons of money, and it was fun, but I wasn’t mature enough to realize that was a unique time, not how life always works.

The bank starts creeping in, telling me, “You can’t trade this, you can’t trade that.” I’m getting in trouble—“Kev, you can’t do this.” Then we have our daughter. She’s born with a heart defect, corrected at birth, but it was a very emotional time for me. It was like a near-death experience—not that I died, but it hit me hard. I never felt the same way about work after that. A couple of other things made it less fun too. Three months after she’s born, we have our best quarter ever, and I think, “I’m going to be like Michael Jordan—sink the basket and walk away.” So I quit.

At the time, I didn’t know what I’d do next. I hadn’t made enough to never work again, but enough to not worry about the next year. I thought, “I could work for a hedge fund, but I don’t want to do sell-side again for a while.” If I worked at a hedge fund for a year and quit, people would remember me as the schmuck who lasted a year. But if I tried something on my own for a year and then went to a hedge fund, no one would care about that year. So I started trading for myself. Eventually, another guy from my old shop joined me, and that was it. Along the way, I started writing the letter and doing the podcast.

One thing I laugh about—I’ve never really had a steady paycheck. Even at RBC, it was a small draw, and it’s been “eat what you kill” for the last 35 years.


Romanticizing the Past

Interviewer: People romanticize the past, thinking it was easy to make money.
Kevin: Exactly.

“I tell people my story, and I always say, ‘Oh, I would have made so much money back then; it was so easy.’ And everyone always thinks it was so easy. But I always tell them, ‘Listen, it wasn’t easy.’ Right now, there’s somebody who is quietly making a fortune, someone who has figured out the equivalent of my interlisted arbitrage. When I was doing my interlisted arbitrage on my machine, I wasn’t telling everyone—I was quiet about it. There’s somebody somewhere doing the exact same thing.

“There are always people making money, and it’s always hard. I remember thinking specifically, when I would listen to their stories—like the trader above me, 5 or 10 years older than me—I’d think, ‘If I had just been there when 87 happened, if I had just been there then…’ People always look back on the past, over-romanticizing it.”

[Kris: If I had a dollar for every time I’ve  heard someone think this about floor trading…The attrition rate of floor traders was insane. Another new face? Give him a month and we’ll see  if he’s around. Also, if I had a dollar  for every time I said this about someone before me! We project our current tools onto the past. I wont’ re-hash it because Nick Maggiulli does a great job on this topic. See The Privilege of Knowledge.]


The Secondary Effect: Norwegian Art Story

Interviewer: Tell the Norwegian art story—it relates to this.
Kevin:

I’ll quickly go through it. For those who don’t know, in the late ’60s and early ’70s, I believe, Norway discovered oil off their coast. It was this huge boom, and everyone was rushing out to get blocks of water they could drill in. There was an enormous fortune to be made with this Norwegian offshore oil boom. For those who don’t know, we think of Norway as a very rich country now, but up until that point, it wasn’t. It was actually the poorer of the Scandinavian countries, mostly reliant on fishing—not a lot was going on in Norway. So, they discovered this oil, and the long and short of it is that all these guys were rushing out to buy pieces of this water to drill in.

Then there’s this trader who looks at the situation and says, ‘Okay, that’s getting fully priced in. What can I do?’ He decides to start accumulating Norwegian art. He just starts buying all this art, and you might think, ‘What kind of crazy guy is this? Why is he buying Norwegian art?’ The long and short of it is that he had figured out that once all these guys made their fortune from the offshore oil, they’d be looking for something to do with their money. Art is a very local market, and when a Norwegian guy makes some money, yes, he might go buy a Picasso, but he’s also suddenly going to want Norwegian art. So, while everyone was busy fighting and paying too much for this offshore oil, this guy was quietly accumulating Norwegian art. A year or two later, when all these newly rich guys started looking to spend their money, he was there with offerings for them and made a fortune that way.

To me, that epitomizes trading. What’s interesting is if you go back and read Liar’s Poker again, you’ll see Michael Lewis talks about two guys who were his mentors. One of them is this guy, Dash Riprock, I think, who sits around watching for a bond to be, say, 30 seconds too expensive, and then he arbitrages it. He’s kind of a block-and-tackle kind of guy—just straightforward. But then there’s this other guy, this big, bold trader. If you reread that section, Lewis describes how, when something happens, this trader is already onto the next iteration, trying to figure out, ‘Okay, this is occurring—what’s the next step?’ Instead of just focusing on the first derivative, he goes for the second derivative. In other words, he thinks, ‘Once everyone does this, what’s that going to mean for the next thing?’ It’s like thinking multiple moves ahead in chess.

[Kris: The character in Liar’s Poker is named Alexander. This is an example of Alex’s second-derivative thinking, which I refer to in Trading Is A Team Sport:

The second pattern to Alexander’s thought was that in the event of a major dislocation, such as a stock market crash, a natural disaster, the breakdown of OPEC’s production agreements, he would look away from the initial focus of investor interest and seek secondary and tertiary effects.

Remember Chernobyl? When news broke that the Soviet nuclear reactor had exploded, Alexander called. Only minutes before, confirmation of the disaster had blipped across our Quotron machines, yet Alexander had already bought the equivalent of two supertankers of crude oil. The focus of investor attention was on the New York Stock Exchange, he said. In particular it was on any company involved in nuclear power. The stocks of those companies were plummeting. Never mind that, he said. He had just purchased, on behalf of his clients, oil futures. Instantly in his mind less supply of nuclear power equaled more demand for oil, and he was right. His investors made a large killing. Mine made a small killing. Minutes after I had persuaded a few clients to buy some oil, Alexander called back.

“Buy potatoes,” he said. “Gotta hop.” Then he hung up. Of course. A cloud of fallout would threaten European food and water supplies, including the potato crop, placing a premium on uncontaminated American substitutes. Perhaps a few folks other than potato farmers think of the price of potatoes in America minutes after the explosion of a nuclear reactor in Russian, but I have never met them.

But Chernobyl and oil are a comparatively straightforward example. There was a game we played called What if? All sorts of complications can be introduced into What if? Imagine, for example, you are an institutional investor managing several billion dollars. What if there is a massive earthquake in Tokyo? Tokyo is reduced to rubble. Investors in Japan panic. They are selling yen and trying to get their money out of the Japanese stock market. What do you do?

Well, along the lines of pattern number one, what Alexander would do is put money into Japan on the assumption that since everyone was trying to get out, there must be some bargains. He would buy precisely those securities in Japan that appeared the least desirable to others. First, the stocks of Japanese insurance companies. The world would probably assume that ordinary insurance companies had a great deal of exposure…]


Transcript

Intro

Kevin Muir, author of the Macro Tourist newsletter and a seasoned trader, joins The Intentional Investor for a fascinating conversation that weaves together trading, life lessons, and Canadian culture. From his early days mastering Monopoly statistics to pioneering computer-driven trading strategies at RBC in the 1990s, Kevin shares candid stories about finding his path in finance.

Kevin discusses growing up as the older brother of a professional hockey player, his journey from discount brokerage manager to institutional trading desk, and how becoming a father changed his perspective on risk and career. He offers unique insights into market psychology, friendship, and the importance of finding work you genuinely love.

Highlights include:

How Kevin combined computer skills with trading intuition to capitalize on market inefficiencies The story behind his decision to leave a successful banking career to trade independently His experience growing up in a family of traders and athletes Reflections on Canadian culture and the historic final Tragically Hip concert Wisdom on maintaining long-term friendships and finding your authentic path in finance

Whether you’re interested in markets, mentorship, or memorable stories from the trading floor, this conversation offers valuable perspectives on building a meaningful career while staying true to yourself.

Guest Introduction: Kevin Muir, The Macro Tourist

Matt Zeigler:

“Now in most cultures, the tourist is a thing to be mocked—the bad shirts, the bad taste in food, the cameras around the necks—and if you’re a local, the tourists are the people who are always in the way. And if you’re a trader, well, they’re the ones who are trying to give you a bad name. But this guest has made a career out of tourism, by which I mean he’s exploring areas that others might not, turning over all the rocks that are there in the name of finding opportunities. He’s a veritable Ferdinand Magellan of who’s buying and selling, a Christopher Columbus willing to back up his portfolio’s dump truck, a Marco Polo of the occasional crapco YOLO, the Jacques Cousteau of commitments of traders and fund flows, and the Amelia Earhart of the occasional gas gauge chart. Is that too soon? Mil, you can make jokes about her, right? He’s the master in the Market Huddle universe, a real He-Man, which maybe makes Patrick O’Shaughnessy Man-at-Arms—we’re going to have to ask him that question on another episode. The ‘everything is interesting’ purist, author of The Macro Tourist himself, promising a conversation that will not be the maturest. And no, I will not play him in ‘Birds for the Bill,’ at least not this time. Bring home the Canadian—let’s bring home the Canadian bacon with me now, the one and only Mr. Kevin Muir. Kev, man, listen, that was the best intro I have ever gotten.”

Kevin Muir:

“Like, nobody will ever be able to top that. As a person who regularly does fantastic intros on Market Huddle, let me say I’m taking the praise. I’m taking—I know that is awesome.”


The Story Behind “The Macro Tourist” Name

Matt Zeigler:

“And you know, you brought up the fact that the tourist is something that’s kind of viewed with a derogatory nature.”

Kevin Muir:

“And I remember when I first chose the name when I was writing my post, and people used to come to me and say, ‘You know, Macro Tourist, that’s actually like a bad thing, you know, like that’s an insult.’ And it’s like, ‘Yeah, of course I get it.’ It’s kind of a self-terror, like I’m making fun of myself, and that was the whole thing about it. And uh, and I laugh, and it just goes along with my um, my kind of motto, which is, ‘All I bring to the party is 25 years of mistakes.’ Now I have to update this because I started that a while ago.”

Matt Zeigler:

“It’s better if you don’t update the 25 years. I saw that and I went, ‘I think when I signed up for these newsletters 10 years ago—’”

Kevin Muir:

“Yeah, he was—you’re absolutely right.”

Matt Zeigler:

“No, but I’m still making mistakes, so that is the one thing I can assure you of.”

Kevin Muir:

“Well, may your 25 years be evergreen.”


FMK Game: Canadian Bands

Matt Zeigler:

“I’m starting here—I’m starting with a game, okay? I don’t know if this—I assume this game migrated to Canada at some point, or at least maybe your kids played it. Well, you don’t want to talk about this one with your kids. I’m going to use the PG-13 rating, which is FMK, or as my friend Raj Bennett likes to say, ‘make sweet love to, marry, kill.’ So have you ever played this game?”

Kevin Muir:

“Uh, make swe—choose one of those?”

Matt Zeigler:

“Well, you’re going to rank them on which one you’d make sweet love to, which one you’d marry, which one you’d kill.”

Kevin Muir:

“Oh, okay, let’s uh, let’s give this a whirl. So we’re gonna give this a whirl, okay? Make sweet love to, marry, kill: Rush, The Tragically Hip, and Bachman-Turner Overdrive. Okay, so I—I’m gonna be—I could be kicked out of Canada for this, but I’m not a Rush fan. And I know that like a lot of people—so I’m gonna put Rush in the kill. So then I’m stuck with—oh, and that’s easy because um, like, Tragically Hip is the greatest band that’s ever come out of Canada, so they’re going to be ‘make sweet love.’ And then I guess I have to marry BTO. I mean, which is kind of annoying because he is um, he—he’s like, he’s a lovely human, and he actually has a radio show that he does, really, on CBC.”

Matt Zeigler:

“Yeah, he has a radio show, and he—and it’s actually terrific to listen to ‘cause he’s really old, and so he’ll talk about like meeting the Beatles and then he’ll play little bits of the songs and stuff. So it’s a great—it’s a great show.”

Kevin Muir:

“But he is definitely um—I think he was kicked out of The Guess Who for being a little too Puritan. And uh, for those who don’t know, um, is it Bachman—I guess that’s his last name, I can’t remember his first name—but he was originally part of The Guess Who. And ironically enough, I was actually—I grew up in Winnipeg, and The Guess Who were from Winnipeg. And I remember—remember hearing my dad’s uh, friends tell stories about like these crazy parties they had and what The Guess Who guys did and like, ‘Oh, we trashed this house,’ and blah blah blah. It was some great kind of Winnipeg Guess Who stories.”

Matt Zeigler:

“And last Guess Who story—I, because I love telling this um, when they asked uh, who was it, uh, who’s the lead singer for um, the uh, Led Zeppelin? Is it Plant?”

Kevin Muir:

“Robert Plant.”

Matt Zeigler:

“Robert Plant, yeah. So they asked—they said, ‘Robert Plant, you have a terrific rock ‘n’ roll voice, you know, like it obviously does—one of the greatest singers of all time. But if you had to pick someone that you would want to sound like, like who would you pick?’ And he chose Burton Cummings from The Guess Who.”

Kevin Muir:

“That’s amazing.”

Matt Zeigler:

“Yeah, kind of interesting pick.”

Kevin Muir:

“There’s all those things because it’s one of those—there’s uh, you know, growing up on this side of the border in America, the weird things that get passed back and forth between our countries. Yeah, all trade commentary aside, like I’m in a trailer park in New Jersey on family vacations—you know, a condo, but it was a trailer park—and like the Canadian kids sliding me The Tragically Hip stuff, like mid-90s, around the side, and just being like, ‘This is amazing,’ and then nobody else caring.”

Matt Zeigler:

“Yeah, you know, they tried to make it big in the States. They got on Saturday Night Live, right? And live appearance. And you know what the problem was? If you go and you watch the documentary—there’s a great documentary for those converted. My wife—full fan now, thank you for that documentary.”

Kevin Muir:

“Well um, and for those who don’t know, The Tragically Hip are like a Canadian band that at their peak could have come to Toronto and sell out the Maple Leaf Gardens for like two weeks straight and yet would go to New York and have to play like a little 5,000-square—I mean a 5,000-person venue—because they couldn’t sell out the big arena. And not only that, all 5,000 were mostly Canadians that were living in New York, the ex-shows up.”

Matt Zeigler:

“And the—and the kind of crazy story about this is that the lead singer got diagnosed with this brain cancer, and instead of just kind of quietly going off and dealing with it, he announced it to the world and said about doing this one last tour in this one last concert. And listen, he didn’t—he could barely keep the lyrics straight. They had to put like uh, uh, the—in front of him through a prompter and stuff. So it was—it was just emotionally hard, you know, felt.”

Kevin Muir:

“And the last show, because they were from this place in Ontario called Kingston, the last show from Kingston was just broadcast throughout Canada. And I can tell you, there’s like—I can remember the periods, like points at which Canada shut down, like where there’d be nobody on the highway. And it was like, generally, like um, Olympic hockey games—like we had a big one against you guys where uh, Sidney Crosby scored the winner, and that was—I remember coming in, like the highways were empty, and we had to pull over to go watch the game. And this was another one where just the whole country stopped to watch this last concert from The Tragically Hip.”

Matt Zeigler:

“Where were you? Where did you watch?”

Kevin Muir:

“I watched it at the cottage. So I was uh, and a lot of people were kind of uh, in cottage country and doing it there. And I should have gone somewhere, and you know, I was tempted to go, but it was just so expensive that—to actually go to the concerts, it was—it was crazy. It’d be like if uh, you know, you got to go to the last taping of MASH or something, like—I don’t even know, like the Super Bowl.”

Matt Zeigler:

“When I—when I tell people, I would say it’s our Bruce Springsteen. So it’s a band, but it would be the same, like imagine G Downey—if he was still alive—would have a Bruce Springsteen level. Hopefully not the same plasticky face thing going on, but—well, New Jersey adjacent.”

Kevin Muir:

“Yeah, and well, I’m very happy to hear that you were a fan. And what—what was your favorite album or song?”

Matt Zeigler:

“So uh, I ended up with a soft spot for Road Apples.”

Kevin Muir:

“Oh yeah.”

Matt Zeigler:

“And like really getting into that, and then I’m trying to think—it was—I don’t know if I made a note of it—the one—it was the one that came in Henhouse, what came out in ‘9—”

Kevin Muir:

Trouble at the Henhouse.”

Matt Zeigler:

Trouble at the Henhouse was like the first—I had that one and the album before it were like the tape that the Canadian friends made to me.”

Kevin Muir:

“Okay.”

Matt Zeigler:

“And that was like two summers, and then I remember being like, ‘Oh,’ ‘cause it was in uh, ‘Breen’—one of the songs was in Brain Candy too, the Kids in the Hall movie.”

Kevin Muir:

“Oh, really? I—I felt like really cool that I got the—do you know what ‘road apple’ is, by the way?”

Matt Zeigler:

“Uh, I found out, thank you to the documentary, yes, finally. I never knew until—”

Kevin Muir:

“Yeah, so, and the funny part about that story is that um, they—The Tragically Hip had chosen this name for their album, and the American record company said, ‘That sounds way too Canadian, like it was like that’s just terrible name.’ And so they were like, ‘You know, F you,’ and they decided to, you know, go, ‘What about Road Apples?’ They thought there’s no way they’re going to accept Road Apples because, for those who don’t know, road apples are basically horse crap, like that’s on the side of the road. And they loved it, and they went with it. So it’s how very Canadian that one of the best albums of all time is named after horse manure.”

Matt Zeigler:

“It’s a beautiful—did they try to name an album that first and then like it got shot down, and then they brought it back down again?”

Kevin Muir:

“I thought it was the other way around. I thought they wanted to name it something, and then it was kind of their, you know—they had—I could be misr—everyone should watch the four-part documentary. I think it’s even better if you know nothing about them, meaning like—meaning I’m sure if you grew up on them, it’s extra exceptional, but if you know nothing about them, you will come out of it wanting to work your way through the entire catalog because it’s so beautiful.”

Matt Zeigler:

“Yeah, I can’t remember—it just felt like that was like that was one in their back pocket that when they called him on not being able to do the other, they were like, ‘How about this?’”

Kevin Muir:

“Right, waiting for this—they’d been waiting to call it Road Apples. It’s the joke with your friends that you’ve like, you’ve been saying for years, and now you’re like, ‘All right, let’s play the card.’”


Growing Up: Family and Early Interests

Matt Zeigler:

“Well, speaking of playing cards, take me all the way back. Mom and Dad—I’m just curious about both of them, what they did, and in particular, like, was Dad seriously trading—Vancouver penny stocks, is that right?”

Kevin Muir:

“You’re absolutely correct. So I grew up in a household um, as I mentioned, I’m from Winnipeg, and there was a company in Winnipeg called Richardson Greenshields, and the Richardson family are one of Canada’s kind of wealthy families, and they’d started the securities arm. And then my dad and mom were actually from Montreal, so they moved out to Winnipeg. My dad decided he was going to be a research analyst, and he eventually ended up being the research director, so that’s like the guy that has all the analysts working below him. Um, but I grew up listening to stories about all these crappy stocks that are just like—just—and for those who don’t know, like Toronto, and more so Vancouver back in the day, had all of these just promotional-type crazy um, mining speculations. And it’s—it’s subsequently no longer there, like because we haven’t had a real kind of resource bull market in a while, but just imagine kind of all your worst SPAC-type, you know, situations, like 2021, but for resources. And that’s what kind of crap that was going on. And I—I promised myself, I was like, ‘I don’t want to trade these things. This is not what—like I love trading.’ And I was always—I was always loving games. My dad laughs at me because he says, ‘I always knew you were going to be a trader because he says, like, you love games.’ Like, you know, even as a little boy, I’d bring them up Monopoly and play—I wanted to play Monopoly, I wanted to play this, whatever it was.”

Growing Up Studying Monopoly Statistics and Game Theory

Kevin Muir:

“And I remember my mom bought me this magazine that was uh, a science magazine, and in it, they had studied the different odds of uh, like the—the return profiles of all the different Monopoly properties.”

Matt Zeigler:

“Oh yeah.”

Kevin Muir:

“And then figured out like, you know, where it is. And so I—I remember I was like 10 or 11—I became obsessed with this because I realized, you know, ‘Oh no, New York, St. James, and all those—there’s such better value because of the—the minus-three card that puts you on them.’ And anyway, so I—I—I studied this, and it was always—my—my old man just laughs. He says, ‘I knew you were going to be a trader.’ Was like, ‘There was nothing else that you were going to do. It was always something you wanted to do, you studying the—the Monopoly table in the back of a magazine.’”

Matt Zeigler:

“Like, but that’s how you’re supposed to learn statistics and stuff, right?”

Kevin Muir:

“I loved it. It was just—this was an eye-opening, you know, experience for me. And then, you know, I went through my stage where I figured out counting cards, and then I was like, you know, flying out to—to um, Atlantic City overnight to—to try my hand as a card counter, which, you know, as I know now, it’s never going to work because the reality is your edge is so small, and you got to do it for so long, and uh, you know, it just ends up being a pain. But I—I had that stage. I had my horse-racing stage where I was like, you know, going to the horses to play the ponies.”

Matt Zeigler:

“Yeah, I got the systems in place and did like this.”

Kevin Muir:

“The only thing I didn’t ever do—and I kind of regret it now—is I never got into the poker because poker has a little—too old for it, and it came after me.”

Matt Zeigler:

“You missed the online poker window.”

Kevin Muir:

“Yeah, like I was already trading, and then once I figured out trading and—and did it, like I’m always kind of shocked at guys in our industry that are actually taking a risk that then want to go to like Las Vegas or wherever and gamble. And I’m like, ‘Why—why would you play that game?’”

Matt Zeigler:

“Yeah, well, first of all, the odds are terrible, but like, don’t you get enough? Like, isn’t there enough stimulus? Like, I don’t really get it. But like poker, at least I understand because there’s a little more mental parts of it, but like a lot of the just going and counting cards is—it’s—once you figure out the system, it’s just methodical and boring.”

Kevin Muir:

“All right, games—like top games besides—besides Monopoly and the stats—what are—what’s the board games in the house? What are the ones where you’re like, ‘I want to pull this off on family game night’?”

Matt Zeigler:

“Um, um, well, do you know—actually, I—we—I don’t play as—just like my gambling, when trading took over, I don’t play as many games.”

Kevin Muir:

“No, no, no, but back then—back then as a kid.”

Matt Zeigler:

“Oh, back then, um—but—but—but just as quick aside, my wife and I play uh, this game called Quirk. I don’t know if you know it. It’s like—it’s—you got to make like patterns, and it’s—it’s actually a terrific game, and my wife is better at it than me in some ways.”

Kevin Muir:

“Is it shapes or numbers or something?”

Matt Zeigler:

“Yeah, it’s shapes and colors, and then you make these different kind of things, and yeah, um, but my wife—I—I always laugh at because she’s—she’s very good at doing things with uh, letters and words. So when one day when we started playing Scrabble—like, we went out and played Scrabble—and uh, I’m terrible at words, like in terms of trying to figure out how to do this, I’m like, just doesn’t come to me. And she’s coming up with these great words, but I’m looking at the board, and I’m figuring out like, ‘Okay, I can block her here, I could do this,’ and I’m just applying like complete game strategy, like I’m not even thinking about the words, I am only, you know, blocking, tackling, and like just trying to do. And like, she looks at me, and she says, ‘You’re—you’re just playing to win.’ And I’m like, ‘What?’ Like, she’s like, ‘That’s—’ She was legitimately offended that I wasn’t trying to make the best words and that I was just playing to win.”

Kevin Muir:

“And then she said, ‘Well—’ She started to figure it out, and then—and then I never won again in Scrabble because she’s so good at it. But she was really upset that I was just using game theory. Um, in terms of going back then, Monopoly was my top game. Uh, eventually, I became a little bit of a Dungeons and Dragons geek, of course, like, you know, um, uh, what else did I like? Oh, then I went to university, and I figured out bridge and uh, Hearts. I started with Hearts, moved to Bridge, and uh, that was a big game for me for a while.”

Matt Zeigler:

“Dungeons and Dragons with the friends, like uh, quasi-Stranger Things going on in the neighborhood. What do we got here?”

Kevin Muir:

“I don’t even remember. I—I—I just remember buying all the books and just being fascinated by it and like having the—the different, you know, numbers, the 20-sided dice, and like—I—I can’t even remember what it was about, like it just seemed really cool at the time. That’s—you know, I was—I was—I was late maturing, meaning like I was like—everyone else was into girls, and I was still thinking about Dungeons and Dragons.”

Matt Zeigler:

“Okay, but then who—late maturing, yet learning to play bridge? Well, who was teaching you? You were fast-forward maturing in one category and late maturing in the other.”

