For the bulk of our wealth, we are diversified so as to underwrite systematic (i.e., non-idiosyncratic) risk in exchange for the premium associated with that risk. The focus is on risk and our appetite for it, which then determines sizing.
The approach is mostly indifferent to expected returns, which are
a) far less predictable than vol and
b) less important since your compounded growth is far more sensitive to the square of vol.
It’s convenient that the focus on the easier thing is also a focus on the thing that matters more.
(And beyond that, the math of taxes is the next biggest lever since it’s high impact and more manipulable than returns, which you have zero control over)
If you weren’t already discouraged at the prospect of predicting returns, this observation suggests that even if you could predict earnings perfectly, you would still be missing 2/3 of the variation of returns.

But man, that’s a lot of dowdy throat-clearing.
We wanna talk about returns anyway, goddammit. Let’s do that in the context of the current market and learn some finance along the way.
In what if the “singularity” trade cracks? I used earnings yield + growth to bracket SPX returns with a floor around 5.2% and a ceiling around 19%. We’ll revisit that and compare the logic to a similar calculation from Elm Wealth.
Holding P/E constant (the tweet above reminds us just how fake that assumption would be, but we are in learning mode for a moment), a stock’s return comes from two sources:
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The dividend. Payout ratio × earnings yield.
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Growth from retained earnings. Whatever isn’t paid out gets reinvested. If it earns the company’s ROE, earnings grow at
g = (1 − payout) × ROE
Add them:
E[r] = payout × E/P + (1 − payout) × ROE
Two extremes bracket what happens at real companies:
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Payout = 100% → E[r] = E/P. No reinvestment, so no growth. You collect the earnings yield.
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Payout = 0% → E[r] = ROE. Everything compounds inside the business.
SPX metrics

The payout is inferred by what we can observe which is the actual dividend yield realized. The SPX dividend yield is about 1%, which represents about ~20% of earnings.
So the 80% of retained earnings is reinvested at the ROE and you back into a number that is much more aligned with annual SPX returns in recent years. The simple earnings yield is not accounting for the growth of reinvested earnings.
At 22% ROE: 0.80 × 22% = 17.6%
Add in the 1% dividend yield, and you arrive at E[r] ≈ 18.7%
But this is too aggressive.
Why?
The formula assumes every retained dollar earns the average ROE. A lot of SPX retention goes to buybacks, which only returns the earnings yield, not ROE.
If 100% of retention went to buybacks, then E[r]= 5.46%
This helps bracket a range of probable returns (again holding the multiple constant) from a low end of about 5.5% (all buybacks) to about 19% (all reinvested at average ROE). A key inference is that not only is ROE important, but also what portion of the 80% of retained earnings gets reinvested at that ROE.
[In what if the “singularity” trade cracks?, we see how Goldman expects AI capex to drag mega-cap ROE down about 7 points because marginal ROE on that spend is lower than the ROE of the first reinvested dollars.]
Just to inject a personal message. The first time I myself ever learned about decomposing earnings into a portion that is paid out and a retained portion that is reinvested was working through an Aswath Damodaran spreadsheet that he publishes when he updates his valuation model. (Sadly, this was likely only a decade ago that I learned this stuff). I recently got sucked into reading a Twitter thread where there was back and forth on this way of decomposing returns which I of course fed to AI to ELI5 and just found it all satisfyingly edifying that stock market returns are not so mysterious. We literally just have record ROE and lots of reinvestment. Of course, the part that feels most pressing today is the extent to which earnings and ROE numbers rely on circular booking for still unfilled orders for compute, chips, and general AI infra smorgasbord. From a personal education pov, I’m quite pleased to zoom in closer than a simple PEG model that says returns are earnings yield + growth but stops short of explicating how growth depends on retention and ROE.
It’s hard to place a section like this in the letter. It feels more advanced than what I might typically write in Money Angle, but it’s Crayola simple to anyone who was even an analyst and not worthy of being in the Masochists section. But then again, maybe the