Kevin Muir:

“You got it. I was like—I was just late. I was like—I was really, really short, like in—I can’t remember—I was 16. I learned in Winnipeg, you could learn to drive at 15 and a half, and I remember I was like—I think I was barely 5 feet tall and 16 or something, like I was really late. And one of my dad’s friends said, ‘I thought you had to be 12 to drive.’ That’s how young I looked.”

Matt Zeigler:

“This is great. You late maturing and early maturing—”

Kevin Muir:

“Yeah, at the same time is uh, is pretty funny.”

Siblings and Family Dynamics

Matt Zeigler:

“Okay, so the games are a big part of it. Now, is it just you—you got siblings, like who else is in the house with you?”

Kevin Muir:

“I actually have a younger brother and a younger sister.”

Matt Zeigler:

“Okay, oldest of three. We can go behind that. Uh, like big age gap, real deep?”

Kevin Muir:

“My brother’s three, and my sister’s eight.”

The Dog Story: Thumper’s Vacation Weight Gain

Matt Zeigler:

“Now I’m totally putting you on the spot with this one because I think I’ve been butchering this story from you for a while, okay? Uh, you guys had a dog growing up, or you had multiple dogs growing up?”

Kevin Muir:

“Yeah, we had different dogs, yeah.”

Matt Zeigler:

“You have some story—and I couldn’t find this in my notes, so maybe I have to edit this out—kinda scared that you got notes about all this.”

Kevin Muir:

“Oh yeah, I—notes about the important stuff, like this story.”

Matt Zeigler:

“Okay, which I feel like—I think this came from you, so you see if I’m wrong. Did you go on vacation and uh, the dog got like sent to be boarded somewhere, and the—the quality of the food—”

Kevin Muir:

“Oh yes, that is my story.”

Matt Zeigler:

“Is that your story? I’ve been telling the story—I’m shocked that you remember the story.”

Kevin Muir:

“I don’t remember it left such an impression. Please tell the story.”

Matt Zeigler:

“Well, you know, because I—I—I tell a lot of stories more than once. This is not one of those ones that I tell all the time, so this is a deep-cut catalog story. Um, yeah, so we had a Rottweiler growing up—very like good-natured Rottweiler. My dad traveled a lot, so he bought my—my mom this um, you know, big tough dog, but he was just the gentle soul. And he was tall—he wasn’t one of those, you know, short, squat ones. He was one of those tall Rottweilers.”

Kevin Muir:

“So, and he was—10 or 120 pounds, like he was a big muscle too.”

Matt Zeigler:

“Yeah, and it was just—that’s a scary—but he was the sweetest guy.”

Kevin Muir:

“Anyway, so my dad would buy cheap food and then just like leave it out for him, and he would eat whatever he wanted. And then we went on—I think we went on this vacation for like two weeks or a month, and uh, he asked—we boarded him, and the guy says, ‘Well, what do you do?’ And my dad says, ‘You—he just, you know, he self-feeds.’ And the guy’s like, ‘Okay.’ The trouble was that the guy gave him good food. And so this dog—Thumper, by the way, was his name—you know, we come back, and Thumper is like 25 pounds bigger ‘cause he’d been like, ‘Holy—I didn’t realize that there’s good food out there, like—what the heck happened to our dog?’”

Matt Zeigler:

“Oh, that’s funny. Oh, so he put on 25 pounds—was something—did you convert the food you get?”

Kevin Muir:

“I think we just put him back on the other food, and eventually it came off. Poor f—but he was a great dog, he really was.”

Matt Zeigler:

“Did you guys—was there always a dog in the house? Did we—”

Kevin Muir:

“Did we always have animals? And even like as—as young adults, as soon as we finished university, we all bought like animals right away. And like, at one point, before we had kids, my wife and I had two dogs and two cats. And I was like, ‘I’m never doing that again.’ I have a rule now—only one of each. There is a hard-and-fast rule, and I always tell people that, like, having two dogs—it sounds romantic, it sounds awesome, until you have it, and then like you have a little baby at home trying to sleep, and then all of a sudden the dogs start barking, you’re just like, ‘No.’ So I just do one of each. We’re very strict now.”

Matt Zeigler:

“I think I’ve cracked the code on it, on finally being accepting of having smaller dogs.”

Kevin Muir:

“Oh, have you?”

Matt Zeigler:

“Yeah, finally—I finally accepted this. But you grow up with big dogs?”

Kevin Muir:

“No, but that was the only ones that we were really around as—”

Matt Zeigler:

“Okay, we had—there was three boys in my house of not totally distant age, so we were a small herd of elephants, and my dad leaving an animal with Mom would not have been the right choice for the longevity of their marriage. So instead, it was opted of just forever promising eventually getting a dog—so we could develop a complex and then, you know, get older and get dogs later. But yeah, so do you have multiple dogs—is what you’re telling me—multiple small dogs?”

Kevin Muir:

“After—after a run here, my little guy who’s eight—we just got another small dog to go with him, and like, they’ve hit it off so far—so far, so good. Talk to me in three months, I might have changed my mind again. But it was one—what kind of dog is it?”

Matt Zeigler:

“You know, they’re—they’re little dogs. They don’t need another like m—you’re just like, ‘No, they’re just little.’ I’m not gonna tell you what kind—it’s little, you know. I’m assuming it’s white.”

Kevin Muir:

“Well, we got—we got one who’s basically too cute for his own good. He’s like a small Muppet of a dog, um, which is absolutely adorable. He’s—he’s Shih Tzu and Yorkie mix—Shorkie, I’ve been told.”

Matt Zeigler:

“And then even better name, because you can’t outdo that—we just rescued this other dog, and he is a part Chihuahua, part Dachshund, which is apparently called a Chiweenie, which is—”

Kevin Muir:

“Great marketing—great marketing.”

Matt Zeigler:

“Um, but the best part is, for a long time, I had a big dog and a little dog, and like the little dog would run between the big dog’s legs, and walking them both—it’s disaster. These two little guys just like bump into each other, and that’s the most of it. They curl up on the couch, they look all cute, and uh, there you go.”

Kevin Muir:

“And you can travel with them.”

Matt Zeigler:

“See, I—I—and I can throw them in the back of the car and go—great. So our joke is um, with my wife—we—so we had these two dogs, two cats. We eventually, you know, the two dogs pass away after 14, 15 years, and it’s time to get a new dog. And then—dogs that we had gotten previously were these like purebred Bearded Collies, and they were, you know, they were great dogs, and they were terrific. And then my wife says, ‘No, I don’t want—’ And it’s like a medium-sized dog. She says, ‘I want a small, non-shedding dog.’ So this is what she tells me. And she wants—she wants a small, non—dog, and we’re going to rescue it.”

Kevin Muir:

“Okay, so this—risky proposition.”

Matt Zeigler:

“Yeah, so we’re going, and we’re spending all this time trying to find this non—small shedding dog that we’re going to rescue. Then kind of six months, and I’m kind of like—because everyone wants that, so nobody’s going to like, you know, when you go to the thing, all it is—”

Kevin Muir:

“How dare you apply market-making tech frame of reference?”

Matt Zeigler:

“So well—no, but the thing is—so eventually though, she’s like looking through all these things, and she falls in love with these Newfoundlands. And like, a Newfoundland is like—like the exact opposite of what she wants.”

Kevin Muir:

“Yeah, it’s like the—and so I—my joke is—so we eventually went and rescued this Newf that’s been with us for—for years, and she’s terrific dog.”

Matt Zeigler:

“How big is—she’s—”

Kevin Muir:

“She’s a small Newf—she’s only 100 pounds—but um, the thing about it is, I said like, you know, ‘You—you wanted a small, non-shedding dog, and you ended up getting like a Newf.’ Is this how you uh, kinda, ‘You wanted a tall husband with a good set of hair, and you ended up with me?’ Because I was like, ‘How do we go from like the exact opposite, you know?’”

Matt Zeigler:

“You could play this spousal Scrabble card as many times as you want. Teeter on the edge here, man.”

Kevin Muir:

“Oh, it’s funny.”


Life in the Gifted Program and Being the “Non-Athletic” Brother

Matt Zeigler:

“Oh, well—so—so you grow up—thank you for sharing the dog story. I knew I had to try to find one if I could get there. The uh, like other interests—are you playing—you playing sports? You’re playing hockey as a kid? What are you—what are you—”

Kevin Muir:

“So, are you a sports guy at all? I am—I come from a sports family. I am—okay, so here, since you’re getting me to open up—so my brother was actually a very good athlete. He played professional hockey for a living. He won the Stanley Cup, and uh, so I grew up thinking I was terrible at sports ‘cause my brother was terrific at every sport he tried. He crushed me. He was taller, he was bigger, like he was better. It wasn’t even close. I literally grew up thinking I was the worst sports guy around.”

Matt Zeigler:

“I would go and people would say like, ‘Oh, do you—you want to play baseball?’ And I’d be like, ‘I’m not very good.’ And then I would go play with them—I go, ‘I’m not very good, but you’re terrible,’ like because I was so used to playing with the guy that was like, you know, just an unbelievable athlete. Um, but no, I did not play uh, you know, a lot of sports.”

Kevin Muir:

“The only thing I ended up being good at was I have a good sense of balance. So I was actually—even though I grew up in Winnipeg—we did a lot of water skiing at the cottage, and then eventually I picked up uh, downhill skiing as I got older, and that came very naturally and easy to me. And that’s kinda the sport I would probably say I have the natural affinity to.”

Matt Zeigler:

“Is this middle brother, youngest brother?”

Kevin Muir:

“Yeah, the middle one. So yeah, so extra pain because like—oh yeah, not only that, he was tall. As I told you, I was late maturing—I was short, like he—he was the same size as me even though he was three years younger, like we would play in house league hockey, and so I would be playing in my year, and he would be coming and playing up, like basically in my year as well, like—is that embarrassing or what?”

Matt Zeigler:

“So rough.”

Kevin Muir:

“And he was better than me, like—like—like not just was he in my league, he was better than me.”

Matt Zeigler:

“So were Mom or Dad athletes at all? There was like—”

Kevin Muir:

“My mom’s side had some like tennis players, and my dad was a good hockey player growing up, but not to that extent, like it was kinda—it was unexpected that he was so good. But my dad always tells the story—he says, ‘I put skates on him, and he just skated—it worked.’”

Matt Zeigler:

“Yeah, yeah, like he would go and—I remember—so we grew up in Winnipeg—really cold, outdoor rinks everywhere—he would go after school straight to the rink, then he would come home for dinner and then go back until like they turned off the lights at the—at the place. Like, so it was just hockey, hockey, hockey.”

Kevin Muir:

“So everyone always goes, you know, like, ‘Oh, you know, you must know a lot about hockey, you must like a lot of hockey.’ I said, ‘I have watched so much hockey, I—I have no interest, like zero, like I’m so done with hockey.’ Like, let’s put it this way—the other day, like last year when Edmonton did well—I think it was Edmonton, right? They were in the Stanley Cup Finals—and I was like, ‘Okay, I’m going to watch this. I got a Canadian team in the finals.’ And then I’m like looking at this um, this MC—I’m like, ‘Who is this McDavid guy? This guy can really play.’ That’s how I was—I was like, ‘This guy can really play hockey.’ I was like—I—you know, I saw him—I was good.”

Matt Zeigler:

“You check in once in a while.”

Kevin Muir:

“Yeah, see how the boys are doing—that’s it. Only if Canada goes far.”

Matt Zeigler:

“Who—who is the team? Like, who’s the household allegiance to?”

Kevin Muir:

“Uh, there really is none, like uh, ‘cause, you know, like my brother played for a million teams. We grew up with the Jets, but we kinda left. Toronto was an easy team to hate—they—they were like—had this terrible owner, like—I guess my dad’s a Montreal fan, but like realistically, there was really nobody that we just loved. And half the time, I would just sit there, you know, analyzing left-wing lock and playing the trap and look—these different systems—and we wouldn’t be caring about like who was—who was playing. We’d be like talking about, ‘Okay, this guy did this, this guy broke down here, you know, look—this guy’s plus-minus stuff,’ like—so it was very analytical, and so it did—it kinda took the fun out of uh, you know, rooting for a team.”

Matt Zeigler:

“So like watching hockey in your house is actually critical strategy—”

Kevin Muir:

“Yeah, like critical game analysis on like who’s setting stuff up and doing stuff.”

Matt Zeigler:

“Well, listen, my wife, you know, accuses me of this all the time. She’s like, ‘Why can’t you just enjoy things?’ Like, so I—I watched this video the other day of a guy that was talking about what makes a good story, and he was analyzing it, and it was just a fascinating video. And he was talking about the elements and how it works, and then he was talking about how he took his wife to Wonder Woman, and they came out of it, and she’s like, ‘What do you think?’ And he’s like—and he’s about to talk, and she’s like, ‘Shh, don’t say anything, don’t ruin it for me, don’t—don’t say anything, just don’t—just shut your mouth.’ And he’s like, ‘Okay.’ And he’s—and then she’s like—like an hour later, she’s like, ‘Okay, tell me what was wrong with the story.’ And when—when he told you, it was true—I was like, ‘Oh no, he’s right.’ It’s good as a movie—that was—that was a poorly written part that ended up ruining the whole thing.”

Kevin Muir:

“And this guy was just—he could only see things with a critical lens that way. And he says, ‘Yeah, if you wanted—like I get it—if you just want to enjoy the—the movie, then don’t think about these things. But if you’re somebody that enjoys, you know, or thinking about crafting stories, then these sorts of things are what you have to look at.’”

Matt Zeigler:

“Do you see a difference inside of that between like being an editor or a critic or something like that versus being a creator? I think about this even like with your own stuff, your own writing—how do you balance that? Because you need the critical eye, but then you also need the creative element that just is willing to put it on the page.”

Kevin Muir:

“Yeah, you have to go for it. There hits points where you just have to say, ‘Ah, you know what, it’s never going to be perfect.’ Um, and one of the big problems that I have sometimes is I—I sit there, and I have a post that’s three-quarters written, and I’m just like, ‘Oh, I gotta just make it perfect,’ or, ‘I gotta do this,’ you know, like—what’s the old line about, like, ‘Perfect is the enemy of good,’ or what is it—‘Perfect is the enemy of good enough,’ or whatever? There’s some—”

Matt Zeigler:

“‘Perfect is the enemy of good.’”

Kevin Muir:

“‘Don’t let perfect be the enemy of good,’ yeah. And so you really do, at a certain point, just need to go for it. And I—I highly recommend that—do your best, work hard, but then eventually just like throw it out there and see what happens, and then the next—move on to the next one.”

Matt Zeigler:

“Yeah, you know, and you never know what you have to say that somebody else is going to latch on to. How many times have you sent something out and thought like, ‘I don’t know about this one,’ and you got 100 responses versus something where you’re like, ‘This is the greatest thing ever,’ and it’s crickets, right?”

Kevin Muir:

“Oh, Matt, I can’t tell you—so people ask me this all the time. They’re like, um, ‘Can you predict the ones that are going to resonate with people?’ Um, and I’m always like, ‘No, I have no clue.’ Because there’s ones that I am so proud of that I feel like are so smart, and I’m like, ‘Wow, I nailed this. I’m like, this is so clever, this is so well-presented.’ And as you say—just crickets. And then other ones, I’m just like, ‘Okay,’ and I just whip it off, and then people are like, ‘Oh my God, that’s the most, you know, insightful thing ever.’ And I’m like, ‘What?’ Like—like even like the other day, I was on um, I was on Odd Lots, and I don’t want to like uh, name-drop or anything, but like the—the reality is that I’ve been wanting to be on Odd Lots forever, right? Like it—and by the way, I did a—I was too nervous, and I was like—it—I don’t usually get nervous, but I was nervous because it—I had built it up in my mind so much. Um, but the whole point about this was that—that was like a throwaway piece that I had written that I was like, ‘Oh, you know what, this is interesting, you know, the—the market’s really concentrated,’ and bla—I whipped off a piece—not a throwaway, but it wasn’t something I felt super passionate about. And like, Tracy, you know, emails me—she’s like, ‘Oh, I love this, like you want to come on, you know, talk about it?’ I’m like, ‘Uh, okay.’ Like—and I had to go learn about it and because I was prepping something I was, you know, felt strongly about that I—that I’d spent a long time thinking about. And so to that, you know, extent, I’m never sure about what’s going to take off and what’s going to be the—the ones that people gravitate towards.”

Matt Zeigler:

“And I think it’s hard to unpack the critical eyes of others. And I can only imagine, like, Tracy Alloway, you know, Joe Weisenthal—like they’ve trained the critical eye of like things that they think will work, right?”

Kevin Muir:

“Yes, so now you’re getting sucked up in the vacuum cleaner of—well, I think the—the reality is that they’re looking for stuff that’s outside the box, right? So they need something that not everyone’s talking about. So the more unusual it is, and—and just kinda by its very nature, they—they’ll want to be at the early stages of it. They’ll see something, and they’ll be like, ‘Okay, let’s talk about this before it becomes everyone’s talking about it.’ And so they look at it, and uh, and that’s why it was that um, point. But it was, as I said, it was not something I expected, like I thought we were going to talk about, you know, Fed balance sheet or, you know, something that was very common, and then she’s like, ‘No, let’s talk about stock market concentration.’ I was like, ‘Great—great, so excited to go pretend I did all the research that I actually need to—to not have a panic attack.’”


School Years: Gifted Program and Moving to Toronto

Matt Zeigler:

“But on the other side of that mic—all right, so what about—take me back to like in school. So aside from playing games, how good of a student are you? What—what are the report cards look like in middle school and high school for uh, for you?”

Kevin Muir:

“Really are just like uh, delving in there, like I feel like I’m on the therapist chair. Um, okay, so I—I was in the—the—the—the enriched or gifted program. So I went to a special school where it got—got sent off, and—and I was with the like—the geeks, like I was—Freaks and Geeks, that show, might as well be about me, like it’s—that’s what it was. And it was just—it was a very—it was a special program where people came from all across, you know, Winnipeg to go to this one class, and—and it was—it was the greatest thing ever, uh, you know, and I—my best friend to this day is still from there, and uh, I—I—I loved it, and it was so great. Um, but it—we were—we were definitely not cool.”

Matt Zeigler:

“Is this at all part of like reaction to his brother already taken off in sports at this point?”

Kevin Muir:

“He was already that way—it was—it was actually just that I—I wasn’t getting along at my—so I went to French immersion. My mom—like, my mom’s third language is English, like so uh, you know, and—and she—they thought it was important I learned French, so I went to French immersion. I wasn’t the greatest at French—I think it’s very difficult, um—so I was in a French immersion school in middle school, wasn’t going well, and then my—I was like, ‘Forget this, like, you know, this isn’t—this is for the birds.’ And so at that point, he decided, ‘Okay, let’s find something for him.’ And then he was like, ‘Okay, this is it—this is where the kid’s going to fit in.’ And uh, he put me there, and it was the greatest thing ever—changed, like it really did. I went from not enjoying school to absolutely loving it, and uh, it was—it was a great experience.”

Matt Zeigler:

“Okay, so in a school like that, it’s not just your standard fare stuff. You took some other weird classes there—had to be some like Greek mythology, some type of advanced statistics that you were like, ‘Oh my God, I love this thing,’ and now as an adult, you’re like, ‘Most people didn’t learn this thing, and I still care.’”

Kevin Muir:

“Um, yeah, so for me, it was even a little more complicated because unfortunately, in Winnipeg, you go to grade 12, and then when I got—my dad got the—the company moved to Toronto because Winnipeg is obviously not a very big financial mecca. And so they moved to Toronto and happened to move on my 12th year. So I didn’t graduate with my—with my class, and it was difficult—all as well—because not only was I going there, I would already done a lot of these programs. So I come to Ontario, and I come to Toronto, and I’m like, ‘I’ve already done all this.’ Like, I remember sitting in calculus class, and one of the girls that I was sitting beside, you know, what—test comes by, and after like halfway through the thing, and she looks at him, and like I got a good mark, and she’s like, ‘Thought you were failing.’ And I was like, ‘What do you mean?’ And she’s like, ‘I thought you were like—I like you—you seem to not pay any attention, and like you’re only here half the time.’ And like—and I’m like, ‘Well, I already did all this.’ And so it ended up being difficult, and uh, in terms of actual classes—was there something that inspired me? No, like there was just—it was standard, like, you know, calculus, physics, whatever. As I said, I was more into game theory, and there wasn’t really a lot of game theory-type, you know, courses in high school.”


Starting at Bank of Montreal and the Path to Institutional Trading

Matt Zeigler:

“So I go to school—I—I started a school out of like—called Western. I end up playing too much bridge. I come back—I’m going to U—I’m—transfer to U of—I’m there—I living in the fraternity. I’m not a fraternity guy, but I don’t know anyone, so I join a fraternity because like I’m, you know, I missed that whole first year of university ‘cause I switched universities. So I’m living in the fraternity—I—I—I try to start looking for part-time jobs. I get a job at what’s called Bank of Montreal InvestorLine, which is like their TD—like their um, discount stock brokerage. And so this is in 1989-90, and I don’t know if people remember—maybe it’s 91—no, no, it’s 90—and people remember, but there’s the ’87 crash, which was very, very traumatic, and there was actually another crash in ’89—there was another little crash in ’89—and so a lot of the um, people were very hesitant to uh, kinda expand because they were worried about this was going to happen again. So this was a big thing—this—this starting this discount stock brokerage—but they didn’t want to go and commit to people. So they got me to come and uh, like work after hours, and I would literally just answer phone calls and give people quotes, okay? Like, that’s like, you know, I’m 20 years old or whatever—19 years old—and I’m, you know, working from 4 to 8. And I was working, and then what happens is the market starts to get busier, and they say, ‘You know what, you want to work today, like the whole day—like 8 to 8?’ I go, ‘Sure.’ The thing about it is that they’re paying me like, in essence, cash, because they don’t want to put me on this, and they’re paying me too much, and I’m like sitting there working 12-hour days. Next thing I know, I’m not going to school, and I’m just working 12-hour days ‘cause this is awesome, like I’m making all this money. And they’re like, ‘Oh, eventually—’ I kinda, you know, six months or a year into this, they go, ‘We—wait, we gotta give you a job, like this is ridiculous.’ So I take a job, and then within six months, I’m running the desk, which is even more ridiculous.”

Kevin Muir:

“I’m like, literally—wa—wait, just to be clear, you’re answering calls—”

Matt Zeigler:

“Oh, taking orders—eventually taking orders. I get registered, yeah, yeah, just like retail—retail guys—ret—how do you go from that to desk?”

Kevin Muir:

“Well, no, the desk is on—it’s like—I mean, the desk there—like I’m just talking about—so they—they put me in charge of the like the—they call it a desk—it’s not really a desk—it’s just order desk—it’s a trading operation, sure. So they put me in charge, and I do that for like six months, and I’m like a level-five manager, and like—and I’m doing really well, and I’m trying to go to school at night, and I’m like, ‘Wait, like this isn’t what I—I don’t want to be a discount stock brokerage manager, like this isn’t what I signed up for.’ And like a complete buffoon, I get a job—I find somebody who—I know the woman that works there—one of her h—her husband knows somebody in Chicago, and I get a job in Chicago because this is what I always wanted to do, like I loved Market Wizards. This was basically my book—I wanted to be the next George Soros or Stanley Druckenmiller. And so a lot of these guys, like Paul Tudor Jones—he started in the pit. So I go to Chicago, and I hate it—I can’t stand it. It’s terrible. And you know, I love Chicago—I love the Chicago people, I love Chicago traders—I think they’re the greatest bunch of traders out there—but this just is not for me, like, you know, this is a lot of testosterone, like just running through the pits, and it’s just—you’re up there, and like I remember guys putting their hands up, and they couldn’t put them down ‘cause they’re so tightly, like they’re—they’re so tightly put in there.”

Matt Zeigler:

“And so I come back, and I get a job, and so my dad says, ‘Okay, this is what you’re going to do. You’re going to go and—listen, if anyone’s young and listening to this—to this story, if you managed to last this long, um, I’m going to give some life advice here that my dad gave me that I think is really, really important, okay? He says, ‘Okay, this is what you’re going to do. You’re going to find out the head traders at the banks you want to work for or the—the broker firms you want to work for, and you’re going to write a letter, and you’re going to send it to them, and then you’re going to follow up with a phone call in a week’s time because—don’t—this is back when you had the mail stuff.’ So I find the six or seven firms I want to work for, and it’s like RBC, TD—uh, not TD—the CIBC, Midland Walwyn, and Gordon Capital. Gordon Capital was the beans, man—like that’s the one I wanted to work for. Gordon Capital was the firm that had kinda created the bought deal, and they were just awesome. So I send off all my letters, and then uh, you know, it comes day for me to phone them. So I phone, and I start with the one I want to, you know, work on the most. So I start with Gordon Capital, and I remember this—the guy’s name was Howie. Howie is just a jerk—that’s why it’s always—it stole in my mind. So I phone up and go, ‘You know, can I speak to Howie?’ They’re like, ‘Howie pick up.’ And so he goes, ‘Howie here.’ I go, ‘Hi, Howie, it’s Kevin Muir, you know, I sent you a letter, blah blah blah.’ He goes, ‘What are you doing phoning me, kid?’ And he proceeds to yell at me for 20 seconds, tell me to f off, and hangs up on my face—like literally, that’s what he did, like that’s—that’s it.”

Kevin Muir:

“And I’m some 20-year-old kid—this has just happened to me—I like wanted to cry, like I—like I—I probably did cry if I’m being honest with it—I—and I—you know, so I’m like, ‘God, this is terrible—my dad gave me the worst advice ever.’ Um, so, you know, I stop, and then my dad comes home that night—he goes, ‘How—how’d it go?’ And I said, ‘Well, didn’t go well.’ I tell him the story about Howie, and he laughs—he thinks this is hilarious. And then he says, ‘Well, how did your next call go?’ And I said, ‘What do you mean, the next call? Nobody wants to hear from me.’ And he says, ‘This is what you’re going to do—you’re going to get back on the phone, and you’re going to phone the next call.’ And sure enough, my next one was at this firm called First Marathon, and it was a guy named Mike Wekerle, who ended up being one of Canada’s greatest block traders. Um, he was super kind to me—he was the opposite of Howie, you know, like—and that’s one of the things in life—you can choose to be an idiot and—and be forever immortalized as Howie the ass—”

Matt Zeigler:

“Can I say—yeah, you can say it.”

Kevin Muir:

“Yeah, okay—Howie the ass—you don’t—to make sweet, sweet love to—you can kill—or you could be the Mike Wekerle that’s, you know, was super kind to me and—and is forever going to be remembered. And you know, I was lucky enough to have Mike on my—on my show, and I was like, ‘Mike, you probably don’t remember this, but you were instrumental in giving me kinda the confidence to go and to keep going—going.’ And because you were just kind, and there’s—it cost you nothing to be kind, and like—anyways, um, so Mike was nice to me—obviously that didn’t go anywhere—but then the next firm I phone was RBC Dominion Securities—RBC, um, happens to have uh, a trader that is who eventually ends up being my boss—but he’s intense, and the guy that’s working for him has just quit because this trader is so intense. And this—this guy who ends up being my friend—you know, he’s only like five years older than me, but back then it feels like that five years is like a lot, right—uh, he says to me, he says, ‘Kev, there was guys better at trading, there was guys better at computers, but you were the best mix of both.’ And so he hires me on the desk. So I’m literally going straight onto the institutional equity desk, and I am doing all of the index trading and the basket trading for the greatest firm in Canada at the time—and it probably still is the greatest firm, but at the time, we were by far the best. And it was the—they were—it was so awesome because they were such an entrepreneurial bunch—they let you do things, they were so, you know, great—it was—it was so—it was such a great experience, and I just—I loved every minute of it, and I just—I used to love going to work, and it was just so exciting.”


Pioneering Computer Trading at RBC in the ‘90s

Matt Zeigler:

“And the long and short of it is that I—I remember talking to my big boss and saying, ‘You know, you want me to get my degree?’ ‘Cause you were asking about my degree. He go, ‘I don’t care if you get your degree.’ And so I got my degree—barely, like just barely—like I went to school at night while I was, you know, making all this money and doing well, um, and it was just—I got it just because I felt like if I didn’t have it, I would forever, you know, worry that I was like—I missed something. But I literally—I think I needed a 1.50 grade point average to—to pass, and I think I got a 1.50—like I think I did not—like you have to give me there—I did two decimal places—you didn’t have to round up—you didn’t mess—”

Kevin Muir:

“I did not waste any extra energy getting better marks than I needed, which is a thing of great beauty.”

Matt Zeigler:

“Perfectly executed.”

Kevin Muir:

“That’s right—perfectly executed.”

Matt Zeigler:

“This thing about the computers and the trading and the balance, like—were you aware that you could combine these two things in the way—like did you know this was a skill beforehand, or did you walk in on this and them going, ‘You possess a skill that now we suddenly value’?”

Kevin Muir:

“No—so a—a little bit of both. Um, I love computers, and I—you know, if people ask me, ‘If you hadn’t been doing trading, what would you have done?’ I definitely would have gone into computers. Um, I was lucky in that my father knew enough—like although he was in research and although he wasn’t on the trading desk, he knew enough that he would kinda talk to me about different traders. And so there was no doubt I was aware about the trend towards computers at this time, and uh, then I just took it and ran with it—like literally, we had um, so one of the things about our firm was that we were able to trade proprietary for the bank. So that was, in essence, I eventually joined a group that was—we just got a percentage of what we made. And I remember sitting there, and I figured out that, you know, all these computers that I had direct contact—or direct access to the exchange with—so that we could do baskets, I figured all they could also do interlisted arbitrage, like we could write programs to buy and sell when something got out of line between Canada versus US. And I—I’ll never forget sitting there writing it, and one of the guys—the—the—the head of like risk says, ‘What are you doing?’ And I said, ‘Well, I’m running this program to do this, blah blah blah.’ He goes, ‘I already got guys doing that, like why you bothering?’ Like he said that to me—he said, like, ‘Why you bothering?’ And this machine kinda within two years was making way more than any of those guys. And so it was—I was very fortunate to be at a place that had the technology that let me run with it at a time in history when my skill sets were perfectly aligned with what was happening in the markets, like, you know, 10 years earlier, it doesn’t—the computer skills don’t help as much.”

Matt Zeigler:

“Yeah, and 10 years after, it’s a totally different state because now there’s been a Kevin Muir at all the shops, like—”

Kevin Muir:

“Right—10 years later, it’s actually—you almost need to be a dedicated computer guy, like my—my seat at RBC ended up being the guy that’s in that uh, Flash Boys movie—I can’t remember what his name is there—like whoever it is that was like one of my—like one of my duties, and one of the things that guy was in that group and doing that thing. And so—but if you look at those guys, they were way more computer-oriented—they—they had already become like you needed to be a Waterloo or whatever, you know, like a math—like a true computer nerd as opposed to a trader who happens to be able to do computers, right? You needed that advanced computer science background—love—whatever—but you were in that window where it was like—like, ‘Sure, I can build this scale model with Legos.’”

Matt Zeigler:

“Exactly—nobody else is doing it.”

Kevin Muir:

“I—it was—it was wild, like there was times I—I still think back to that computer that we got going, and we were trading through a firm called ITG, which is a very big um, kinda direct shop that a lot of people use. And I remember our sales lady coming up to us and saying, ‘Uh, D—I just was in a meeting, and we were going through all the accounts for like the whole firm, and they said, “All right, can anyone guess what the number one account is this—this year—this month?” And everyone’s guessing like Fidelity and like CapOp and all these names, and they’re like, “Nope—RBCD’s machine number two.”’ We were literally the best client that ITG had one month—that’s how much business we were doing. And it was just like—the Americans didn’t understand that stuff was interlisted, and so we would sit there, and we would provide liquidity and just trade, like they would come for Research in Motion, and if you think about it, you guys were buyers because you love the story—or Nortel even—whatever—whatever it was, you guys were buyers, but the—the actual stock was all in Canada. So you got these kinda natural like sellings in one place, the buyings in the other place, and so there was literally periods where it just sat there—bing, bing, bing, bing—and like I was like—like I was scared at times that something was wrong because it was making so much money. I was like—because, you know, the one thing you do have to learn as a trader is if something seems too good to be true, it’s—it’s like, you’re like, ‘No, it’s definitely too good to be true.’”


Learning Hard Lessons About Market Traps and Trading Ethics

Matt Zeigler:

“Well, because I got a great story to tell you about that if you want, uh, about being too good to be true. So one time, this machine’s going—it’s doing all this money, making all this money—and then the—the main desk—like I’m on the derivatives desk, but the main desk trader comes up to me. He says, ‘Kev, I got this trader that’s like this hedge fund guy who’s willing to do this arbitrage—not arbitrage—he’s willing to trade with me on, you know, on—in Canada of this stock, and I could immediately sell it for a 10-cent profit in the US. I’ve done like, you know, quarter million—do you want to do some?’ And I’m like, ‘Okay, wait—so you’re telling me that this hedge fund guy is phoning you up and is wanting to do this trade that is very clearly an arb—like against him?’ He says, ‘Yeah.’ He said, ‘Whoa, whoa, whoa—hey, have you played Scrabble with my wife to be?’ I’m like, ‘Turn off the machine.’ I’m like, ‘Turn it off,’ like I—like I went and told the guys, ‘Turn off the stock,’ like it was this one stock. And I’m like, ‘I gotta figure out why,’ because I know that if this guy’s doing this, it is—there’s something there that I’m missing. And sure enough, it was trading with what’s known as a due bill in the States. So it looked like there was a dime profit, but there was really like a $1.50 or $2 loss, like occurring. And I remember the um, the sales guy coming up to me for that account and saying, ‘I’m so sorry that my client tried to pick you guys off.’ And I said, ‘Are you kidding me? It’s the greatest thing that ever happened. If he hadn’t picked me off, I would—if he had just done it in the machine, I wouldn’t have figured it out, and it might have been like days before,’ because the due bill doesn’t come for another few days. And once I figured it out, I very quickly could—you know, I might—I can’t remember how much we were at—I think we were at a couple hundred grand, but I think I made back like half of it arbing it the other way—putting it to the right price—like I was like, ‘Okay, okay, now we’re going to put this to the right price.’ And so I immediately unwound everything we had done and then did a little extra the other way. Um, but I remember the guy apologizing—I was like, ‘No, you don’t have anything to apologize for—this is the greatest thing ever.’ That guy hadn’t been so greedy and tried to do blocks, like—that was it—he was trying to do blocks.”

Kevin Muir:

“And I really don’t understand that guy because that was a dumb play in—in lots of different reasons. One of them was—you ultimately—you got found out quicker, but the other thing is that you were picking off your friends, like even though like you’re—they’re your brokers, like you’re—you’re talking to them, and you shouldn’t ever do that, like—and another quick story about this—like I remember um, one time we figured out there was something called the—the—an EFP, which is exchange for physical. So we were trading the index versus the futures, and so we figured out that there was a dividend everyone was missing on a big stock—like one—like Bell Canada or something—and it changed the EFP um, price significantly. And I remember going out there and like—let’s say it was trading like a dime to 15 cents, like a 10-cent bid, 15-cent offer—and it was all of a sudden worth a dollar. And I was like, ‘Holy smokes.’ And like Peter and my boss were like, ‘Let’s—let’s just get on the dime bid and see if anyone hits us.’ And I said, ‘No, no—let’s move it and let’s get some size,’ right? So I remember going out there, and we like go, ‘What’s the market?’ And they go, ‘10 to 15.’ I go, ‘Okay, bought from you at 15—I’m 15 bid—where does it come?’ And then someone sells us some at 20, and I go, ‘Bought from you at 20,’ and—what—and I start marching it up. And so like—I can’t remember—guys are selling me—like this is an EFP, so it’s like 5 million, 10 million. Finally, I move it up from like 20 to 50—50, okay—don’t forget, it’s worth a dollar in my books, okay? And my—my arch-nemesis at CIBC—he’s woken up to the fact that there’s—that I’m moving it, and he offers me size, and I’m like, ‘There it is.’ And I’m like, ‘Okay,’ like—I can’t remember—it’s 200 or something—it was a big number—and I was like, ‘Bought from you,’ and, ‘We’re bid,’ okay? And so—and then immediately I get a call overhead, and he’s like—it’s him—and he’s like, ‘Kev, you just lifted me on this EFP—what’s going on?’ And like, you know, I—at that point, I can do a lot of different things, but the right thing to do is like—I tell him—I don’t say to him, ‘Everything’s okay—sell me another 200.’ I say to him, ‘Go check your numbers,’ like I don’t—like—he—and he doesn’t ask to be let off of it, you know—he goes and checks his numbers, and then next thing I know, he’s 60 bid trying to get it back because he’s realized he’s screwed up.”

Matt Zeigler:

“Yeah, but the point is that—like guys that don’t behave honorably, like that—and like—are trying to pick guys off—it—it comes back to you, like it’s—it’s—it’s a small street. It’s that the guys, you know, try to be picking off clients, picking off their dealers, or picking off even each other—I—I never felt that that was fair, like if you were on the pit and you were trading, that’s fine—I had no problem with it—but if you’re going to fool me overhead, I’m not going to like, you know, try to pick you off to your face.”


Meeting His Wife at a Fraternity Party

Matt Zeigler: Where did you meet your wife? Did you meet her in school? I know I met my wife at a fraternity party.

Kevin: Okay, frat boy Kevin! Yeah, I met my wife at a fraternity party. Funny enough, I was working at the time and financing all of our kegs. I was the only one who could afford the deposit—$5,000 or $3,000, whatever it was. You had to put the deposit down on the kegs, and our fraternity was terrible at keeping track of things. So I was like, “Okay, fine, I’ll finance the stupid things.”

Matt Zeigler: So your wife comes to one of these keg parties that you’re self-financing with your stockbroker job?

Kevin: Yes, that’s correct. We hit it off immediately.

Matt Zeigler: Did you know right away?

Kevin: Yeah, we hit it off, and that was it. It’s been a while—lots of good years. A lot of good Scrabble, not too much scrabbling on occasion!


Starting a Family and Career Progression

Matt Zeigler: Fast forward a bit—when do you start having kids? Is that once you’re in the prop trading job? How far along into the role do you start expanding the family?

Kevin: So, I get my job at RBC when I’m 23. By 26, I’m fully into equity derivatives, in charge of all the risk. Probably from 26 to 27 or so, my wife’s sitting there saying, “I want to travel,” and I’m like, “I can’t travel.” She’s like, “Well, I’m not going to just sit here.” I’d started making some money, and she’s like, “Why am I working?” She was at Talstar or something and said, “I’m quitting.” I was like, “Okay.” She goes off traveling with my little sister—to Nepal, Tibet, all these places.

I’ve got a funny story about that. She goes to Nepal because of Seven Years in Tibet, the Brad Pitt movie. This is during either the Long-Term Capital crisis or the Asian financial crisis—I can’t remember which. She’s trekking from monastery to monastery, hasn’t slept in a decent bed, and finally gets on a plane to Thailand. She gets off, hasn’t booked anywhere to stay, and says to the taxi driver, “Take me to your best hotel.” She’s a low-key person, but she was just so sick of roughing it. She phones me—this is the ‘90s, when calling wasn’t easy—and says, “I don’t know where I am. I’m in the fanciest hotel in Thailand. It’s 8,000 baht or something, I don’t know what’s going on.” I’m sitting there thinking, “Oh my God, what has she done? This bill’s going to be brutal.” But it’s during the Asian crisis, so it ends up being like $210—or even less. Nothing!

Anyway, we have our first kid when I’m 29. I’d been at RBC for six years or so. At that point, the bank was slowly overtaking the dealer. It started as an entrepreneurial place, but over time, the bank got more involved. Rightfully so—I look back at some of the stuff we were doing, and I’m like, “I’d never let some 27-year-old punk do this.” It was irresponsible. We made tons of money, and it was fun, but I wasn’t mature enough to realize that was a unique time, not how life always works.


Challenges at RBC and Quitting

Kevin: The bank starts creeping in, telling me, “You can’t trade this, you can’t trade that.” I’m getting in trouble—“Kev, you can’t do this.” Then we have our daughter. She’s born with a heart defect, corrected at birth, but it was a very emotional time for me. It was like a near-death experience—not that I died, but it hit me hard. I never felt the same way about work after that. A couple of other things made it less fun too. Three months after she’s born, we have our best quarter ever, and I think, “I’m going to be like Michael Jordan—sink the basket and walk away.” So I quit.

At the time, I didn’t know what I’d do next. I hadn’t made enough to never work again, but enough to not worry about the next year. I thought, “I could work for a hedge fund, but I don’t want to do sell-side again for a while.” If I worked at a hedge fund for a year and quit, people would remember me as the schmuck who lasted a year. But if I tried something on my own for a year and then went to a hedge fund, no one would care about that year. So I started trading for myself. Eventually, another guy from my old shop joined me, and that was it. Along the way, I started writing the letter and doing the podcast.

One thing I laugh about—I’ve never really had a steady paycheck. Even at RBC, it was a small draw, and it’s been “eat what you kill” for the last 35 years.

Matt Zeigler: When you tell your wife you’re leaving the job—obviously after the scary moment with your daughter’s heart defect—are you both freaked out about it?

Kevin: She was more worried about the child. She’s always been supportive. I never felt tension about it. She wasn’t like, “No, stay!” She’s not a fan of the Bay Street douchebags—our version of Wall Street. When we meet some larger-than-life trader guy trying to impress her by being brash, I’m like, “That’s not going to work with her.”


Building The Macro Tourist Community

Matt Zeigler: That commitment to figuring things out for the right reasons ties into the community you’ve built with The Macro Tourist. I love the letter—not just for the memes, though I come back for those. Where can people find you if they want to learn more?

Kevin: Go to themacrotourist.com. If you want samples, email me at kevin@themacrotourist.com—I’ll send them off. Also, join our chat—it’s easy to find, with lots of smart people. I’m proud of how it’s taken off. Twitter got mean and unfriendly, and when I got frustrated with Elon, I committed to Substack. The chat’s been a great surprise.

Matt Zeigler: Between the Market Huddle podcast and the letter, you’ve built a real community. I love those summer emails with chat highlights—it’s my favorite thing in my inbox.

Kevin: Glad you like that! It’s a real community, and that’s rare. Thanks for being part of it.


Reflections on Trading and Life

Matt Zeigler: Does it bother you that there aren’t monocultural moments like The Tragically Hip’s last concert for your daughter?

Kevin: That wasn’t that long ago—she remembers it. I’m not fussed. I think there’ll be moments like that for her and my other kids—different, but they’ll happen. Humans haven’t changed.

Matt Zeigler: Here’s a trading aside—people romanticize the past, thinking it was easy to make money.

Kevin: Exactly.

“I tell people my story, and I always say, ‘Oh, I would have made so much money back then; it was so easy.’ And everyone always thinks it was so easy. But I always tell them, ‘Listen, it wasn’t easy.’ Right now, there’s somebody who is quietly making a fortune, someone who has figured out the equivalent of my interlisted arbitrage. When I was doing my interlisted arbitrage on my machine, I wasn’t telling everyone—I was quiet about it. There’s somebody somewhere doing the exact same thing.

“There are always people making money, and it’s always hard. I remember thinking specifically, when I would listen to their stories—like the trader above me, 5 or 10 years older than me—I’d think, ‘If I had just been there when 87 happened, if I had just been there then…’ People always look back on the past, over-romanticizing it.”

Matt Zeigler: Tell the Norwegian art story—it relates to this.

Kevin:

I’ll quickly go through it. For those who don’t know, in the late ’60s and early ’70s, I believe, Norway discovered oil off their coast. It was this huge boom, and everyone was rushing out to get blocks of water they could drill in. There was an enormous fortune to be made with this Norwegian offshore oil boom. For those who don’t know, we think of Norway as a very rich country now, but up until that point, it wasn’t. It was actually the poorer of the Scandinavian countries, mostly reliant on fishing—not a lot was going on in Norway. So, they discovered this oil, and the long and short of it is that all these guys were rushing out to buy pieces of this water to drill in.

Then there’s this trader who looks at the situation and says, ‘Okay, that’s getting fully priced in. What can I do?’ He decides to start accumulating Norwegian art. He just starts buying all this art, and you might think, ‘What kind of crazy guy is this? Why is he buying Norwegian art?’ The long and short of it is that he had figured out that once all these guys made their fortune from the offshore oil, they’d be looking for something to do with their money. Art is a very local market, and when a Norwegian guy makes some money, yes, he might go buy a Picasso, but he’s also suddenly going to want Norwegian art. So, while everyone was busy fighting and paying too much for this offshore oil, this guy was quietly accumulating Norwegian art. A year or two later, when all these newly rich guys started looking to spend their money, he was there with offerings for them and made a fortune that way.

To me, that epitomizes trading. What’s interesting is if you go back and read Liar’s Poker again, you’ll see Michael Lewis talks about two guys who were his mentors. One of them is this guy, Dash Riprock, I think, who sits around watching for a bond to be, say, 30 seconds too expensive, and then he arbitrages it. He’s kind of a block-and-tackle kind of guy—just straightforward. But then there’s this other guy, this big, bold trader. If you reread that section, Lewis describes how, when something happens, this trader is already onto the next iteration, trying to figure out, ‘Okay, this is occurring—what’s the next step?’ Instead of just focusing on the first derivative, he goes for the second derivative. In other words, he thinks, ‘Once everyone does this, what’s that going to mean for the next thing?’ It’s like thinking multiple moves ahead in chess.


The Importance of Finding What You Truly Love in Markets

Matt Zeigler: You’ve talked about trying things—like going to Chicago, thinking it’d be great, then hating it.

Kevin: Yeah, I thought it’d be the greatest thing ever, but it wasn’t. We tell our kids, “Don’t fuss—you’ll figure it out.” I saw guys at RBC try trading, hate it, and go back to research. You’ve got to find what matches you. This industry attracts a lot of people, but you better love it—not just do it for the money. You can hear it in their voice when they truly love markets.

The “grammar” of trading with SIG’s Todd Simkin

SIG’s Todd Simkin went on Ted Seides’ Capital Allocators podcast recently. I’m biased but Todd’s interviews are some of the best you’ll find in finance (also SIG interviews are rare to come by). Come for the discussions of risk and trader education, stay because his personal stories are highly thought-provoking.

My notes on his prior interviews are some of my most-read podcast summaries.

Notes From SIG’s Todd Simkin (35 min read)

5 Takeaways From Todd Simkin on The AlphaMind Podcast (11 min read)

I didn’t do a full breakdown of this one but I’ll point you to a few key parts.

Ted asks, “When someone’s learning and getting up the curve, what are some of those most important questions that a more senior trader might ask someone that they need time to learn to ask themself?”

If I had a script for it, it’d be easy, because then I would just give people a script to use as a checklist, like a pilot does when they’re starting up their plan, or like a surgeon does when they’re starting a surgery. I don’t have a script, and I wish I did, because then I could hand it off to somebody.

Instead, it’s more like a grammar. There are things that you know how to do grammatically that you could not describe. If I were to say to you that I have eight large red French soccer balls, you would know what I mean. It makes sense. And if I were to change the order of the adjectives, it would sound crazy to you. If I moved one adjective and I said I have “eight red French soccer large balls”, I would certainly not sound like a native speaker.

You’d have a hard time explaining what the right order is for adjectives. A lot of people have gone through and tried to describe the rules here, and it comes down to number, opinion, size, age, shape, color, origin, material and purpose, I think, is the right ordering for the way you use adjectives, and you just know that.

You know that because you’re a native English speaker, you’ve been using the language long enough that something sound right and something sound wrong. In the same way, when junior traders talk about trades, they might point out something that just feels like it doesn’t matter compared to something bigger that does. And I don’t know which question to ask them a priori, I don’t want to say what you need to focus on is the size of the order before the price. Or you really need to focus on where the order is coming from before you look at the underlying rhythm. There’s not a simple answer to it, other than to say it definitely sounds wrong when a junior trader gets it wrong and a senior trader knows it and feels it because they know the grammar. They know what goes into making appropriate decisions for risk allocation under conditions of uncertainty.

What are the signs of a someone who will become a good trader?

I think it actually goes back to the first thing we were talking about with my desire to learn sign language. It was something that I did not have mastery of and I wanted to know it better, and it was entirely self-serving. It was just for me. Nobody else cared whether or not I learned sign language. Nobody was grading me on it.

Everybody that we’re bringing in as quantitative traders is smart. They’re all capable. They are all straight A students in finance or physics or computer science or whatever it might be. What differentiates the ones who end up being great from those who end up being fine are the ones who just really, really want to dig in and get it and understand it and win the game.

You’ll see people that will come up after a mock trading session and say, “Okay, I understand the basic options model. I understand these adjustments that we at Susquehanna make to the basic options model. And I pulled up the formula that we use to plug into the machines that are trading our automated strategies, and it has this additional factor in it. What does that factor mean?”

The person who’s digging in deep enough to pull up the mechanics in the machine to see how it’s treating and see how that differs from what we’re teaching them in an open outcry environment.

That person is not doing it because they’re getting paid an extra X dollars to do it. They’re doing because they just really want to beat the rest of the people in the room at their trade. They want to understand it well enough to know this also might matter. So there’s a drive and an intrinsic curiosity and an extrinsic one.

And then the other part that I’ve already alluded to is that they then talk about it. So when they are curious, they don’t have enough information to learn it on their own. But once they start talking about what they’re curious about and where their questions are, that they are finding the appropriate resources internally, and we have plenty of them to be able to point them in the right direction. To learn more, and then when they learn more. They actually have more questions, not fewer. Those are the people that have a big impact not only on their own trading, but we get to leverage those questions and really improve, best practices across the firm.

Todd tells the story of when he was on Jeopardy and after recording(but before it aired) all Jeff Yass cared about was that Todd bet the right amount in Double Jeopardy, joking that nobody cared if he didn’t know trivia but if he bet the wrong amount he shouldn’t bother coming to work on Monday. Jeff said “Just tell me what each person had at the end of double jeopardy, and I’ll tell you what the right bets, should have been going.”

Todd did indeed get it correct. He lets Ted try by setting up the problem:

Charles had 11,400. I had 10,200 and Peter had 1,600.

The other thing that’s worth knowing is that without knowing the Final Jeopardy category, everybody’s a favor to get it right. Figure out what you think I should bet with my 10,200.

The best decision he’s ever made:

I’ve got five children, and I’ve wanted to make sure that I have a relationship with each of them, so with each of them when they turn ten years old, I’ve done a one-on-one trip with just me and that child. It’s the best piece of advice I have for parents everywhere.

The best advice he ever received:

The advice was passed on to me by my eighth-grade English teacher, John Patterson. But the advice comes from Mark Twain, and it is his famous quote about travel, which is: “Travel is fatal to prejudice, bigotry and narrow mindedness, and many of our people need it sorely.

It’s this idea that you cannot be closed-minded if you expose yourself to a broader range of people.

What life lesson have you learned that you wish you knew a lot earlier in life?

Nobody cares. [I mean this] in a really positive way. The goofy thing that you love — singing in a choral group with 130 people, maybe it’s going to be embarrassing. Nobody cares. Nobody’s looking at you. Nobody notices that stain on on your tie. Nobody else is thinking about you. They are all too worried about themselves. Do what makes you happy.

Don’t miss some of the fascinating sections I didn’t cover:

  • why Todd majored in deaf studies
  • the art vs science in trading
  • Their new insurance business and some of the most fun or interesting bespoke risks that they underwrite
  • Making markets in prediction markets (they are market makers on Kalshi) and sports
  • The mistakes competitors who take LP money make and the advantage of permanent capital (You will recognize the thinking of If You Make Money Every Day, You’re Not Maximizing)
  • Todd won his first night on Jeopardy and lost the second night. The betting strategy for the second night was trickier. Tune in to find out how that went and also why he answered the Jeopardy question with his roomate’s name.

4 Observations from George Lucas’ Career

I listened to Founder’s podcast episode #345 about the life of George Lucas.

The following is the 4 points I want to save:

A movement coming from the fringe

This excerpts remind me of

  1. Paul Graham’s essay The Power Of The Marginal
  2. The importance of finding the people who inspire you via Bill Gurley’s Running Down A Dream speech

Keep in mind, this is the mid-1960s. There’s not many film schools in the United States. And so this is why Tarantino last week in his book would talk about the movie brats. He said they love movies, they dreamed of movies, and they even received degrees in movies back when that was a dubious major. And Lucas talks about this like it was embarrassing. Other people were like, you’re going to a film school, they didn’t even call it a film school, they call it cinematography school. “Like what the hell is this?” and he says, “I lost a lot of face.”The idea of going into film was a really goofy idea at the time. His dad’s like “there’s no way in hell, I’m playing for art school”. 

That decision changed the trajectory of George Lucas’ life is because that’s when he meets essentially just a collection of filmmakers who are all obsessed with movies, they’re all young, and they wind up helping each other for decades. It’s almost like the island of misfit toys because before this, it says, for many of them, it was the first time they had a click of their own, a gathering place where they could talk about their interest, movies without eye rolling from the other cool kids. For many reality finally began when they entered film school.

Lucas knew that he had found his way. Before he wasn’t sure, obviously in the college he had all these other interests. And he’s like, “Oh, wait, this is it.” I was sort of floundering for something. “And when I finally discovered film, I really fell madly in love with it. I ate it. I slept it 24 hours a day. There was no going back after that.” 

Steven Spielberg describes, he uses the exact same language. This is what Spielberg said, “Making movies grows on you. You can’t shake it. I like directing above all. All I know for sure is I’ve gone too far to back out now. There is no going back.” They both discovered what they’re going to do.

Now this is the fascinating part because this turns into the USC Mafia, Spielberg is part of that, even though he didn’t go to USC. You’re talking about a group of super talented filmmakers and a lot of them come out to California, even though they called the USC Mafia, some of them like Martin Scorsese, Oliver Stone, they went to NYU, Brian De Palma went to Colombia. Francis Ford Coppola was at UCLA, Spielberg is on the lot getting his own curriculum at Universal.

They were all friends who would have a lasting impact on film and culture. This is another example that relationships around the world. You see it over and over again in these books, so important to develop relationships with other people that are just like you and even if you’re — they don’t look at themselves as competitors. They tend to compete, but they also collaborate, but they all need each other because they’re trying to break into a system that is closed.

At this point in history, unless you’re part of a union, unless you already know somebody in the industry, you’re not breaking it even with a film degree. It’s yet another illustration of one of my favorite concepts from Game of Thrones, where they said those on the margins often come to control the center. At this time, Spielberg, Scorsese, De Palma, Coppola, Lucas, they are on the margin.

The center is controlled by these old school conservative studios that are locking all these young people out. It was unheard of to have a director in their 20s. And yet this network that they’re building and the talent that they have for their craft, like those on the margins often come to control the center. They become the center.

Now this is really fascinating because when I had dinner with Charlie Munger, this is the advice that he gave us. He talked about is exactly what him and Buffett did. I think he was 35 when he met Buffett, Buffett was about 28, 29 something like that. Each talked over and over again, the importance of — the advice he gave was like you have to develop relationships with people. He’s like, they were still doing deals. He talked about the fact that they would meet people in their 20s, 30s and 40s, and they would do business and do deals for the rest of their lives. The USC Mafia would regularly hire, fire and conspire with one another on countless projects over the next five decades, putting together a kind of system of their own. Lucas is 23 when he meets Coppola. Coppola is 28. They’re going to be making movies doing deals, starting companies, breaking up, fighting for decades.

It’s really important because at that time, because there is no young directors. There’s no 28-year-old director doing a major movie set. You have to be an independent filmmaker to do that. And so Coppola inspires not just Lucas, he inspires Steven Spielberg too. 

Coppola actually succeeded in getting his hand on the door knob and flinging open the door. And suddenly, there was a crack of light. And you could see that one of us, a film student, without any connections had put one foot in front of the other and actually made the transition from being a film student to being somebody who made a feature film sponsored by one of the studios.

To Steven Spielberg, Coppola was a shining star. Spielberg said, Francis was the first inspiration to a lot of young filmmakers because he broke through before many others. So not only did Coppola proved to Spielberg and Lucas that, “Hey, this is possible.”

But the influence that Coppola had on Lucas too is like, “Listen, you have to learn to write.” At this time, and you’ll see Lucas make this mistake a few times. He tries to outsource the writing. And Coppola was saying, “Hey, what separates just a director to a filmmaker is like you have to — any director, he would tell Lucas like any great director has to know how to put together a screenplay. And so he would repeat to Lucas over and over again like no one’s going to take you seriously unless you write. And that wind up being excellent advice because Lucas forced himself to write Star Wars, which is obviously his entire empire.

I’d be working all day and all night living on chocolate bars and coffee, said Lucas. It was a great life. I had enthusiasm, and I was too busy to get into drugs. Movies where his addiction, we were passionate about movies. “We were always scrambling to get our next fix.” Listen to how they’re describing this. This is how he knew what he’s been doing with their life. Described working as your next fix to get a little film in the camera and shoot something.

Spielberg has said multiple times that George Lucas inspired him and said at the time of his first encounter with Lucas in early 1968, Spielberg’s filmmaking was still more aspiring than actual. And Spielberg talked about this, like no longer did his role models have to be these older, in many cases, deceased filmmakers. They’re actually someone his own age, someone I can actually get to know, compete with and draw inspiration from.

“Surf the wave when it comes”

The next year, the film Easy Rider comes out. It is written and directed by a 32-year-old or a 33-year-old Dennis Hopper. It was not made in Hollywood. It was made on a shoestring budget. They raised $350,000. Why is that important? $350,000 is released in theaters. The film makes $60 million. Easy Rider goes on to be one of the most profitable films ever made.

And so the studio executives see them and they’re like, “Oh, s***”, and this is what they said. The studio smelled money. Why invest millions bank rolling production of an enormous film on a studio backlot when you can simply distribute independently produced films. Suddenly, independent films and independent filmmakers, which is exactly what Lucas and Coppola want to be, were in demand. The studio wanted young talent.

I just said that Charlie Munger talks about  surfing the wave.

Listen to the words that they use to describe this.

Easy Rider had created a tsunami of independent enthusiasm. Coppola decided to ride the wave right into the offices of Warner Bros. Come on, that fit together so perfectly there. So goes with Warner Bros.

This is Coppola who’s like — sometimes I think you might need a guy like this because it’s not like we’re going to make one movie.

He is like, listen, you front us a bunch of money. We’re going to bring you a finished film just like Easy Rider did. We’re not going to do with this once. We’re going to — we have seven films we want to make with you guys. We have seven films we want to make with you guys.

They’re young entrepreneurs, don’t have experience, don’t really know what they’re doing. The movies they’re going to make are going to flop. But what’s fascinating is like they still had an insight into the future. And so it says both Coppola and Lucas predicted a bold high-tech future. Remember, this is 1969, 1970, maybe. And they said movies will eventually be sold like soup. What does that mean? You’ll be able to buy it in cartridges for $3 and play it as you would a record, music record at home. He’s predicting VHS tapes, then DVDs, then Blu-ray and now streaming.

Forgiveness not permission

This is more juvenile delinquent behavior. He says the rules are of no concern to him. I broke them all. He said, “Whenever I broke the rules, I made a good film”, so there wasn’t much that the faculty could do about it.

George Lucas is very resourceful.  He always would find a way to get what he needed in terms of equipment and bodies to put together a crew like sometimes when you film like when you film Star Wars in London later on, they have these like really strict rules for the London like Film Union. You have to start at 8:30. There has to be a tea and I’m not even joking about this. You have to start 8:30, then you have to break for tea at 10 a.m., and then you have to break for an hour lunch at 1:00 and then you need another tea break at 4:00 and then you can’t work past 6. He’s like this is madness.

He didn’t want any kind of restrictions. So they would break into the equipment room to get not only materials that they needed, like an expensive camera, but they would also break into facilities. It says Lucas didn’t want to limit his use of the equipment to the building’s regular hours either. We’d shimmy up the drain spout, cross over the roof, jump into the patio and break into the editing rooms so we could work all weekend. And this idea that you use juvenile delinquent actions to actually be more productive.

Entrepreneurship is problem-solving

Tarantino in his book, he says, the job of a director is to solve problems. Solve problems for your actors. And I read this book by Danny Meyer, the famous restaurateur called Setting the Table. It’s excellent. And he tells a story that I’ve never forgotten. He’s at dinner with Stanley Marcus, who is part of the Neiman Marcus family, the family that controls the Neiman Marcus. He’s a wiser older man, probably, I would guess, 40 years older than Danny at this point. I think Danny’s in like mid-20s, maybe late 20s at this point. And so he’s — they’re having this conversation:

Danny says:

“Opening this new restaurant might be the worst mistake I’ve ever made.”

Stanley set his martini down, look me in the eye and said, so you made a mistake. You need to understand something important and listen to me carefully. The road to success is paved with mistakes well handled. His words remain with me throughout the night. I repeated them over and over to myself and it led to a turning point in the way I approached my business.

Stanley’s a lesson reminded me of something that my grandfather had always told me. He said the definition of business is problems. His philosophy came down to a simple fact of business. Success lies not in the elimination of problems, but in the art of creative, profitable problem solving. The best companies are those that distinguish themselves by solving problems most effectively.

The way I condense that down so I can remember myself, business is problems. Therefore, the best companies are just effective problem-solving machines. The best directors are just effective problem-solving machines.

Lucas has a problem. He’s got an idea in his head. No one can make the special effects. There’s no technology at the time. So what did he do? The solution sometimes to a problem is to found your own company to solve that problem. The solution to this problem that he’s having now is the founding of Industrial Light & Magic.

So it says Lucas would not merely have to produce the visual effects. He would have to develop the technology needed to shoot them in the first place. George was absolutely adamant that he wanted to set up his own shop with his own people. Industrial Light & Magic would then be an official subsidiary of Lucasfilm, born of necessity seeded with his own money and feeding off Lucas’ need to control every aspect of the production.

Industrial Light & Magic would stand as one of the cornerstones of Lucasfilm’s empire, an investment that would set him well on the way to becoming a multibillionaire.

Ron Howard admiringly said:

How many people think of the solution of gaining quality control, improving fiscal responsibility, and stimulating technological innovation is to start their own special effects company. 

5 Takeaways from Kobe and MJ’s Trainer

Tim Grover was Michael Jordan’s trainer for 15 years, and he also trained Kobe Bryant. His book is a collection of stories designed to give a glimpse of the mindset these athletes carried with them.

Link to full Founders episode:  https://www.joincolossus.com/episodes/78531762/senra-340-michael-jordan-and-kobe-bryant

Stop waiting to be told

The most common criticism Grover got was the book doesn’t tell you what to do. And this is what Tim Grover said about that:

“That is 100% accurate. Why would anyone want to be told what to do. The whole point of this book is that in order to be successful, to truly have what you want in your life, you must stop waiting to be told what to do and how to do it. I can’t give you a 10-step process or a checklist. What I am giving you is insight into the mentality of those who have found unparalleled success by trusting their own instincts.”

And so, there’s a very old story that’s very reminiscent of what he’s talking about.

A young man was 21 years old, and he asked Mozart, he said, “Well, how do you write a symphony?”

And Mozart replied that “You’re too young to write a symphony.” And that young man said, “But you were writing symphonies when you were 10 and I am 21.” And Mozart’s response was very much the point that Tim Grover is trying to teach us right in the first chapter. He is like “Yes, but I didn’t go around asking people how to do it.”

There is a price

One of the reasons I would heavily recommend getting the audio book, if you like audio books of Relentless is because he talks about a lot of things in this book that most people kind of omit. You’ll see them in biographies. But this idea, the dark side of Michael Jordan and Kobe’s personality is mentioned a lot in this book.

And so, I just want to go into it a little bit here. He says,

“I understand how they think, how they learn, how they succeed and how they fail. I understand what drives them to be relentless, and it’s not all pretty. If you’re aiming to be the best at what you do, you cannot worry about whether your actions will upset other people or what they’ll think of you. Your strategy is to make everyone else get on your level. You are not going down to theirs. You’re not competing with anyone else ever again. They’re going to have to compete with you.”

And so, that idea that, hey, I’m not going down to your level, you have to rise to mine or you need to leave. It’s something that Kobe and Michael repeat over and over again across decades. It’s something that their teammates mentioned over and over again, it’s something that their competitors mentioned over and over again.

Control over their minds

“You can’t excel at anything before you train your mind. Mental dominance is what ultimately makes you unstoppable.” Michael talked about this in the book Driven from Within. He says, “The mind will play tricks on you. The mind was telling you that you couldn’t go any further. The mind was telling you how much it hurt. The mind was telling you these things to keep you from reaching your goal, but you have to see past that. You have to turn it all off if you’re ever going to get to where you want to be.”

And I don’t think that part can be overlooked because your own mind can be your worst enemy. It can actually stop you from even trying.

Kobe: “The greatest fear we face is ourselves. “

It’s not anything that’s external or anything that’s superficial. I think the greatest fear that you face is yourself because we all have dreams. And it’s very scary sometimes to accept the dream that you have, and it’s scarier still to say, I want that. It’s scary because you’re afraid that if you put your heart and soul into it and then you fail, how are you going to feel about yourself. So being fearless means to put yourself out there and going for it, no matter what, go for it, not for anybody else, but for yourself.”

Jordan’s ability to be present and block everything including the past out

Later in the book it says, if one thing separate Michael from every other player, it was his stunning ability to block out everything and everyone else. He was able to shut out everything except his mission. In the very last episode of the Last Dance it talks about this. It says most people struggle to be present. Most people live in fear because we project the past into the future. Michael is a mystic. He was never anywhere else. His gift was that he was able to be completely present. The big downfall of otherwise gifted players is thinking about failure. He would say, why would I think about missing a shot I haven’t taken yet.

And you see this even after they win the sixth and final Championship in Chicago. They’re having this big celebration. Michael’s in his hotel room with a bunch of reporters. He’s playing the piano. He’s smoking a cigar. He’s having a good time.

And then somebody asked him, “Hey, you got another one in you.” And he just stops.

He goes, “It’s the moment man, it’s the moment. It’s that Zen Buddhism shit. Get in the moment and stay there. Just stay in the moment until next October, and then we’ll know where the hell we are.”

And so, this idea of controlling your mind, controlling your emotions, not panicking, not letting the emotions blur judgment and staying in the present moment is repeated throughout both books.

Mastery and its byproducts

In The Almanack of Naval Ravikant,  Naval said something genius in that book because really talking about like the effect of like the modern age, the effect that we’re living in the age of infinite leverage. And so, it really affects everything, what you’re doing for work, how to do it, how to think about it, really.

It’s the book that I give out as a gift most frequently. In fact, I bought 4 more copies like last week or a week before. But when I get to this point, he’s like, I want somebody to be excellent in one thing. And I think this is going to become even more and more important. And Naval says in that book, “Being at the extreme of your craft is very important in the age of infinite leverage, which is what we live in. The person that is the best in the world gets to do that for everyone.”

To illustrate this point, Tim Grover tells a story where him and Michael Jordan went to — they go and they visit an FBI training facility. And this is an excellent story because the idea behind it can be applied to everything, right? So they show up and it’s a practice range for the most elite sharp shooters in the world, so snipers. There’s one guy out there alone practicing his craft over and over and over again. The target is 400 yards away, 4 football fields. He has to get in his truck, drive to the target, set it up and drive back to where we’re standing. He gets his gun with the scope, takes aim, one shot. Then we get in the truck with him and drive back to the target. He hit it dead f****** center.

Michael asked him how many people use that target range. And he said, “Just me.” He was alone working on this one shot over and over again. So when people in the military need someone who can hit that kind of target, they call him. No one knows what this guy does every day to be this good. People just know that he can deliver results.

Figure out what you do, then do it and do it better than anyone else and then let everything else you do build around that. And that’s something Michael talks about because now obviously, he was one of the greatest if not the greatest basketball player of all time. But if you look at what he’s done in his — he’s one of the best entrepreneurs too.

And his whole point was like his game was his best endorsement. He said, my dedication to the game led to all this other stuff. The fact that he made I guess, like $1 billion or $2 billion selling his NBA team. The fact that he’s got this crazy deal with Nike, that he’s been getting 5% royalty. I think he’s going to make something like $300 million this year.

And that only happens because he figured out what he did, then did it better than anyone else, and he let everything else that he did build around that.

Insights From John Fio on Invest Like The Best

Patrick O’Shaughnessy interviews John Fio

Link: https://www.joincolossus.com/episodes/86445795/fiorentino-creating-magic-for-consumers?tab=transcript

Patrick’s intro:

My guest today is John Fiorentino. John is a product inventor and entrepreneur who, in the space of a few years, has bootstrapped four products: Gravity Blanket, Moon Pod, Moon Pals and Birthdate Candles, which have collectively sold hundreds of millions of dollars of revenue.

Our conversation is quite different than normal. Alongside his successful brands, John has had a range of life experiences from starting as a Jazz musician to working for Justin Bieber that give him an original world view. I was especially interested in his points around product positioning, creating magic for consumers, not letting yourself become the product and how to build enduring brands. 


The following excerpts are notes I want to save. IT’s important to note that Fio’s insights are derived from his work in consumer brands and he makes no warranty of them applying universally. All emphasis are mine:

When marketing can’t be disentangled from the product

One of my favorite brand stories of all time. Sorry, if I’m butchering the story, but something like this happened, where Coca-Cola had hundreds of thousands of taste testers and they put the same Coca-Cola formula in a bunch of different bottles and cans and cups. And the thing that they realized was that when someone drank the same Coca-Cola formula from a white cup and then they drank that same Coca-Cola formula in a can that had the Coca-Cola logo on it, not only did different parts of their brain lit up, different parts of their brain that was triggered by taste buds lit up.

So positioning that product around, it literally changed the way that your brain experienced the taste. When people say that ideas are not valuable, the idea of getting to this place where you are just flicking someone’s brain 10% to make them imagine something different while they engage with the thing is a completely different product.
And that is competitive. You can compete on that. And if you own that positioning in the consumer’s mind, that is what I would like to call a real moat. Do not underestimate the power of the positioning and the ideas that come around how to position something the right way because, in my opinion, that is the product.

[Kris: Rory Sutherland explains a neurological theory for why this effect:  Prediction combined with Bayesian updating makes more sense as a data architecture than perceiving everything and then forging it into a whole. If this is true, it explains many oddities, like the fact that advertising changes the taste of a product.]

It’s no accident that Slow Productivity embedded is the chewy center of the woo

In history, I think if you look at these paradigm-shifting moments and ideas and creations, inventions and people, the through line is that there is a really fucking weird non-through line. You can’t get there by doing [their] morning routine, you got to go a little deeper than that. And if you look at Leonardo da Vinci, you read about how he used to spend his day, where I read his book, one of the craziest things that stood out to me was like he just spent six months taking notes on how the woodpecker’s tongue worked. I was like, “What? That is what got his attention?” And then the guy who invented Pokémon was just out collecting bugs. And James Cameron was just a truck driver that fell into taking over a movie that was about to fail. And then he just basically fucking invented Terminator. What are the things that are actually driving those people? It’s not some quantifiable thing. It is some undeniable spirit that they have this fearlessness where they are able and comfortable to just follow in a cheesy way. They’re following their heart. And they are so committed to that truth that it leads them down these windy insane paths that, that path actually ends up having these paradigmatic discoveries or inventions. What is the through line there? It is this unbelievable commitment, obsession, transcendent infatuation with, in my opinion, finding something that is true. And I think things that are true aren’t really quantifiable, which is why if you talk to most people and what they’re doing with their day, they’re trying to get money. They’re trying to make a lot of money. That doesn’t really stand the test of time. I don’t think money rules the world. I think this undeniable magic rules the world, and I think the people that are able to tap into that and shape that rule the world, and I think money follows that. Money is not the thing. Money is the measurement of the thing, and we’ve kind of forgotten about that. I call it money worship or number worship. We’ve become obsessed with this idea that truth is quantifiable. The point is not money. The point is to make incredible things for the world that then gets you money. That subtle difference is unbelievably important.

[Kris: This is reminiscent of so much of Cal Newport’s slow productivity ideas]

Products that are pulled not pushed

For 99% of consumer product businesses, if you need an investment, you don’t have a business because all of my businesses have been profitable on day one. On day one, there is enough of a demand for it, where if I show it to 1,000 people, 200 of them are buying it. If you don’t have that metric, you don’t have a business.

And if you can’t convince the consumer that the thing that you’re selling is so compelling that they should wait six months for you to deliver the thing that you are describing, you either don’t have a good product, you can’t describe it well enough or the market doesn’t give a shit. And I can tell that in 10 seconds. And that is something that makes people unbelievably uncomfortable and terrified because again, that’s scary. That is a path that you can’t tell me there is no step-by-step path to get you out of that

[Kris: again here’s Newport — If you feel like you have to rush to compete in something or race in some way, chances are you don’t have a great sustainable competitive advantage.]

The cardinal mistake — forgetting that your cult of personality serves the product not the other way around

Patrick: I want to dig a little bit more on this. Apparent fine line between genius, people able to create these elements of magic, let’s call — let’s stick with that word, and something opposite genius. I think five years ago, if you polled everyone is Kanye a genius, most people would probably say, yes. Now I think probably more people would say, he is a psychopath. He said awful and seems to deeply believe some really terrible things.

And then to invoke a name like P.T. Barnum, for example, who I’m sure was some form of a genius. But normally, if you hear that, it’s someone saying something negative about you, like you’re sort of a con artist. Even people like Elon, there just seems to be this fine line between these magic makers, having history write them one way or the other. Is Disney a con artist or a genius? In what ways is he different from P.T. Barnum, is he different from Elon?

There just seems to be this really delicate line. So maybe talk about that line.

John: There is a hierarchy and a formula that you spiritually have to stay within or you get crucified. My way of describing that is you need an idea, something bigger than yourself. And then you need to be the shepherd of that idea and then the way that you spread that message needs to have a product and then that product goes to an audience.

So this is a very real hierarchy in my mind where it makes a lot of sense where if you start to mess those things up, it either becomes extremely less valuable or it blows up. The cardinal sin where you can get really, really far really, really fast is if you turn yourself into the product, which then makes you the idea. And when you become your product and idea, you get crucified. It’s like a very causative effect formula for human psychology. You see the scapegoat thing. You see the story over and over and over again. The crowd turns against the hero and basically crucifies them, you see this. It’s the oldest story of all time.

You can really, really see that play out. And again, do these little tests. Around the world, do you think more people know Elon Musk or the word Tesla? There is a line where he’s crossing where it’s becoming Elon. That’s dangerous. Now you are the thing.

Look at what happened to Trump. If you break that order, you go quick. You can create insane momentum and you become this crazy passionate leader, but if you aren’t doing it for something bigger than yourself, you get sniffed out and you just get crushed. The audience is like, they don’t trust you and they throw you out. Trump got there really, really quick, unbelievably effectively, and then he’s done. Maybe that’s powers that be, maybe that’s the audience, maybe that’s people just got sick of him. My critique on someone that doesn’t get that formula right is like, remind me of the bigger thing. With Trump, it felt like he was for Trump. It didn’t really feel like he was ready to rebuild America and put heart and soul back into this country and unify us. It was like, no, no, no, I’m going to win. And you can see in his tweets, search query of how many times he says me or I or something, which by the way is a leading indicator of serious depression and suicide. If you start saying I and me, it is the highest leading indicator that you’re about to fall into depression.

You put yourself first, you go to hell. It’s just a law that I think exists where if you can use that as a guide of, like, it keeps everyone in check. No one wants to worship a guy. They want to worship a guy that is sacrificing himself for something bigger, and he is showing the world that it’s possible to commit himself to something bigger than yourself, which I think is a very human struggle. It’s a daily quest to find the ways in which to get outside of yourself and help someone else. For whatever reason, a lot of people are fearful of that. They don’t want to do it and they’re scared and it’s vulnerability or whatever, but when you do, you just automatically feel better. You don’t feel necessarily more powerful, which can be unbelievably addicting and intoxicating, but you definitely feel better.

Again, there’s a very real reason why our heart, brain and soul acts that way. And I think that when you tap into that and you understand that there is this real hierarchy of truth and value and you submit to that, now you can be trusted. And don’t get it wrong, consumers, people are unbelievably smart. Unbelievably smart. You cannot trick them.

So what is the role of the creator?

Patrick acknowledges “ it does seem like some of the most successful people have figured out that if the founder or the artist or something is a bit more a part of the story themselves, it’s like a force multiplier. Maybe say like if you’re advising, let’s say, your friends who are starting a company, how would you tell them to build and engage with an audience, if at all?

JohnI think this is where we’re heading to a really interesting time, where it’s like the things that are going to be valuable are the things that you can’t really teach or copy. And that’s just going to be like, how do you teach someone how to be someone’s good, best friend that’s entertaining? I don’t know. Can you?

I would say, if you are an intelligent, personable, funny, charismatic person, that is an unbelievably unique asset that is more and more rare in the world that we are headed in, and you better figure out how to insert yourself into the organism of the company that you’re building because that can be a very valuable force multiplier to get you attention in very unique ways that did not really exist.

But I would say caution, because if you let that get out of whack, you’re going to get killed. I think it’s a very, very delicate balance. And I also think it’s going to be really obvious when people are doing this with the intention of coming up with a formula of how to maximize shareholder value. It’s so obvious when someone starts a podcast because they think it’s going to help them build their audience. It’s just so obvious.

You’re one of the only podcasts I listen to. Why? Because you’re the best interviewer ever. You have a very, very unique ability to interview and make me feel incredibly comfortable to explore these things in my head and ask these very, very poignant questions that’s super rare from an interviewer, which is why you have one of the best podcasts out there. If you try to teach me how to do that, you couldn’t do that.

But because you can do that, I would say, holy shit, quadruple down on that. That will give you — because no one else can do this, this will give you an advantage on being everyone’s best friend that’s the best person at asking questions to the most interesting people. And oh, by the way, I want to meet X, Y and Z. Now you’re in that top 150 range that I was talking about, and you’re going to get that deal flow. [John has an idea he calls Fio’s Number that is similar to Dunbar’s number where you want to be one of the first people think of when they think of X]

Notions of personality typing or a focus on one’s own identity as a unique thing to be cultivated and cherished in contrast to others

I think these archetypal frameworks are interesting to create. I don’t think that they’re interesting to try to put on yourself. I think this idea of self and identity and self-love is similar to practicing schizophrenia. It is not real. It is not healthy, and it does not help you become who you become. You become who you become through movement and motion and following a set of beliefs that puts you in motion. You don’t get to become great by saying, “I’m great. I identify as great.” That’s not for me to decide.

[Kris: McConaughey from an outstanding commencement speech: if we stay in the process, within ourselves, in the joy of the doing, we will never choke at the finish line. Why? Because we aren’t thinking of the finish line, we’re not looking at the clock, we’re not watching ourselves on the Jumbotron performing the very act we are in the middle of. No, we’re in the process, the APPROACH IS THE DESTINATION… and we are NEVER finished. Bo Jackson ran over the goal line, through the end zone and up the tunnel — the greatest snipers and marksmen in the world don’t aim at the target, they aim on the other side of it. We do our best when our destinations are beyond the “measurement,” when our reach continually exceeds our grasp, when we have immortal finish lines. When we do this, the race is never over. The journey has no port. The adventure never ends because we are always on our way. Do this, and let them tap us on the shoulder and say, “hey, you scored.” Let them tell you “You won.” Let them come tell you, “you can go home now.” Let them say “I love you too.” Let them say “thank you.” ]

All of this shit that I’m saying, we’ll look back on this in 20, 30 years, and it will be super clear if I am actually a creator or if I just was a fan boy.

And I won’t be able to convince you. We both will just know. It would just be so obvious. And to me, that is identity. These things that people try to put themselves into, to me, it’s so much pent-up energy in the wrong direction. Don’t look inwards. Look outwards. Serve something bigger than yourself. Do not try to make yourself happy. Try to make someone else happy. And paradoxically, that is what’s going to make you the happiest. [Kris: notice how self-effacing this is]

You’re not going to find love by figuring out what love language you are and who is going to give you that love language. It’s like, no, you find that by making a choice to love someone every single day. I spent the last 5 years or so, as I’m getting to this point in my life, spending tons and tons of time finding people like yourself who I really, really admire who, in my mind, have it all. They have the family, they have the wife, they have success and they’re on this path that doesn’t look like it’s going to end. And they all say very, very similar things. Every 75-year-old billionaire that has their family together just sounds like the exact same person. Which is a contrarian view that I have, which I design and create for is that we are all the exact same. Everyone is the exact same.

We’re all playing the same game. We’re all trying to find love. We’re all trying to eat, and we’re all trying to survive. And when those incentives are at the core of our daily life, everyone plays very, very similar games. Think about how different everyone could act. Everyone is doing the exact same thing. If you’re focusing on these differences, you’re splitting hairs that are just meaningless. And if you start to create, you try to work every day around the core assumption that we are way, way, way more similar, if not almost entirely identical than different, in my opinion, you’re going to have a lot more success.

[Kris: Some related quips about when therapy-talk bleeds into self-defeating snowflakism. 

  • VGR’s take on the strong/weak meme cycle: a world talking itself to death where action would actually help
  • An exchange between the main characters in Tomorrow, Tomorrow, and Tomorrow:
    Sam: “The knowledge and experience we have—it isn’t necessarily that helpful, in a way.”
    Sadie: “It’s so funny you should say this, because if you were one of my students, you’d be wearing your pain like a badge of honor. This generation doesn’t hide anything from anyone. My class talks a lot about their traumas. And how their traumas inform their games. They, honest to God, think their traumas are the most interesting thing about them. I sound like I’m making fun, and I am a little, but I don’t mean to be. They’re so different from us, really. Their standards are higher; they call bullshit on so much of the sexism and racism that I, at least, just lived with. But that’s also made them kind of, well, humorless.
    “If their traumas are the most interesting things about them, how do they get over any of it?” Sam asked. “I don’t think they do. Or maybe they don’t have to, I don’t know.”]

Fio continues:

You’re kind of breaking rule number one: don’t turn yourself into the product. You can’t craft yourself. You can submit to something and serve that, but you can’t craft yourself.

Being in the Hollywood world, there was a lot of these conversations where it was like, the product should be a blanket. When I would try to manage my artist, it was like, I don’t want to make you the product. This is weird. I don’t want to tell you how to do certain things. That’s a weird thing. Like you are becoming the product. And that’s a super, super dangerous thing. And what you’re talking about with these things is like you’re trying to craft yourself. And that is essentially what celebrities do. And just really pay attention to a celebrity. How many people go on these crazy runs where they are that thing for like a year? There’s 50, 60 new names that come up every year where you’re like, oh my God, and then they’re gone. It’s like what is that guy doing? Was that really worth it? Was that the game that he wanted to play? Was that the game he should have played? Or should he have tried to do something a little different, a little bigger?

All these artists that ride these fame waves, they all crash until they come out with a hit again. So if they lose sight of that, it really doesn’t matter what the personality game is they’re playing. If they make a hit, they’re back on top. So does it really matter what games? I think like Frank Ocean and Adele do this really well. They go into a hole for 10 years, and then they just emerge. They drop literally generational-defining music and then they disappear. [Kris: Slow productivity again — this is Newport’s description of Grisham]

It’s like, wow, that dude is a light maker. That dude is making magic. And he’s not the product. He’s cool. I want to hang out with him. I was in L.A. the other day and I had lunch next to him. There was not a bone in my body that would let me go up to him and be like, “Dude, can I get a picture?” Because he was not the thing. He did the honorable thing of making himself smaller to a larger thing he believed, which is the art. And when someone makes that humble decision, I trust them and I treat them like a real person. And if he’s sitting there crafting these archetypal things of what he’s going to do to make himself stand out as a personality, this and this and this, I don’t trust him.

He might get my attention for a year, but I’m not messing with that guy on a 10-year time line until he comes out with a generational-defining hit. And the second he’s capable of doing that, he’s going to realize that the other shit doesn’t matter at all.


A general thought I had when listening to this and many other interviews:

Business is heavily theorized but there seems to be little truth. So much competing information. In a way the things I’m sharing are revealing my bias more than uncovering truth. But I suspect it’s more important to have a point of view and just get to work than hand-wringing about your theories in a wicked domain. It’s a parallel idea to why investing feels like astrology — everything that makes sense gets overbid and the only place to find an edge is where at first it doesn’t appear to make sense. You do and if you can retrofit a why well that’s just a luxury.

Takeaways From Cal Newport on the Tim Ferriss podcast

These are the takeaways I wanted to save not a full set of notes.

episode link: https://tim.blog/2024/02/21/cal-newport-slow-productivity/


Techno-selectionism

The way we should think about dealing with technologies in our life, but also in our organizations and our culture. So at multiple scales, it’s hard to predict in advance always the impact a new tool is going to have.

I always give the example of going back and watching Steve Jobs’ keynote speech in 2007 when he’s introducing the iPhone. He doesn’t even get to the internet features until 30 minutes into the speech. I mean, he was just jazzed that your iPod was going to be on the same thing as your phone and you wouldn’t have to switch back and forth. He had no way of predicting eight years later. You’re going to have, for example, a teenage mental health crisis.

Techno-selectionism says, be willing to actually aggressively step backwards. Be willing to say, this looks interesting. Let me try this out. Oh, no. No, no, this is not matching what’s really important to me, so you’re out of here. So being more willing to both experiment and reject after the fact, to move away from these narratives of techno-progressivism that says new technology is good and there are bumps along the way, but you can’t put this genie back in the box. And I say, we can build all sorts of new boxes. And that’s probably the right way to go forward. So in my own life, for example, what I used to be really known for was the fact that I never signed up for traditional social media.

Slow Productivity: The Lost Art of Accomplishment Without Burnout

You can’t be busy and frenetic and bouncing off the walls with 100 projects if you’re obsessed about doing something really well. It’s incompatible with that. Now, doing something really well means you might have some really intense periods when you’re pulling something together, but it is incompatible with being busy. Like Chris Nolan, the director, doesn’t even own a smartphone. He is just, “I’m making Oppenheimer, and that’s what I’m doing for the next three years. And then when I’m done, I’m going to go away for six months and just read. That’s what I do.”

I cannot be on YouTube because when you obsess over quality, two things happen. One, you can’t be busy because that gets in the way of actually getting really good at something. And then two.If you’re doing something really well, that actually gives you the autonomy to push the other junk out of your life and slow down even more. As you get better at something, the more say you get over the way your life unfolds.

The glue is quality first”

Obsess over quality. Yes, because the other two principles are to do fewer things and work at a natural pace. However, if you’re only adhering to those two principles, you’ve set up a sort of adversarial relationship with work in general. It’s as if all you’re thinking about is how to do less. You see work as an adversary. You want more variety in your pacing. You’re just trying to reduce or change work. If that’s all you’re doing, you’re building up a negative attitude towards work, which I believe is one of the dominant reactions to burnout right now in, let’s say, elite culture. It’s an outright rejection of work itself.

Like, any drive to do things is a capitalist construction. And the real thing to do is to do nothing. But that doesn’t last. And the people who are telling you to do this are not doing nothing. They’re striving really hard to ensure that their substacks and books about doing nothing will have a large audience. They’re giving talks on it.

You can’t just focus on the doing less part. You need to obsess over quality. And that’s where you’re able to still fulfill that human drive to create. And that’s where you still build the leverage to control your life and make a living.

“Don’t get started”

[Kris: unconventional advice these days]

It’s really hard to get a good idea. So, take your time. Cultivating a good idea takes years. You have to write, you’re going to dedicate a lot of your life to it. So, don’t get started if you can hold back until you’re really, really sure about it.

People say, “Yeah, but I worry that I’m just going to procrastinate forever.” In some sense, it’s like, well, maybe you’re not meant to do this type of work. But the solution to that is not just to go, tweet this, do this video, or jump over this.

Don’t start using generative AI, or look for a quick thing that you can connect. You shouldn’t want to get started until you can’t help but get started. I think that’s frustrating for a lot of the internet generation because it takes a really long time.

To say I am a writer is something that I think many folks right now, who are in any form of content, would have a lot of trouble saying, “I am X.” They might say, “I’m a YouTuber,” but usually it’s like 15 hyphens. And therein lie many opportunities and also many temptations to be resisted.

It makes me think of Warren Buffett and the phrase, “Don’t just do something, stand there.” This is like, you don’t need to make 100,000 investments. You don’t need to be a day trader. Wait for the fat pitch. Figure out what the fat pitch looks like.

Figure out what your zone of genius is. What is your advantage?

How do you figure out what to work on?

I think you have two options and you can do both. One option is to have a way of test driving ideas. Like with a newsletter or blog to test drive it. And the internet makes that easier than it was 20 years ago.

Then the other option, and this is what I think of as the MFA option, is you have to develop really good taste.

These MFA programs, which are creative writing graduate programs, they don’t really teach you. It’s not instructive. Like here’s how you do paragraphs or here’s techniques you didn’t know, but it increases your taste, meaning your ability to recognize what’s good and what’s not and what’s possible with good things.

Slow productivity

There was no hustle culture. That’s the interesting thing. So when you go back and study people producing things of real value using their brain, they were smart and they were dedicated and they worked really hard, but they didn’t hustle. And they didn’t work 10-hour days, day after day. They didn’t work all out year round. They didn’t push, push, push until this thing was done.

It was a more natural variation. They had less on their plate at the same time, and they glued it all together by obsessing over quality. That’s the Slow Productivity approach. It still produces stuff that you’re really proud of. But it doesn’t burn you out. And it doesn’t leave you in this weird out of sync balance where work is taking up almost all of your time.

Can we take an example, like Newton and the Principia, and apply it to someone who has a 21st-century corporate, semi-remote hybrid work job for a big company? How do we isolate the principle and then make it pragmatic for people who are not traditional knowledge workers, but modern knowledge workers?

If we start with the first principle, “do fewer things,” what this really means for someone with a normal corporate job is to start being very explicit about workload management. Everyone does workload management, but we tend to do it in really inefficient ways because this is left to the individual in the knowledge work context in most jobs.

People send you emails and you just say, yeah, sure, I’ll do it. So what most people do, for example, is they wait until they feel really stressed. And then they say, all right, I have psychological cover to say no. Because I’m so overwhelmed that I feel justified in taking the social capital hit for saying no. It’s a terrible way to manage your workload. So you can be much more explicit about how you manage your workload. Here’s how many slots I have. Oh, I filled them. I mean, this is really sort of four-hour workweek style.

Let’s get in and write the systems for how we manage workload. You could go to a pull-based system instead of a push-based system. You can do reverse to-do list. There’s a lot of things you can do to make sure that the amount of work on your plate doesn’t get too large. In a way that’s fully compatible. Work at a natural pace. While there’s organizational things you can do here so that you’re not at full intensity, but you can also just do this yourself. You can titrate your workload. I go easier in the summer than I do in the rest of the year. And I can do this in a way that my employer doesn’t notice. You know, it’s pretty subtle in like what projects you take on or don’t take on.

Selling the idea of slow productivity in place of pseudo-productivity

We will make more money if we don’t pile 15 things on their plate because more of their time is going to be working on value-producing objectives and not talking about objectives that they don’t have time to actually get to. There’s a useful alignment happening here between clients and entrepreneurs, between employers and employees.

Slow Productivity produces good stuff. It doesn’t just make the workers happier. Doesn’t just make you happier. You produce better stuff. I mean, your company has more profit. Your clients are happier. You can charge more for the services you offer. So it’s not zero sum. It’s more win-win than anything else.

I think people don’t realize how chaotic and haphazard and impromptu the way they’re organizing their work is. How chaotic it really is, right? I don’t think people realize that. What we really did, and by we, I mean like the whole knowledge sector, is in the 1950s, when knowledge work emerged as a major economic sector with really large companies, with a large number of people working in offices.

There wasn’t a clear idea, how do we measure how someone is productive? Because all the ideas about that came from manufacturing and agriculture, and they didn’t apply.

In manufacturing, you could tabulate the labor hours per Model T produced, and in agriculture, you could count bushels produced per acre of land. You had numbers, and so you could say, oh, the assembly line increases this number, so let’s do that instead, or this Norfolk crop rotation method increases the bushels, so let’s do that instead. Knowledge work couldn’t…

Have any number like that because the jobs were more diverse and the organizational systems were autonomous. It’s just up to you to figure out how to organize yourself. There was no organizational-wide way of assigning and monitoring work that you could test and see, what if we change this? Is it better? So what happened was we invented this idea called pseudo-productivity.

Which was we will use activity that’s visible as a proxy for useful effort. So it’s just, hey, you’re doing something that’s good. Doing more things is better than less. That’s where the sort of notion of sort of busyness is good.

Once we got mobile computing, the internet, networks, and email, and I could work on my laptop, you can’t combine that with pseudo-productivity. If more activity is better than less, and you have endless work that you can do in any place, you just spiral into constant work and guilt.

This is the thing I think people miss: they believe they understand what productivity means and have many opinions about it. My argument is that they don’t have a sensible definition. We just have this notion that activity is somehow good, which is clearly not the case, especially for non-entry level knowledge work. Busyness doesn’t produce high value. So, people too often think of something like Slow Productivity as a willingness to trade off economic output for psychological sustainability. They’re willing to trade off making more money for feeling better about themselves. But that’s not what it is. What you’re doing now is crazy. You’re building Model Ts with the lights off. It’s a terrible way to work. It’s like, no, let’s get a real definition of productivity. One that is very sustainable, but also produces good stuff. So, I think people believe they’re stepping away from something that works, but it’s hard. It just gets it done, but it’s hard on me. The thing that we’re doing now doesn’t work. It’s not a sensible way of connecting human brains to add value to information. It’s not a good way of working. So almost any alternative that’s intentional is going to be better than what we have. So we might as well choose one that’s also sustainable and makes us feel good.

What productivity means to Cal

You take a craft that you think is important and that you could be good at and that’s interesting to you. And then you really put on your blinders for a decade. Get really good at something  important. Everything else will work itself out. Like his [Steve Martin] exact quote was, be so good they can’t ignore you. If you do that. Everything else has a way of working out.

A bad sign: when you think you have to rush to compete

If you feel like you have to rush to compete in something or race in some way, chances are you don’t have a great sustainable competitive advantage. I would say almost certainly you don’t have any sustainable competitive advantage. In which case, if you telescope out and just ask yourself, “What does this look like? What does my life look like in one year, three years, five years?” It’s going to break. Something’s going to break. It’s just a question of when it breaks. So you want to preemptively think through how to prevent that.

A specific example I admire is John Grisham. I once compared him to Michael Crichton. I found an old interview of Michael Crichton when he was 27 years old and wrote an essay comparing him to John Grisham. You can see two different approaches to the same job, which is writing popular genre fiction. Crichton was all about being busy. This interview was after The Andromeda Strain had come out. He was full of ambitions. He wanted to direct, do movies, had five books in development, was writing screenplays, and had just moved out to LA. He had a huge plan.

John Grisham, on the other hand, simplified his life as soon as his second book, The Firm, did well. His first book, A Time to Kill, was a flop when it first came out. But he said, “I’m going to write two books. If one of the two works, then I’ll keep doing this.” The Firm did really well. As soon as he had some autonomy, he simplified his life to the point where, at some point in the 2000s, he didn’t need to hire a new assistant when his longtime assistant retired. He said, “No one bothers me. My agent and my editor know how to contact me. I don’t do anything else. I write my book once a year. That’s it. I spend a lot of time doing stuff in my town.” He was a commissioner of the little league and did a lot of things unrelated to work.

He slowed down and said, “I just want to write. That’s all I do. I don’t need to have TV shows. I don’t need to write the screenplays for my books when they get made into things. I don’t need to create a six-part series and direct my own shows. I’m just going to write. I’m getting paid a lot of money. That’s what I want to do. I want to simplify.” So Grisham has always stood out to me. I know a couple of people who know him, and they confirm this. He writes one book a year. You’re not going to hear from him until it’s done. Then you get him for about four weeks, and he’ll do some publicity. But people know who he is. He has the leverage to do nothing.

Embracing slow productivity

Here’s the heuristic that maybe ties a lot of this together. At least for professional stuff, in the end, it’s craft. Craft is what matters. Respecting craft, developing craft, applying craft, finding meaning in craft. Just keep watching on repeat, “Jiro dreams of sushi,” right? Just go back and watch that like once a month, because the more you think about craft, the more I find fulfillment.

Craft is where I impact the world. Craft is where I gain autonomy over my professional life. It can provide for the people I care about and give interesting opportunities in my life. It all comes back down to craft. You slow down. Your timeframes become much longer. Psychologically, you gain so much resilience.

Maybe you couple that, if I’m going to add a second heuristic, with ignoring the internet. It’s a crazy-making machine. Don’t rely on metrics you have to look at on a day-to-day basis.

That’s the two things. Do those two things. It’s night or day. Like what your life is like is night or day.

Intentional productivity involves having a consistent, coherent philosophy for how I’m going to do my work. This philosophy should be more sophisticated than simply being busy. Being busy is often people’s default because it prevents self-recrimination and assures them that they are trying. However, it’s important to be more intentional.

Not everyone needs to be busy all the time. If you’re an investment banker or trying to become a law partner, a very intentional, coherent, and reasonable productivity plan might involve working all the time. This is specifically what works in that world. However, for most people, when they’re intentional, they realize that 80% of what they’re doing is just trying to generate smoke from friction, but there’s no fire. They’re just trying to be busy because they don’t know what else to do. Slowness becomes almost always inevitable once you actually start to be intentional about what you’re really doing. You start to question what really works, what matters, and what doesn’t. Adopt a blend of relentlessness and patience.

Take your time. The good things will wait because it’s uncrowded. They’re really important things. Those domains are typically very, very uncrowded.

A clever insight about writing

Slow Productivity is actually kind of hidden all around us if we pause to look at the people we most respect. All i do as a writer basically is come up with two word terms for things that widely exist and everyone already knows about. “Deep work” already exists i just put a name to it. “Digital minimalism”. I’m just putting a name to a philosophy. That’s my whole secret.

And I’ve said this before to people about pragmatic nonfiction writing. The goal is not to try to teach someone something completely new they didn’t know about. The goal is just to try to help people articulate something they already know deep in their gut is true. They just don’t have a framework or terminology for it. You know, don’t try to convince people of new things. Explain to them what they already know in a way that lets them take better action.

That’s the secret to nonfiction. Prescriptive nonfiction writing is you’re not really teaching people something new.

Lessons From Ed Thorp’s Interview With Tim Ferriss

Episode link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CNvz91Jyzbg&ab_channel=TimFerriss

This is not a summary but just a selection of excerpts I want to preserve.


You’re teaching a class of the neophytes how to invest? And some are, say mathematically inclined, and some are not. It’s a very mixed group. What types of tools or thinking frameworks, heuristics, mental models? Anything would would you focus on in the first handful of of lectures?

The first thing I tell them is, the answer is really easy for almost everybody. But you’re not going to believe me until you work through it yourself and understand it. I’ll tell you the answer to start with, and then I’ll try to convince you that it’s the right answer.

So, the answer is, if you’re a long-term investor, you should just buy and hold equities. The best place to have equities has been the US for the last couple of 100 years. Overall, equities here have compounded about 10, or 10 and a half percent for 200 years. The data for the first hundred years is not as good as the data for the last 100. But the data for the last century is quite good and very well documented.

How does that do against everybody else? Well, you can prove by logical mathematical arguments. I won’t go into all the details here. Some of it’s in my book, it’s also in other places, you can prove that if a person simply buys the index and holds it, they will outperform most all other players. The people who buy and hold the index will beat the whole collection of people who don’t do that. They do way better, on average, the ones who don’t do that pay trading costs. They have more volatility from lack of diversification. They often pay investment advisors, and all this and they also pay taxes when they trade. So the upshot is that you might make 10 and a half percent. If you don’t pay all these people, you might make eight, or seven or 6% to pay the crowd of people waiting to, quote, help you unquote. So that’s the simple answer for people who don’t know anything about investing.

Now, you might say, Well, yeah, but I’m pretty smart. I hear all these stories. I listen to Cramer on TV who jumps around, makes loud noise, and sounds good. So why can’t I do better?

Well, the academics have something called the efficient market theory in which they claim that you can’t do better. Now, I’ve already explained that that’s wrong, you can find instances where you can do better. Warren Buffett’s company did much better. I found with my hedge fund, I could do much better. But the kind of work you have to put in to do much better is substantial. It doesn’t seem like it at first. But when you get into it, there are all kinds of details and follow-ups and things to be checked out. And you end up spending a substantial amount of time and energy, figuring out how to do it better. And for everybody who finds out how to do better, the rest of the crowd who isn’t buying the index is doing a little bit worse, because you can show that the whole collection of people who don’t buy the index, or themselves as a group, is like the index. You subtract the index part out, and the rest is like the index too. So the people who aren’t buying the index that are like the index, as a group, are busy paying all these costs, taxes, investment advisors, and so forth. So on average, that whole group does worse. So you’re starting, you’re paying basically, casino vigorish, or whatever, if you’re not indexing, and you got to beat that, in order to do better than the indexes. And obviously, the group can’t beat that. So it’s only a small collection of people, some by luck, and some by skill will end up doing better. So you’re basically betting against the odds if you just invest by stories, and invest in various mutual funds that are actively managed, and so forth. So that’s what I would tell people.

Now, on the other side of the coin, if you really are interested in investing, it’s worth educating yourself and trying to do it, because you will learn a lot about investing, you might actually find a way to win. And you’ll learn about how the world works and a lot about life too. The things you learn from what seems like a narrow, specialized field, generalize very widely to all kinds of things. If you’re the kind of person who can take a lesson in one part of life and transport it to another part of life.

What are some of those transferable lessons in your mind?

Let’s take investment risk as a good example. You learn about how you minimize great risks. This is because significant investment risks can remove you from the game altogether. You might have an opportunity where you multiply your money by ten times, but you might also lose it all. Highly volatile things, like buying cryptocurrency, fall into this category. You may have the chance for a large gain, but also the risk of a significant loss. If you lose most of your capital, it’s challenging to recover. For instance, if you lose 90% of your capital, you’ve got to multiply what’s left by ten to break even, which means you’ve got to make a 900% return to offset that 90% loss. It’s not easy and takes a long time. So, you want to avoid really bad outcomes.

I applied this, for example, to COVID. I thought about what to do and how to deal with it. The early 2020 stats showed that people 85 and up, particularly males, had an 18% death rate if they contracted it. Even now, the death rate is very high for those who get it. If they’re unvaccinated, it’s probably close to that, and if they’re vaccinated, it’s maybe a tenth of that. So, I consider that a risk that could take me out of the game. It was a fairly high probability, so I’m going to avoid getting COVID if I possibly can. I’m going to mask up, avoid crowds, and think about the risks of various activities that I do and decide whether it’s worth it. So, I did my own analysis of COVID and its risks and tried to be very careful from then on. I think it’s paid off for me and my family. I’ve passed this information on to people around me.

On thinking for yourself

You won’t adhere to something unless you understand it yourself. There’s an old saying, “Give a person a fish, and they eat for a day, teach a person to fish and they eat for a lifetime.” The same applies to thinking. If you give somebody advice about a problem, they might solve that one problem. If you teach them how to think about problems, they can solve problems for the rest of their life. Also, if you give them advice, and they don’t understand what the advice is, or how to think about it, there’s a good chance they won’t take the advice.

A brutal example of someone not thinking for themselves

Back in 1991, I was invited to review the portfolio of McKinsey and Company in New York. They had a profit-sharing and a pension plan. I looked at all the things they had and they were quite good. But there was one very strange investment that yielded one or 2% a month, every month, for years. I asked, “How do they do this?” They said they didn’t know exactly, but they showed me their accounts.

I saw that this account had stock and put option positions with calls. Collars. They had a put option a little below the stock price, and they bought a call option a little bit above. The two things paid for themselves, so it seemed like they didn’t have a lot of risk. But I could show that in a down market, they would lose and in an up month, they would win. They won every month because a mysterious trade was put on involving S&P index options, and it was always in the right direction.

So, I said this is not possible. I wanted to go over and look at this place. They called the person in charge, Peter Madoff, the brother of Bernie Madoff. Bernie was off in Europe raising money. This was 1991. When Peter Madoff heard I was coming, he said, “No, I won’t let him in the front door.”

I decided to take a better look at all their trades. I saw that half the trades never happened when I researched them. That is, there were no trades occurred on any exchange at the prices they were making them out for these options. Another quarter of the trades had so much volume, that the volume couldn’t have happened because there wasn’t that much volume on the exchanges where they traded. The last quarter of the trades didn’t happen anywhere. There was no explanation.

So, I decided to look at some of the trades that actually could have happened. I went to a vice president of Bear Stearns and asked him to research 10 options trades. I wanted to know who was on the other side of these trades. In particular, was Madoff and Company on the other side of any of them. They researched the trades and said they couldn’t find any trace of Madoff and Company.

So, I said to McKinsey, “This is a fraud.” They said, “But we’re making 20% a year.” I said, “Well, you’re making 16% on your other investments. If I’m right, this 20% is not real, and the roof’s gonna fall in someday, and you might lose your jobs. On the other hand, if I am right, and you move, you’ve solved this problem. If I’m wrong, and you move, you’re only going from 20% to 16%. So it makes a lot of sense to just exit.”

So they exited in two months. We inquired of everyone we knew on my network, they through their network, to find out who had investments with Madoff and how much they had. We could only cover a small part of the territory because our network was not comprehensive. We were able to identify about half a billion. That means that there was a lot more than half a billion out there. How much more we couldn’t say.

But how could you challenge Madoff? He was a pillar of the National Association of Securities. He’d been a past president, even on committees there. He was the biggest third market, that is off the exchange maker, in the country. He was a respected person, well known to everybody, and he had thousands of investors. Because he had so many investors, everybody knew it had to be right, because surely those people had checked it all out.

The finale of the story is that when I was doing this, the person who invited me, who was a hedge fund manager himself and had been an advisor to McKinsey, believed in Madoff and continued to raise money for him. In 2008, when the news came out that Madoff was a fraud, my son called me up and said, “You know, Dad, the stuff you’ve been telling me about for 17 years, it finally happened. It blew up.”

This fellow who had been running a fund of funds, and included Madoff in that fund of funds, that’s a special type of hedge fund that invests in other hedge funds. He had been doing this and had a very big fund of funds. He was raising money for Madoff the same week that the bad news came out. He had his own personal money, his family’s money, and trusts where money was with Madoff. But I had explained everything to him in great detail. I knew him quite well, at the time back in 1991, that McKinsey and Company had this analysis explained to them and decided to pull out.

The whole point of this is, here’s a person who had all the information, it was explained very clearly, and he just didn’t believe it. He himself was in the investment business and was very successful. But he was swayed by popular opinion. He would poll people and then go by the poll. So just imagine that you asked 10,000 people whether they thought you could travel faster than light. 9,999 said, “Yep, you can do it. I saw it on TV.” And only one guy said, “No, you can’t do it, Albert Einstein.” So a guy like him would overwhelmingly reject Einstein and believe the 9,999 average people who just said, “Yeah, you could do it,” because the poll was 9,999 to one on one side.

He doesn’t think for himself. He lets the crowd think for him. And that, I think, is a fundamental mistake that many people make. They let the crowd do their thinking. They don’t figure it out for themselves.

[Kris: This is an incredibly difficult topic — the tension between first principles and consensus in truth-finding. In this example, Thorp uses the consensus finding method know as a poll aka democracy. In Dinosaur Markets, I explain a a very similar metaphor I learned from Jeff Yass at SIG. Yass and Thorp would probably agree that if there was a futures market traded on the speed of light question the contract would trade for a much smarter price than what the poll would indicate — Einstein would have raised money to short the proposition from a small but rich group of investors who are in the business of finding wedges between fair value and consensus price.

But even markets can suffer from the madness of crowds. Markets and democratic means of finding truth can both fail. And that is where the first principle people shine. It’s the scientist, entrepreneur, or Billy Beane whose independent thinking coincides with everyone laughing at them. 

But I say the tension is difficult because well-functioning markets have a good track record of being hard to beat, so if every problem is a nail to be hit with a first-principles hammer your gonna waste a lot of energy tearing down Chesterton’s fences only to discover that your predecessors deserved more credit. 

also see  Snowflakes vs Lemmings]

Which investors, other than Warren Buffett, impress you? They could be people who are no longer actively investing, or they could be current investors. Are there any who come to mind who have particularly impressed you, aside from Buffett?

There are people in the hedge fund world who have done remarkable jobs at various times, but they’re not accessible to your listeners, or to most people. For example, let’s take Jim Simons of Renaissance. Renaissance Partners is basically a private operation at this point. But it’s been extraordinarily successful, using PhDs, computers, math, and codebreaking, and so forth. And it has, from around 1989 or 1990, been spectacular in its performance, probably having the best risk-adjusted record in the world from that time forward.

Any other names who come to mind?

Well, I’m trying to think of whom I would give money to invest. I don’t have anybody now to whom I’d give money to invest. There are a few good hedge funds around, but they take too much for the general partner and leave too little for a limited partner. They also generate income that is highly taxed if you’re a taxable investor. So, they’re only good for nonprofits or tax-exempt investors.

You could have simply become a full-time capital accumulator. How did you decide to wind it down? And how do you determine what is ‘enough’? This doesn’t strike me as a common sentiment among people who are really good at investing.

The way I entered the investment world was as an academic. I was curious and found things interesting. I wasn’t really there to get rich; I was there to solve interesting math problems that kept coming up. Blackjack and Roulette were math/physics problems. Investing was, for me, lots and lots of math. So, I enjoyed that. I just do things I like, and I don’t worry about money. As my former sister-in-law once said, “Do what you love, and the money will follow.” She wrote a book with that title. And I thought, that’s right. Do what you love, and the money may follow. If it does, that’s fine. If it doesn’t, you’re still doing what you love. What’s important in life, I think, is the journey, the people you spend your time with, and how you spend your time.

I started out as a child of the Great Depression, so I knew what it was like to have basically no money. I used to sleep four or five hours a night in high school and get up at two or three in the morning to deliver newspapers. I made $25 a month, which seemed like a lot of money. I saved part of that for college and invested part of it in science equipment, chemistry, telescopes, electronics, and so forth, just because I liked playing with those things and learning about them. So my goal wasn’t to make money; it was to have a good life, enjoy myself, and have fun. It just so happened that I also made a lot of money.

What I found in the investment world is that lots of people go into it for the money. And when they do, they keep going and going. It’s a validation for them that they can’t stop. They end up with five or ten villas, a yacht, a jet. But imagine having five houses. How much of your time is spent in each house? You can’t be in your house all the time. You’ll be vacationing, traveling, meeting, and so on. So maybe it’s a sixth or seventh of the time, on average. Now, some houses you’re going to spend more time in, some less. You may spend a tenth or fifteenth of your time in one of those houses. So you end up with a lot of stuff to manage and take care of. You end up hiring people to do that, then you have to manage those people. Then you have to hire people to manage the people who manage the people, and so on. It’s like running a business. You don’t get to enjoy the important part of your life, which is time.

[Kris: You don’t have to be a centimillionaire to relate. If you live in a nice suburb town near a coastal city (ahem the working rich) you can learn from this too. Personally, I feel that many high-earners who still feel money insecurity just spend too much time looking over their neighbor’s fence. But Thorp endorses a book by Ian Shapiro that proposes another possibility that I think makes more sense. It’s not envy. It’s a fear grounded in what are eyes see — communal breakdowns. The book is called The Wolf at the Door: The Menace of Economic Insecurity and How to Fight It.

Thorp describes the book:

The book is fairly recent, explaining the concepts I learned in a political science course a few months ago. It discusses how to form coalitions that can win and how to pass measures that will endure. For instance, Social Security has remained intact because it immediately established a strong constituency that would perpetually defend it. Politically, despite attempts by some politicians and occasional political parties to dismantle it, they have not been successful due to the deeply embedded and robust constituency. He provides a clear description of how to effectively accomplish goals. He believes that incremental progress can be made, as discouraging as it may seem these days, by correctly forming and defending against blocking coalitions. I highly recommend his book to anyone looking to make evolutionary progress.

In my opinion, we are currently in a democracy crisis. Simplistically, we have three paths: devolution, which we are currently undergoing; evolution, which I hope will occur where we fix things and improve; and revolution, which is extremely unpleasant.

One of your previous interviewees, Ray Dalio, has a book that I believe is worth reading, despite being a challenging read. It contributes significantly to the discussion about the crisis we are currently facing, discussing the changing world order, the rise of China as an empire, and the decline of the United States. As an empire, we need to do some serious thinking. We cannot rest on our laurels, claiming our past greatness and hoping it will continue. We need to do things differently.]

Did you have a specific point at which you knew you were going to exit the business, so to speak, or was there a particular day or experience that prompted you to say enough is enough?

I wasn’t having fun anymore. It was turning into work. And I thought, “Well, I don’t need to do this. I have enough wealth. I’m never going to spend it all. Why keep doing this?” So, I decided to wind it down. It was fun for a long time because they were challenging problems. It was challenging to try to figure out new things and to deal with all the issues that came up. But when it became bureaucratic and paperwork, and a grind where I had to do things I didn’t want to do, that was enough. It was time to go. And it was the same thing in academia. I loved academia, but there were aspects of it that became burdensome: committee meetings, endless reviews, grant proposals. What I liked was research and teaching, and the people that I met there, the students and the faculty who were smart and challenging. If it was only that, I’d still be there. But it wasn’t only that, and I found other things that were equally or more fulfilling. So, anyhow, I just migrate to where I want to be. I don’t have a set thing that I have to keep doing. Let’s explore that.

I spend my time reading, traveling, exercising, enjoying my family and friends, and learning things I can. It’s also entertaining to casually manage my investments. I might interject here that one thing that makes you independent is accumulating capital. Then, the capital can grow on its own if it’s simply invested, as I described before, in an index fund. Once you have capital, you have the chance for independence. If you have enough capital, it can support you indefinitely. When you’ve achieved that goal, there’s no point in spending time doing anything you don’t enjoy if you can avoid it. There are some things you don’t like but have to do, like gathering your tax information every year or going for routine medical appointments.

Is there anything that you are particularly interested in learning more about, currently in the process of learning about, or looking forward to learning about?

What I’ve focused on for the last year or so is reading about what’s going on in American society. What may happen? I don’t think we can predict for sure what’s going to happen. But we can map out scenarios, we can map out possibilities. We won’t get them all, but we can map out quite a few of them. And ask ourselves, what will we do if scenario A, scenario B, or scenario C materializes, and have some sort of preparation and readiness for that.

I won’t go into a list of extreme scenarios except maybe a few:

  • You could have an autocratic country where a minority pretty much rules everything and dictates everybody else.
  • You could have a turbulent country where a large part of the country, maybe a majority, is badly upset and just wants to bust everything up and start over somehow.

So you could have the choices that describe a devolution, evolution, or revolution. I don’t know how it’s going to play out. But it’s worth thinking about what might happen. And whether there’s anything any of us can do about it.

I don’t think there’s much that an individual can do on a grand scale, unless he happens to be in a position of great importance, or manages to get himself in a position of great importance. But I think there’s a lot that an individual can do on a small scale. And I think the best thing we can do is teach everybody to think for themselves. So they don’t just take what they’re told, in the press, for example, or in the other forms of the media, the internet, Twitter, and so on. They don’t just take that and blindly believe it, but they question it. And they ask whether, in fact, it might not be true. What the motives are of the people who are putting these things out and so forth. When you begin to think for yourself, the whole world changes and becomes much clearer, in my opinion. And you can manage your life much better. 

[Kris: This is an area which I would partially disagree with Thorp. While I think it’s a noble goal to want to teach everyone to think for themselves…I think this fundamentally unscalable. I am not optimistic about the capacity of individuals to elevate their ability to cognitively reflect by large jumps. Which means we are locked into the distribution of this ability as it is. And even if we could, it’s not clear that it is adaptive or even possible at the group level. I don’t feel that the group level is just a scaled up version of the sum of individual gains — I think it’s a phase shift into which those gains would either be lost or sublimated into another dumb mob mentality, hacked by the same forces that infiltrate every group movement draining them of the purity of their initial energy. At a society level, progress requires the carrying capacity to bring our dumb caveman selves along with it. In spite of it.

If progress is contingent on us escaping our tribalism, it’s doomed from the outset. I think Dan Carlin has the framing best — our unraveling will come from failing to seriously confront an existential coordination problem. And we are going to need to do that without counting on a collective mental upgrade.]


If you use options to hedge or invest, check out the moontower.ai option trading analytics platform

Excerpts From Byrne Hobart on Hedge Funds, VC, and Finding Alpha

Eric Torenberg interviews Byrne Hobart and Daloopa CEO Thomas Li on Hedge Funds, VC, and Finding Alpha

I pulled some excerpts below I’d like to hold for future reference. I used ChatGPT to clean up the transcribed excerpts — the result is a mix of quotes and paraphrases. 


On Alfred Winslow Jones first hedge fund being similar to the modern pod shop:

But other things were just generally a sensible part of the model that you charge based on performance. You try to hedge your exposure. So you’re not just betting the market goes up. But you’re trying to differentiate among different companies and try to figure out what makes each company unique. Not just understanding the business, but also understanding what makes the stock move. A bunch of other hedge funds started appearing in the 60s. Then, in the early 70s, almost all of them went under. Many realized they could borrow as stocks were going up. They borrowed a lot to buy a lot, and it worked really well for a while. Then most of them got wiped out. However, there were a few survivors. You had this golden age in the 80s where you had people like Soros doing more macro stuff, and people like Tiger doing more company-specific fundamental stuff. As computers got faster and we started having more data, people came up with systematic strategies across different asset classes. A lot happened between the 80s and today, but the current evolution has been towards some funds that run classic strategies like value-based stock picking and being mostly long, with a couple of short positions. The strategy that’s gaining a lot of market share in terms of assets and public attention is the multi-strategy, multi-manager, platform, or pod shop model.

In this model, you give a portfolio manager some capital budget/risk budget. You tell them they are picking stocks in their sector, the kinds of companies they pick, and they must have no net exposure to the market, large stocks versus small stocks, or one industry versus another, or momentum stocks versus value stocks. Once you hedge out all those factors that cause different companies to correlate, you end up with a very pure view of which stock is going up relative to its peers. This model has worked really well as a way to create uncorrelated streams of alpha. So if you have 100 different people doing that in 100 different subsets of the market, and they all stay on top of these companies better than anyone ever before, they will generally figure out when orders are slowing down or picking up, when an airline will accelerate its growth, or when a price war between steel companies will abate. If you are continuously tracking and turning over a portfolio, you end up always identifying the idiosyncratic news that’s going to drive a given stock’s movements, beyond just the random noise that drives prices. That’s a general overview of what those funds do and how they think.

Examples of HF strategies

We’ve mentioned the multi-manager, multi-strategy funds, and they encompass a large number of different strategies within them. We’ve talked about the fundamentals and different strategies, but many of those funds will have systematic strategies. These range from broad-scale strategies, like looking at all the different asset prices and what correlates with what. For example, if there’s a view that deviations from these correlations will snap back. So, if oil stocks generally move together with the price of oil and then one stock is lagging, that’s the one you buy and you short a basket of other stocks against it. You can also have much more sophisticated systematic strategies.

One category that goes through booms and busts is index inclusion strategies. This involves predicting who will get added to or removed from the S&P 500 or other indices. The first order problem is predicting who gets added or removed based on explicit index inclusion criteria and your view of the index committee’s decision-making. You’re also trying to bet on the volume of trades that is already making this bet. For instance, if the index inclusion means that the index funds have to buy 10 million shares of Company X, but traders betting on that inclusion have already bought 15 million anticipating selling them to the index, then it’s actually a bad catalyst. When the inclusion happens, they are trying to sell more stock than the index funds want to buy.

Another style that goes in and out of fashion is global macro, which can be split into two things with opposite cycles. One is doing these global relative value trades, where you look at the world and basically look at which countries seem to be converging in terms of standard of living and government norms with the United States. You buy their currencies or revive their assets, expecting that convergence to continue. The other is, you look at the state of the world, decide something is totally unsustainable, figure out what’s going to break, and find the most cost-effective way to bet that it breaks. This kind of strategy can work extremely well during a crisis or sometimes when there is a crisis in one place or some outlier event.

Every time there’s an election surprise, you wait a couple of weeks, and you’ll find out that some macro hedge fund is up significantly, like 300%, because they had a massively levered bet on something like Argentinian stocks. They were the only ones who truly believed it would happen and that the rally would be as magnificent as it was. Regarding Brexit, there was a lot of activity where hedge funds were commissioning private polling and trying to track the developments over time. They tried to predict what would happen and, if so, what the magnitude of the price impact would be.

Risk-parity and 60/40 being implicit macro bets on low inflation

If you look at a long chart of the equity and fixed income correlation, you see that the sign flips depending on the level and uncertainty of inflation. When I started working at a hedge fund in 2012, it was a given that when stocks went down, treasury bonds went up, and vice versa. This pattern essentially started in 1998, triggered by a market dip due to long-term capital management, the East Asian financial crisis, and the Russian crisis. The Fed significantly increased liquidity, boosting bond prices, and eventually, stocks snapped back while bonds came down, channeling liquidity into the stock market. This led to the highs of 1999 and part of 2000, which was enjoyable for everyone except the short sellers.

This situation was possible because inflation had been steadily declining since the early 80s. Around 1998, it could be argued that China’s labor supply was almost infinite compared to the world’s demand for physical goods. As long as people could move from the countryside to cities to produce goods, the cost of tradable physical items like TVs, toys, furniture, and apparel would either remain flat or decline. This price drop was largely due to production moving from more expensive countries to cheaper ones, with China offering a huge labor force and good ports, plus a government eager to grow its industrial base and invest in infrastructure.

For a long time, inflation wasn’t a concern. Whenever growth slowed, stocks would drop, and rates would decrease, causing bonds to rise. This made risk parity an excellent trade. However, it turns out that risk parity is essentially a macro bet that inflation will remain low, implying that the risk-adjusted return of stocks plus bonds is significantly better than that of either one alone.

Most strategies are implicitly a bet on the yield curve

If you’re a venture capitalist, you’re interested in the tail end of the yield curve being as low as possible.

In risk parity, the preference is for the yield curve to have a traditional curve shape, essentially what people envision when they think of a yield curve.

For a market neutral or factor neutral hedge fund, the ideal scenario is for the short end of the yield curve to be high, and for it to be flat or almost inverted, indicating high volatility

Don’t tell the VCs, but it’s true. A flat low yield curve implies a very low growth environment where real rates are extremely low. This means that if you can invest in a company that can produce secular growth at a time when rates are low, the valuation becomes completely nonlinear. For instance, look at what companies were trading at in 2021, it was because the present value of profits in 10 years was really close to the value of those profits today. As a result, many of them were valued on a multiple of 2027’s revenue or something similar. As long as they were growing really fast, that multiple made them look quite cheap. [Kris: See Negative Interest Rates and the Perpetuity Paradox]

These things work really well when rates are extremely low. Low rates also mean there’s a lot of capital floating around. This goes back to the earlier point on what Limited Partners (LPs) want; often they seek a single digit return. If you can buy 10-year treasuries at 5%, a single-digit return is not hard to achieve with very simple assets. But if your Treasuries are earning 70 basis points, then you absolutely have to take risks. This creates an interesting feedback loop where a lot of money flows into the growth parts of the economy. Many startups sell things to other startups. So, every time another large check goes into Snowflake before its IPO, suddenly there are more Zoom and DocuSign seats being sold, more Slack seats being sold, and there’s more usage on AWS. It all feeds into the same ecosystem. If everything’s trading at a high enough price-to-sales ratio, then every dollar that goes into the ecosystem increases the market value of that ecosystem by more than that dollar.

Additionally, if companies are increasingly paying people in equity, then you don’t need much cash to keep the flywheel going for a long time. Venture capital turned out, at least in modern venture where you have an ecosystem of startups selling to other startups, to be about understanding unit economics well enough to look at companies burning cash and ask, “What are they getting when they burn that cash? How much Lifetime Value (LTV) are they getting for the Customer Acquisition Cost (CAC) they have to spend?” If that number looks good, then you could put a really high valuation on these companies.

That’s one of the things that changed in the venture ecosystem, even over the five years up to 2021. People got really good at quickly identifying companies with a product-market fit, looking at what the unit economics look like, and discounting that by looking at the Total Addressable Market (TAM) and then basically saying, someone else can also figure out these numbers, so someone else can capture this TAM. Therefore, we absolutely need to give this company massive funding. The playbook for growing a company fast by dumping a lot of money into it got very refined by that time. You could find someone who had worked at a company that scaled at that speed and who knew where the bottlenecks were. Meanwhile, some of the scaling got easier because of all of these third-party services.

You didn’t have to build out an entire internal communications infrastructure like Amazon did when they were getting started; they built their entire customer service system in Emacs Lisp. But now you would just use Front or something similar, so you don’t have to put any engineer hours into building that system, which means you can scale much faster. More of the money went more directly into the company’s core competency because everything that was non-core was somebody else’s SaaS product that you could just buy.

Why shorting overvalued or fraudulent companies is a weak hedge from a correlation point of view

I wrote a piece on shorting recently and how it’s become a worse hedge over time. The basic argument is that when people are shorting, whether it’s on an unconstrained generalist basis or within an industry, they tend to find the same companies. They tend to identify companies that are over-earning, have dishonest CEOs, or are overly promotional, and so they short them by default. Alternatively, they might do the funding short of just picking a company where nothing is going to change over the next decade. So if they have to have a short position, they could just short this and not think about it anymore.

One problem with this is that it means when there are extreme market disruptions and hedge funds are telling all their portfolio managers to cut their exposure in half as quickly as possible, they’re all selling the same stuff or, more likely, selling some of the same stuff and also buying some of the same stuff. Sometimes it’s gratifying when I’m on Twitter and I see a rumor that some pod somewhere blew up, and then I look at the stocks I’m short and see they’re all up five or 10%. It feels good to know that I’m shorting the same things the professionals are, even if I found out because that particular professional didn’t perform well and got fired.

An interesting example of this I stumbled on recently was a company called Zion Oil and Gas, which seems like a scam. They’re drilling for oil in Israel, which is one industry that Israel does not excel in. It’s one part of the Middle East where that’s not the main economic activity. But they’re raising money from American investors who think this is really cool or maybe it’s biblical somehow. The stock in Zion Oil and Gas was at $6 a share in December 2008 and then went up to $14 a share in February 2009, making it one of the better-performing US equities over that time period. This was during the depths of the crisis. I have to assume that a lot of it was that very smart people were shorting this, thinking it’s a retail promotion that’s going to run out of money and die. Then all of them were losing money on everything else they did and had to cut exposure and buy back. So the stock went up. Maybe they did a big promotion, or maybe they had some sort of financial crisis, the End of Times themed stock promotion, but a lot of the worst companies in the world all go up on bad days because everyone is covering. So it becomes harder; over longer periods, shorts do hedge a portfolio, but day-to-day, it’s more painful.

Framing the competition between retail and professional investors

Why different time horizons mean different arenas

In many ways, everyday investors will generally either have a really short timeframe and are more or less gambling, or making educated bets on minor market movements, or they’re making longer-term bets like, “I know this company, I like the company, I use the products all the time, I’m going to buy the stock and hold it for 20 years.” If you’re doing that, it doesn’t really matter if Citadel is better informed about how this quarter is shaping up. Sure, it’s unfortunate that you might have bought the stock for 10% less if you waited a week until they reported bad earnings. But if you truly believe in the company, then it’s a minor difference, especially over longer timescales. And if you’re investing continuously, saving money, and putting a little money into the market every so often, then it all averages out.

One of the nice effects that hedge funds have for you as an investor is that they price in all the incremental changes in the outlook all the time. So every time there’s a new round of data that tells you a bit about share shift within some industry, hedge funds immediately adjust to that, or they have predicted it and already adjusted. This makes you less likely to be blindsided by certain types of surprises, especially on the revenue side of consumer-facing companies. It’s broadly true that hedge funds do make the market more efficient, so you’re getting a better deal.

Hedge funds are not trying to figure out where the stock will trade in 10 years. To the extent that they are, it’s more like they’re trying to reverse engineer the process of large, long-only investors, like Fidelity and Capital Group, etc...and what incremental news flow over the next two weeks will adjust their 10-year price target in a predictable way that you can trade ahead of.

Retail advantages over pros

The single largest source of advantage in the markets, ironically, are not owned by hedge funds but by retail investors, and that’s the time horizon. Over a long enough time horizon, you can actually outperform most hedge funds if you do things with discipline. Hedge funds have some disadvantages which you can easily avoid as a retail investor. The first disadvantage is that hedge funds incur a lot of short-term capital gains tax when they make money because of trades that mostly don’t go above a year. For retail, holding a stock for over a year is not that difficult. The second key benefit is that hedge funds need to show short-term performance; monthly returns matter, quarterly returns absolutely matter. They are forced to take movements when the markets are not favorable. For instance, there’s a grossing down problem. If the markets are bad, and everybody’s losing money, that’s the time you want to be deploying capital. But what typically happens is they’re reducing their exposure to the market to figure out what is going on, and that’s when you see huge market dislocations. As a retail investor, you can sit there and say, “8% is nothing if I’m going to hold the stock for the next 10 years, I’ll just hang on to it.” And that time horizon difference is a huge source of alpha in a market that, for the most part, isn’t competed away, even with the biggest hedge funds, because they don’t have the ability to do that.

Hedge funds measure themselves on a risk-adjusted basis, and part of it is just how they’re structured and capitalized. They’re often levered, like six or eight to one is the usual ratio. So if you’re an individual portfolio manager at one of those funds, if you have a billion-dollar allocation, you think their target return is like 10% a year, but no, their target return is on the order of like two or 3% a year. Because they are hedging so many things out, they just aren’t taking enough risk to make massive returns. The risk comes from stacking a bunch of these portfolios together. And if you make a trade and it’s not working right away, you’re probably going to exit that trade because you don’t know why it’s not working. It means that hedge funds are in this constant effort to generate new ideas. There’s this idea of velocity, like if you have a portfolio and it has X amount of names, and you’re turning over all of the stocks in that portfolio every Y trading days, then you need at least one original long or short idea every workday to have a portfolio with the right structure. The median quality of the ideas is not necessarily good, but it is a volume game.

What is a hedge fund solving for fundamentally?

You’re in the risk removal game, trying to remove as much risk as possible, because you have access to cheap enough leverage that if you can consistently generate a 3% return, it’s world-class, it’s absolutely phenomenal. With that consistency, you can borrow 10 times the money and make a 30% return. So, to achieve a consistent 3%, the key being consistency, you are removing every type of risk possible. However, the challenge of doing that is you often end up in situations with many other funds trying to do the exact same thing. Hedge funds tend to get into crowded longs and crowded shorts, where everyone is following the same thesis. For example, everyone might be long Amazon and short a bunch of other e-commerce tech names, or long Booking and short out the rest of travel.

In these nuanced situations, if a company like Amazon reports earnings and beats them, but not by enough due to the high number of long positions, the stock may trade down. These funds that are long Amazon then have to sell because the earnings, though fundamentally good, didn’t meet the high expectations set by the market. In trying to remove risk, these funds actually take on a significant risk by not considering that everyone else is removing the same risk.

To avoid this problem, one strategy is to engage in areas others are not focusing on. This approach, however, can be challenging because it often means fewer resources, fewer people to talk to, fewer conferences to attend. You’re often on an island, which can be a more difficult psychological battle. When working for a large platform, especially those managing double-digit billions, you quickly realize you can’t deploy hundreds of billions of dollars in ideas that others aren’t looking at. The equity markets will tap out very quickly in those spaces. Thus, the risk many hedge funds end up ultimately taking, which they want to avoid, is the risk of everyone else doing the same thing.

[Kris: This section touches on a few ideas I’ve observed before:

  1. GPs have some misalignment with LPs (and non-partner PMs)
  2. The trading mindset is merging with investing as the focus on alpha marries and operationalizes what “trading as a business” understands with informational inputs that come from understanding what drives business fundamentals and market reaction]

The curse of hedge fund managers is that they start out because they enjoy picking stocks, building systematic models, or day trading, but as they grow, that becomes 0% of their job. Instead, 100% of their time is spent on risk management, investor relations, or recruiting. They end up building a system that automates a lot of what they’re good at and then have to find their own idiosyncratic source of returns. If a hedge fund has access to the best prime brokers, best exchange connectivity, and best algorithms for implementing trades with low slippage, they need to gain an idiosyncratic return by hiring unique people early and onboarding them effectively.

A significant part of the business becomes structuring the trade in a way that defines a person’s incentives and non-compete agreements to capture as much of the alpha as possible at an acceptable price. These funds often offer experienced portfolio managers guaranteed bonuses and agree to hire them at the beginning of a non-compete, allowing them to wait it out. The hedge fund entity’s trade is about defining the person’s incentives so that they capture as much alpha as possible.

From the LP perspective, a hedge fund is like a marvelous treasury bond, producing a stable, non-correlated, and safe return. From the GP perspective, it’s more like a venture fund, looking for the handful of superstars who will consistently generate that 3% growth every year to make the business the best it can be.

Surprisingly, the big platform funds like Point 72, Millennium, Citadel, and Balyasny, which have backgrounds in day trading and systematic fixed income, do not come from a background of deeply assessing management integrity, which was a focus of Tiger Management. Tiger Management, once one of the biggest funds, wound down but seeded funding to its best analysts and network, creating an implicit multi-manager fund. However, they didn’t have the central risk management that current multi-strategy platform funds have. Julian Robertson’s funding led to a sort of implicit multi-manager fund, but they all used very similar strategies and often crowded into the same stocks.

This paradox shows that a background in assessing portfolio managers and analysts does not necessarily translate to success in managing a multi-strategy platform fund. The people who excelled at it were those who deeply loved creating the game.

 

“Peak-pod thesis” and efficiency

If you look back, there was a time when hedge fund returns significantly outperformed the market. However, starting around 2000, this gap began to shrink, and by 2010, it was minimal, closely aligning with the drag from fees and taxes. Hedge funds were once consistently generating a lot of alpha, but that started to decline. Now, the quality of reported alpha is higher, with more funds truthfully reporting no net market exposure or accurately disclosing their exposure and additional returns. However, as the skill level of investors increases and they understand the model better, the quantity of alpha available inevitably shrinks.

Hedge funds have become so proficient at generating ideas and maintaining a certain hit rate that they continue to produce risk-adjusted returns. But as more capital flows into these strategies and into competing funds, it becomes harder to execute large trades. The industry might reach a peak where the role becomes more routine and systematized, potentially leading to lower compensation per person but still remaining a significant job category.

Regarding total investment returns, imagine a stock market chart resembling a zigzag line deviating from a straight linear path. The area under this zigzag line represents the total market returns, predominantly beta. Alpha is the difference between this zigzag line and the linear path. In a market where volatility is high, hedge funds tend to perform better because the deviation from beta is greater, thus increasing the total alpha available. The current question is whether we have reached the peak number of portfolio manager “pods.” This depends on the total market volatility, which has been increasing due to higher interest rates, suggesting a potential for more pods and higher alpha generation.

However, if interest rates decrease and market volatility diminishes, hedge funds may face challenges in maintaining their current levels of alpha generation. They would need to diversify into other sectors to find new sources of volatility and alpha. Theoretically, if the market were to move in a perfectly linear trajectory, there would be little need for hedge fund pods, but such a scenario is unlikely to occur.

The concept that alpha sums to zero before taxes and transaction costs is crucial. If you’re making above-average returns, it’s typically because someone else made less optimal trading decisions, either buying high when you sold or selling low when you bought. Hedge funds rely on a supply of traders who are either valuation insensitive or simply poor at trading. However, this reliance draws other traders to exploit the same opportunities.

In The Laws of Trading you hear alpha doesn’t last forever, and this applies to both positive and negative alpha. For instance, negative alpha can occur in large pension funds that execute market orders for stocks every two weeks when employees contribute. Over time, traders might notice this pattern and begin buying these stocks a day earlier, selling them back to the pension fund at a higher price, thus reducing the fund’s impact and making it harder for them to systematically lose money. If it were possible to deliberately lose substantial money consistently, then inversely, one could make money by doing the opposite of their losing strategy. In public markets, it’s almost impossible to consistently lose money in absence of significant transaction costs.

How this can get quite meta

Concerning alpha capture, multi-manager funds analyze their portfolio managers’ decisions to determine their strengths and weaknesses. They can identify managers who consistently perform poorly with certain stocks or situations. This information helps build a meta portfolio that represents what the firm’s portfolio would look like if managers were perfectly self-aware of their abilities. Interestingly, someone who is consistently wrong about a particular stock, like consistently mispredicting Nvidia earnings, can be valuable. Their predictability, even in failure, can be leveraged by a quant model to generate profits by taking the opposite position.

This leads to a somewhat disconcerting situation where a financial professional might realize their value came from consistently incorrect predictions about a specific stock, contributing to their firm’s success by serving as a reliable contrary indicator. It’s this weird Marxist alienation from your labor, where if you find out that you had a really lucrative financial career, and it was entirely because you were really, really bad at Netflix earnings or something, but you were so bad that the quant model realized it would just fade you in much larger size every single time and make money like that’s gonna be a depressing realization. But someone, someone someday will probably come to that realization that they were just so reliably bad in certain situations that they actually made their employer money.

Understanding the good and bad of the job can help you determine if pro investing is for you

It’s exhilarating to feel like you’re always in the flow, that when something happens, you either anticipated it or are among the first to grasp its implications and strategically position yourself. That’s a thrilling feeling, although it’s not the norm. Usually, you feel clueless, underperforming, and stressed by random bad news. It’s like walking into the office and getting hit in the face. But occasionally, it’s extremely fun. The most gratifying things often come through ongoing stress and suffering. If you learn to enjoy that, you’re set.

Working at a hedge fund is unique because of the day-to-day variability. You’re dealing with extreme uncertainty and making decisions where being wrong 45% of the time means you’re top-notch. If you value intellectual honesty and variety, it’s a fantastic career.

However, when things go bad, they can be drastically different. The high level of trust and unpredictability can significantly impact your personal life.

There’s a trend of hedge funds starting venture practices and vice versa. It’s interesting to see if there will be more crossover, as both sectors tolerate a high rate of being wrong. One key difference in venture capital is the longer feedback loop. You won’t know if you’re a good venture investor for many years, unlike the quicker feedback in hedge fund investing.

The hedge fund industry is known for high burnout rates. Many enter in their early to mid-20s and leave by their 30s. Often, these employees haven’t experienced a full market cycle; they’re hired in good times and shocked by downturns. For instance, the downturn in Q4 2018 was mistaken by some as an apocalypse, but it was followed by a great year, giving a misleading impression of real downturns. In 2022, with an actual downturn, the industry faced a harsh reality check. 

Updating is something people do a lot within a cycle on kind of minor stuff, like on Netflix, for example, it was more of a net subscriber additions story for a long time, and then became more of a revenue story. And it was also partly a margin story. However, when there’s a quarter where you correctly predict the net adds but get the revenue wrong, and the stock reacts more to revenue, you must quickly adjust your focus.

You have to very quickly tell yourself “the thing I was really good at predicting actually does not matter as much as this other thing. And so now I have to get good at predicting that.” And it’s when the really big shifts happen — like when the focus shifts from growth to profitability, or when we can’t assume infinite capital or money having zero cost doing lazy discounts. Now you actually have to think about what is the value of 50 cents in five years versus $1 in 10 years, instead of treating $1 in 10 years is worth roughly $1 today.

The ability to quickly adjust perspectives and decide what matters is crucial. Adapting your mental model rapidly during major shifts, such as a shift in focus from growth to profitability, is challenging.

Those who can adapt and last through multiple market cycles do extremely well due to their growing experience and opportunities.

[Kris: See 5 Takeaways From Todd Simkin on The AlphaMind Podcast to understand how a trading firm trains cognitive flexibility. This is especially important when you hire smart people who aren’t used to be wrong. This is echoed below.]

There’s a saying: “a smart person knows what to do, and an experienced person knows the exceptions to what to do.”

The average age in a hedge fund is relatively low compared to many other industries, including their mutual fund counterparts. You often see people working in hedge funds who have had a series of successes throughout their lives to reach their current positions. The typical profile of an analyst, for example, is someone who excelled in high school, attended a prestigious university, graduated at the top of their class in finance or economics, then went on to work at a major investment bank. After one or two years, they’re recruited from that investment bank to a top private equity shop or hedge fund. It’s a chain of success where they haven’t experienced significant career failure.

However, once in a hedge fund, the measure of success is not about the ability to study well or work hard. The skills required for success in a hedge fund are different from those correlating with educational success or early career achievements at places like Goldman Sachs or Morgan Stanley, where hard work is more directly linked to success. In a hedge fund, working harder does not necessarily equate to generating more alpha. If it did, everyone would be working 20-hour days.


If you use options to hedge or invest, check out the moontower.ai option trading analytics platform

The GOAT’s Parting Wisdom

Just popping in on my writing break to share a 1 lot…

🎙️Stripe’s John Collison Recently Interviewed The Late Charlie Munger (Invest Like The Best)

Loved the rapid fire format. RIP Charlie, a true legend. I’m hesitant to put my favorite excerpts because it’s no substitute for listening to it, but I’m going to anyway to make it easier to quote from in the future.

Excerpts

Did you learn the big ideas in the various disciplines because you were just intellectually curious about them? Or because you thought they’d be instrumentally useful in the work?

Both. I saw instantly, for instance, when I was introduced to the math of Pascal and the elementary probability, I saw immediately how important this math was. My math teacher had no idea that he’d come to a part of the math that was very important in the regular world to everybody, but I saw it immediately and I just utterly mastered it. And I used it. I’m still using it. I used it routinely all my life quite intensely.

And when I got to study in the Harvard Business School, in the early days at the Harvard Business School, they were proudest of something called decision tree theory. And they taught it at the Harvard Business School, a lot of pomp and ceremony and many examples, all these graduate students.

Decision tree theory, it’s a Harvard Business School — in those early days, what they were teaching you was that Pascalian probability math works in real life. Here’s the Harvard Business School needing to do remedial high school math to a bunch of graduate students, and they weren’t wrong. They were right in those days to teach decision tree theory because other people hadn’t mastered probability math the way it should be mastered.

My teacher in high school, if you don’t pay attention to anything else, this stuff you ought to master. And he should explain how carny operators and casinos take advantage of ordinary people. It should have been taught, and it wasn’t taught right in high school, and it wasn’t taught right in college and it wasn’t taught right. Finally, the Harvard Business School got so they taught high school math to graduate students. And you can say how could that be correct? But it’s because the earlier education was so ineffective.

In Poor Charlie’s Almanack, you advocate the multidisciplinary approach and knowing the big ideas from all the different disciplines. And one of the ones that I particularly liked and stuck with me was the one from biology of stable ecosystems and understanding how entities prosper within ecosystems. And in particular how you don’t want necessarily to be in this robber baron, monopolistic, rent extraction position. But instead, businesses that sustain and endure over the long term are ones where they are not rent extracting.

Well, some of the robber barons last a long time. And there are a lot of real estate operators that are basically sleazy. And they don’t even think their business is sound unless they’re doing something sleazy. They’re doing something sleazy, they have a safe advantage. And of course, that’s exactly the opposite to my idea.

My idea is so simple, is that if you make your living selling things to other people that are good for them, that is safer and more profitable averaged out than selling them stuff that’s bad for them like gambling, drugs, crazy religions, all kinds of things that are terrible for people. And so of course, you want to sell things that are good for them. And it’s amazing the people who don’t pay any attention to that rule.

And I think it was sleazy products and investment banking has sort of you willing to sell and the sleazy stuff that compensation consultants are perfectly willing to sell. And I just decided I wasn’t going to do any of that. I was going to sell what kind of stuff that I would buy if I were on the other side. And I also wanted to work with the kind of people that I admired. And that’s a very important thing to learn to just search out the reliable people that you can trust and be the kind of person in dealing with everybody else that they can trust.

It’s just a huge advantage if you start doing that young and keep doing it consistently through life. It isn’t very hard, stay awake in high school math and deal with the good people instead of the bad people and sell what you would buy if you were the buyer, not what you can sell by misleading people. These are very simple ideas. But it’s just absolutely amazing how well they work for people who relentlessly follow these simple ideas.

On Investing

Has investing gotten harder?

Of course, it’s gotten harder, way harder. It’s gotten so hard that most of the people who are in wealth management have an almost zero chance of outperforming an unmanaged index like the S&P.

How has it gotten harder?

There’s so much more of this wealth invested in securities. And so we’ll get a whole lot of big sums to manage. And of course, it’s a long time to buy in, a long time to sell out, costs are higher. And so it’s way harder to manage a large sum of money to make a lot of money at high returns than it is to manage a small sum of money. And then way more brains came into the business. So it’s gotten brutally competitive.

And then we have these manias that get — when things are hot and they’ll start running like the behavior gets almost crazy. It’s almost like a delusion. Of course, it’s harder. And in my lifetime, a guy who just bought the best common stocks and sat on his ass, would have made about 10% per annum before inflation. Maybe 8% after inflation. That is not the standard return that a man can expect from investment. That was a very unusual period in a very unusual place. And I do not anticipate that the average result is going to be nearly that good over the next 100 years.

Why was the results so good? Why was it 10% per annum?

Let’s call it 8% after inflation. The Great Depression so demoralized everybody, they were utterly despised and then the economic system improved a lot. And the combination of the investment climate, the economic situation together evolving, just made it unusually good. If you go back to what the rich people of England did back, say, in 1900, they bought consols (type of perpetual bond), 2.5%, no inflation. Two and a half percent return if you wanted to stay safe, you’d be satisfied with that. No rich people thought there was any safe way of getting 8% if you go back to 1880 among the rich people of England.

And so this is an unusual period. And now everybody who’s in investment management teaches everybody, you’ll get 8% after inflation by dealing with us because that’s the way it worked for the last 100 years. Just because it worked for the last 100 years does not mean it’s going to work for the next 100 years.

So it’s been a period of significant economic growth. I think there’s also maybe the U.S. stock market that has outperformed…

Yes, everything, United States, country prospered, a lot of good stuff happened at once that caused that very good result. It’s not always going to work that way.

What do you think of the SEC?

We’re a lot better with an SEC. The tendency to prosper through financial chicanery in all forms of wealth management is perfectly enormous. So of course, you need something to throttle that back and control it. So I’m glad we have an SEC. It would have been crazy not to have one. By the way, that came in as part of the Roosevelt, and I would argue that its main trouble is that it isn’t tough enough.

Tough enough on what?

Miscreancy. If I were running the SEC and had the power to do it, I wouldn’t allow people to publish a record saying, “Here’s what I did over the last 20 years, when I started with $2 and went up to $200 million.” because it misleads people. And of course, we will create mutual funds, create little ones to get a phony big record. I would forbid that kind of stuff.

I would force everybody who is a big-time money manager to report his investment record per dollar year instead of historical, and that would take the miscreancy out of it. And it would be so simple, and it would radically change the whole industry.

And how many people have you ever heard say it will be mandatory that all wealth management will report its results per dollar year, which would be easier to do mathematically? And it would totally change the way everybody is promoting their service in a way that fosters truth and excellence and a lot of the things.

What I just suggested is so goddamn simple and so obviously required in terms of honorable disclosure, that it ought to be automatic. And yet who has ever suggested — why is little Charlie Munger, 98 years old, think the SEC or the government ought to require that all investment professionals report results per dollar year instead of per historical? Nobody suggest it. But to me, it’s obvious it ought to be required.

And when you say per dollar year, you mean dollar weighted results, basically?

Yes. How much return — for every dollar year, what was your return? And of course, that’s a very different figure. I know of a case of a hedge fund where the proprietor made a lot of money, but per dollar year, the net return was zero. Because when he got a lot of money, he really made a lot of dumb mistakes.

He made a lot of money when this one didn’t matter much. And yet it looks like a wonderful record. But in fact, it was terrible. And why wouldn’t that be a fair thing to require?

The Principal-Agent Problem

It’s very interesting reading the book with the lens post the financial crisis. It’s also interesting to see you railing against derivatives in this a few years before the financial crisis.

That derivative railing was so manipulative and they marked the books like, “Two guys that make a big trade, they both recorded a big profit to their accounts, the accounts would less the profit on both sides.” It’s the same trade. One was reporting a profit, and the other’s reporting a profit. It couldn’t both be — if it gets too easy and too manipulative, and into that culture, the stock brokers, big banking, the guys who did the ordering, they take them to Las Vegas, they buy them a stack of chips, negotiable chips, and give it to them.”

“There was cocaine, they were prostitutes. It was not a pretty culture and kind of tolerated. What do you expect from a bunch of security traders? Everybody knew that his traders were behaving that way, but it was a mistake to let all that stuff to creep in. And it got pretty extreme. And then the bankers deal — that deal that Goldman Sachs did with Malaysia, that sovereign wealth fund…that guy obviously should have been avoided on moral grounds, and prudential grounds, too, but these get so intoxicated by the easy money.

It feels like a lot of the objections you have, sort of, say, professional money managers or Wall Street or whatever, can be summed up by people should be more cognizant of principal agent problems. Is that fair?

You can hardly imagine a field more full principal agents with their money than wealth management. Of course the wealth managers take care of themselves. That includes the foundation manager. A foundation manager basically wants to get $400,000 a year while a professor gets $110,000.

He’s got one way of doing it: picking money managers who get 3% off the top and in various forms of private equity. That’s the only way he justifies his big peso. It’s a principal agent problem. Of course you’re going to want to invest a lot of money with private equity. And of course, private equity is going to do all kinds of horrible things to try and get 3 points off the top. Imagine you get 3 percentage points off the top of somebody else’s money.

It’s a good business model.

You can only do that if you have some miraculous way of making money. By the way, the guys in your field, Jim Simons, Jim Simons is a world-class mathematician. Here’s what he did. He just used his damn computers to identify trading patterns that had deep human psychological background.

One of them was very simple. He took his computer data and he found that patterns in the market as a whole, there are 4 different patterns: win-win, lose-lose, win-lose, and lose-win. If it’s just random, then all 4 are going to be equal. And low and behold, he sifted the data and win-win was more common than win-lose or lose-win. And lose-lose was more common.

So all they had to do is use program at computers to make these modest moderate-sized trades, or big -by his standards were moderate compared to the market. On that basis, the business whirled and whirled, the money just poured out of it.

The tax shenanigans.

Billions poured out of the clearance system. And it was so simple and so elementary. And as a social utility of making money that way is about zero, so if I’d done that, I suppose I would be pleased that I was so clever, but I would have been a bit ashamed of not delivering anything to society in exchange for my big winnings. But luckily, I wasn’t enough of a computer science to even think about such things, and I don’t like short-term trading. And I don’t want to be hanging over some trading desk punching keys.

Why do you think Sequoia has done so well?

Sequoia got early into the game, and it’s a fanatic meritocracy. So they work very hard, all of them. And they’ve gotten big and successful way ahead of everybody else, and they kept writing it like some chip manufacturers, each generation of chips they get. And in the end, they have a file. We have an example.”

“In our apartment houses, we use some little computer program in adjusting the rents or something or other that somebody — and this one little guy, I had him check, Sequoia already had a file on this guy. So every little asshole with a little tiny computer program, they got an army of young guys out there finding every little guy and on big files and so forth.”

“So they see more — they see better opportunities sooner and more than other people. And they’ve got the reputation. So people who are usually successful, they want to go with Sequoia, not some lesser firm. And the combination is just unbeatable. But lately, were they right to go into big Robinhood, but no, they made a huge mistake for Sequoia there, and they shouldn’t have gone…

Morally or…

Morally and professionally, it’s a big mistake. Really stupid. But it got so much, we’ve got to be in every new thing that’s hot. They got to thinking like investment bankers, but it was a huge mistake for Sequoia to get involved with Robinhood and…

Is your objection to Robinhood that it encourages short-term trading and trading options?

Yes, they lie and so forth.

Do they?

Oh my God.

What do they lie about?

Anything that works. They try and sell it, hey, this is a new fraternity of freedom or it’s — the whole thing is a lie.

You don’t like the movement aspect of it.

Oh no, no. They’re trying to create mass hysteria. I don’t like luring people in and screwing them, basically. You’re successful with Sequoia and you’re identified with financing people like Apple and so on, why in the hell would you take Robinhood? It’s totally crazy. You don’t want to do all the business that’s legal for you to do. You want to exclude all kinds of things because it’s beneath you. This shows that you work at these things intelligently. It gets hard, but it doesn’t get impossible.”

But the other side of it is, if you take the — I have been very well located in life. But with minor exceptions, what do I have relative to investments in life? I’ve got Costco stock, Berkshire stock, Li Lu’s China fund and Avi’s apartments. So I have four investments, basically, after 60 years or something — by the way, I feel perfectly adequately diversified. Nobody teaches that’s adequate diversification.

And they’re dead wrong. Simple fact is that it’s easier to find four things that are above average than it is to find 40. It’s not that damned easy to find. You find something that’s almost sure to work because you figure — you’re asking to finding a gold mine in your backyard. When it works, is that easy? How many gold mines are you going to find in your backyard? You shouldn’t expect to have all that many opportunities that are clearly identifiable.

“It’s going to be very hard and you’re lucky if you get only a few in a lifetime. And then you have to be a combination of very patient and very aggressive. You have to sit patiently waiting, watching, surveying, hunting and pounce very occasionally. You get four pounces in a lifetime that really work big time, and that’s a very successful lifetime. And other people think — like that guy on TV, he’s an expert in every company every time. That’s crazy. He’s an expert in saying something that’s mildly plausible. That’s not being an expert investor.

Doesn’t it feel like the narrative on that is changing, where I think people are coming to understand the merits of concentration in positions that really work?

I had dinner with a whole crowd of Fidelity this very week, and they’ve got trillions under management, and they scrape only a modest amount off the top. And they’ve got a wonderful business, but they have the moral problem that they have no possibility at all of exceeding what an index man could do with their common stock investments.

Maybe they have an occasional analyst that’s a little better than average that works into the system. Basically, what they do is they force everybody to be a closet indexer because nobody wants to be an extreme outlier on the losing side because that can destroy your investment management business. But I would argue that the whole damn system is corrupt in investment management.

They take care of the agents way better than they take care of the principals, and they lie to themselves and they lie to others. And that’s our system. And everybody that wants a fair amount of easy money pretty fast. And that requires a plausible narrative. That’s what’s admired now. I regard modern venture capital as investment banking in disguise. Just a little different form of investment banking, same morality, same obsession with a lot of quick wealth. There’s nothing wrong with investment banking, properly done, venture investing.

Excerpts From Grant Sanderson on The Lunar Society Podcast

Dwarkesh Patel interviews Grant Sanderson (who runs the excellent 3Blue1Brown YouTube channel) about:

  • Whether advanced math requires AGI
  • What careers should mathematically talented students pursue
  • Why Grant plans on doing a stint as a high school teacher
  • Tips for self teaching
  • Does Godel’s incompleteness theorem actually matter
  • Why are good explanations so hard to find?

Watch on YouTube. Listen on SpotifyApple Podcasts, or any other podcast platform. Full transcript here.


Kris: I snipped several excerpts for future reference. Emphasis mine. I cut up the excerpts as I want to remember them which means there are missing sections so I encourage you to listen to the whole episode or read the sections of transcript I’m pulling from if you want a closer look.

On the future of education 

[key ideas: reducing distance to students, educator’s role is not just explanation but more importantly “bring out knowledge” not put it in, the non-linear influence of a teacher on a student’s future, and the chaotic concept of “sensitivity to initial conditions”]

Dwarkesh Patel 0:44:44

Should the top 0.1% of educators exclusively be on the internet because it seems like a waste if you were just a college professor or a high school professor and you were teaching 50 kids a year or something. Given the greater scale available should more of them be trying to see if they can reach more people?

Grant Sanderson 0:45:01

I think it’s not a bad thing for more educators who are good at what they’re doing to put their stuff online for sure. I highly encourage that even if it’s as simple as getting someone to put a camera in the back of the classroom. I don’t think it would be a good idea to get those people out of the classroom.

If anything I think one of the best things that I could do for my career would be to put myself into more classrooms…

One of the most valuable things that you can have if you’re trying to explain stuff online is a sense of empathy for what possible viewers that are out there. The more distance that you put between yourself and them in terms of life circumstances. I’m not a college student so I don’t have the same empathy with college students. Certainly not a high school student, so I’ve lost that empathy. That distance just makes it more and more of an uphill battle to make the content good for them and I think keeping people in regular touch with just what people in the classroom actively need is necessary for them to remain as good and as sharp as they are…

The other thing I might disagree with is the idea that the reach is lower. Yes, it’s a smaller number of people but you’re with them for much, much more time and you actually have the chance of influencing their trajectory through a social connection in a way that you just don’t over Youtube.

You’re using the word education in a way that I would maybe sub out for the word explanation. You want explanations to be online but the word education derives from the same root as the word educe, to bring out, and I really like that as a bit of etymology because it reminds you that the job of an educator is not to take their knowledge and shove it into the heads of someone else the job is to bring it out. That’s very, very hard to do in a video and in fact, even if you can kind of get at it by asking intriguing questions for the most part the video is there to answer something once someone has a question.

The teacher’s job, or the educator’s job, should be to provide the environment such that you’re bringing out from your students as much as you can through inspiration through projects, through little bits of mentorship and encouragement along the way. That requires eye contact and being there in person and being the true figure in their life rather than just an abstract voice behind a screen.

Anytime I chat with mathematicians and try to get a sense for how they got into it and what got them started, so often they start by saying there was this one teacher and that teacher did something very small — like they pulled them aside and just said, “Hey. You’re really good at this. Have you considered studying more?” or they give them an interesting problem.

And the thing that takes at most 30 minutes of the teacher’s time, maybe even 30 seconds, has these completely monumental rippling effects for the life of the student they were talking to that then sets them on this whole different trajectory.

Two examples of this come to mind. One is this woman who was saying she had this moment when she got pulled aside by the teacher and he just said, “Hey, I think you’re really good at math. You should consider being a math major.” which had been completely outside of her purview at that time. That changed the way she thought about it. And then later she said she learned that he did that for a large number of people. He just pulled them and was like, “Hey, you’re really good at math.” So that’s a level of impact that you can have as a figure in their lives in a way that you can’t over screen.

Another one which was very funny. I was asking this guy why he went into the specific field that he did. It was a seemingly arbitrary thing in my mind but I guess all pure math seems to be. He said that in his first year of grad school he was sitting in this seminar and at the end of the seminar the professor, who was this old professor who he had never met him before, they didn’t have any kind of connection. He seeks this guy out and comes up and he says, “You. I have a problem for you. A good research problem that I think I think might be a good place for you to start in the next couple months” and this guy was like “Oh, okay” and he gets this research problem and he spends some months thinking about it and he comes back and then it later came to light that the professor mistook him for someone else that was someone he was supposed to be mentoring. He was just the stereotypical image of like a doddering old math professor who’s not very in tune with the people in his life that was the actual situation but nevertheless that moment of accidentally giving someone a problem completely shifted the research path for him, which if nothing else, shows you the sensitivity to initial conditions that takes place when you are a student and how the educator is is right on that nexus of sensitivity who can completely swing the fences one way or another for what you do.

For every one of those stories there’s going to be an unfortunate counterbalancing story about people who are demotivated from math. I think this was seventh grade. There was this math class that I was in and I was one of the people who was good at math and enjoyed it and would often help the people in the class understand it. I had enough ego built up to have a strong shell around things. For context, I also really liked music and there was this concert that had happened where I had a certain solo or something earlier in that week.

There was a substitute teacher one day who didn’t have any of the context and she gave some lesson and had us spend the second half of the class going over the homework for it. All of the other students in the class were very confused and I think I remember like they would come to me and I would try to offer to help them and the substitute was going around the class in these circles and basically marking off a little star for how far down the homework people were just to get a sense are they progressing. That was kind of her way of measuring how far they were. When she got to me I had done none of them because I was spending my whole time trying to help all of the others and after having written a little star next to the same problem like three different times she said to me like, “Sometimes music people just aren’t math people.” and then keeps walking on.

I was in the best possible circumstance to not let that hit hard because one, I had the moral high ground of “Hey, I’ve just been helping all these people. I understand it and I’ve been doing your job for you.” This was my little egotistical seventh grade brain. I knew that I knew the stuff. Even with all of the armor that was put up, I remember it was just this shock to my system, she says this thing and it just made me strangely teary-eyed or something.

I can only imagine if you’re in a position where you’re not confident in math and the thing that you know deep in your heart is actually you are kind of struggling with it, just a little throwaway comment like that could completely derail the whole system in terms of your relationship with the subject.

So it’s another example to illustrate the sensitivity to initial conditions. I was in a robust position and wasn’t as sensitive. I was gonna love math no matter what but you envision someone who’s a little bit more on that teetering edge and the comment, one way or another, either saying you’re good at this you should consider majoring in it or saying, “Sometimes music people aren’t math people” which isn’t even true. That was the other thing about it that niggled at my brain when she said it.

All of that is just so important for people’s development that when people talk about online education as being valuable or revolutionary or anything like that, there’s a part of me that sort of rolls my eyes because it just doesn’t get at the truth that online explanations have nothing to do with all of that important stuff that’s actually happening and at best it should be like in the service of helping that side of things where the rubber meets the road.

On explanations 

[key ideas: not everyone responds to the same explanations so explanations that scale well are difficult to conjure. There’s room for multiple approaches and ways to communicate]

Dwarkesh Patel 1:02:22

Why are good explanations so hard to find, despite how useful they are? Obviously, other than you, there’s many other cases of good explanations. But generally, it just seems like there aren’t as many as there should be. Is it just a story of economics where it’s nobody’s incentive to spend a lot of time making good explanations? Is it just a really hard skill that isn’t correlated with being able to come up with a discovery itself? Why are good explanations scarce?

Grant Sanderson 1:02:47

I think there’s maybe two explanations.

The first less important one is going to be that there’s a difference between knowing something and then remembering what it’s like not to know it. And the characteristic of a good explanation is that you’re walking someone on a path from the feeling of not understanding up to the feeling of understanding.

Earlier, you were asking about societies that lack numeracy. That’s such a hard brain state to put yourself in, like what’s it like to not even know numbers? How would you start to explain what numbers are? Maybe you should go from a bunch of concrete examples. But like the way that you think about numbers and adding things, it’s just you have to really unpack a lot before you even start there.

And I think at higher levels of abstraction, that becomes even harder because it shapes the way that you think so much that remembering what it’s like not to understand it. You’re teaching some kid algebra and the premise of like a variable. They’re like, “What is X?” It’s not necessarily anything but it’s what we’re solving for. Like, yeah, but what is it? Trying to answer “What is X?” is a weirdly hard thing because it is the premise that you’re even starting from.

The more important explanation probably is that the best explanation depends heavily on the individual who’s learning. And the perfect explanation for you often might be very different from the perfect explanation for someone else. So there’s a lot of very good domain specific explanations. Pull up in any textbook and like chapter 12 of it is probably explaining the content in there quite well, assuming that you’ve read chapters one through 11, but if you’re coming in from a cold start, it’s a little bit hard.

So the real golden egg is like, how do you construct explanations which are as generally useful as possible and generally appealing as possible? And that because you can’t assume shared context, it becomes this challenge. And I think there’s like tips and tricks along the way, but because the people that are often making explanations have a specific enough audience, it is this classroom of 30 people. Or it’s this discipline of majors who are in their third year. All the explanations from the people who are professional explainers in some sense are so targeted that maybe it’s the economic thing you’re talking about. There’s not, or at least until recently in history, there hasn’t been the need to or the incentive to come up with something that would be motivating and approachable and clear to an extremely wide variety of different backgrounds.

Putting in work with calculations

Dwarkesh Patel 1:20:44

If you’re self teaching yourself a field that involves mathematics, let’s say it’s Physics or some other thing like that, there’s problems where you have to understand how do I put this in terms of a derivative or an integral and from there, can I solve this integral? What would you recommend to somebody who is teaching themselves quantum mechanics and they figured out how to put how to get the right mathematical equation here. Is it important for their understanding to be able to go from there to getting it to the end result or can they just say well, I can just abstract that out. I understand the broader way to set up the problem in terms of the physics itself.

Grant Sanderson 1:22:00

I think where a lot of self-learners shoot themselves in the foot is by skipping calculations by thinking that that’s incidental to the core understanding. But actually, I do think you build a lot of intuition just by putting in the reps of certain calculations. Some of them maybe turn out not to be all that important and in that case, so be it, but sometimes that’s what maybe shapes your sense of where the substance of a result really came from.

I don’t know it might be something you realize like “Oh, it’s because of the square root that you get this decay.” And if you didn’t really go through the exercise, you would just come away thinking like instead of coming away thinking like such and such decays but with other circumstances, it doesn’t decay and not really understanding what was the core part of this high level result that is the thing you actually want to come out remembering.

Putting in the work with the calculations is where you solidify all of those underlying intuitions. And without the forcing function of homework, People just don’t do it. So I think that’s one thing that I learned as a big difference post college versus during college.

Post college, it’s very easy to just accidentally skip that while learning stuff and then it doesn’t sink in as well. So I think when you’re reading something, having a notebook and pencil next to you should be considered part of the actual reading process.

And if you are relying too much on reading and looking up and thinking in your head, maybe that’s going to get you something but it’s not going to be as highly leveraged as it could be.

The “failure to disrupt”

[key ideas: learning is not bottlenecked by good explanations but by social incentives. Deeply resonant. Reading between the lines — we are aspirational and good at copying others or trying to impress them, so if we know that we should provide good models for learners to emulate]

Dwarkesh Patel 1:23:39

What would be the impact of more self teaching in terms of what kinds of personalities benefit most? There’s obviously a difference in the kind of person who benefits most. In a situation where it’s a college course and everybody has to do the homework, but maybe some people are better tuned for the kind of work that’s placed there versus all this stuff is available for you on youtube and then textbooks for exercises and so on but you have to have the conscientiousness to actually go ahead and pursue it.

How do you see the distribution of who will benefit from the more modern way in which you can get whatever you want but you have to push yourself to get it.

Grant Sanderson 1:24:17

There’s a really good book that’s actually kind of relevant to some of your early questions called Failure to Disrupt that goes over the history of educational technology. It tries to answer the question of why you have these repeated cycles of people saying such and such technology that almost always is getting more explanations to more people, promises that it’ll disrupt the existing university system or disrupt the existing school system and just kind of never does.

One of the things that it highlights is how stratifying these technologies will be in that they actually are very very good for those who are already motivated or kind of already on the top in some way and they end up struggling the most just for those who are performing more poorly.

And maybe it’s because of confounding causation where the same thing that causes someone to not do poorly in the traditional system also means that they’re not going to engage as well with the plethora of tools available.

I don’t know if this answers your question, but I would reemphasize that what’s probably most important to getting people to actually learn something is not the explanation…but instead, it’s going to be the social factors. Are the five best friends you have also interested in this stuff and do they tend to push you up or they tend to pull you down when it comes to learning more things? Or do you have a reason to? There’s a job that you want to get or a domain that you want to enter where you just have to understand something or is there a personal project that you’re doing?

The existence of compelling personal projects and encouraging friend groups probably does way way more than the average quality of explanation online ever could because once you get someone motivated, they’re just they’re going to learn it and it maybe makes it a more fluid process if there’s good explanations versus bad ones and it keeps you from having some people drop out of that process,which is important.

But if you’re not motivating them into it in the first place, it doesn’t matter if you have the most world-class explanations on every possible topic out there. It’s screaming into a void effectively.

And I don’t know the best way to get more people into things. I have had a thought and this is the kind of thing that could never be done in practice but instead it’s something you would like write some kind of novel about, where if you want the perfect school, something where you can insert some students and then you want them to get the best education that you can, what you need to do is — Let’s say it’s a high school. You insert a lot of really attractive high schooler plants as actors that you get the students to develop crushes on. And then anything that you want to learn, the plant has to express a certain interest in it. They’re like, “Oh, they’re really interested in Charles Dickens.” And they express this interest and then they suggest that they would become more interested in whoever your target student is if they also read the dickens with them.

If you socially engineer the setting in that way, the effectiveness that would have to get students to actually learn stuff is probably so many miles above anything else that we could do. Nothing like that in practice could ever actually literally work but at least viewing that as this end point of “Okay, this mode of interaction would be hyper effective at education. Is there anything that kind of gets at that?”

And the kind of things that get at that would be — being cognizant of your child’s peer group or something which is something that parents very naturally do or okay, it doesn’t have to be a romantic crush, but it could be that there’s respect for the teacher. It’s someone that they genuinely respect and look up to such that when they say there’s an edification to come from reading Dickens, that actually lands in a way.

The natural extension of this:

Encourage people to mentor or teach on the side!

Grant Sanderson

I think there are two things I would want to get out of teaching in a school setting. One of them, as I was emphasizing, I think you just lose touch with what it’s like not to know stuff or what it’s like to be a student and so maintaining that kind of connection so that I don’t become duller and duller over time feels important.

The other, I would like to live in a world where more people who are savvy with STEM spend some of their time teaching. I just think that’s one of the highest leverage ways that you can think of to actually get more people to engage with math

And so I would like to encourage people to do that and call for action. Some notion of spending, maybe not your whole career, a little bit of time. In teaching, there’s not as fluid a system for doing that as going through a tour of service in certain countries where everyone spends two years in the military

Shy of having a system like that for education, there’s all these kind of ad hoc things where charter schools might have an emergency credential system to get a science teacher in. Teach for America is something out there.

There’s enough ways that someone could spend a little bit of time that’s probably not fully saturated at this point that the world would be better if more people did that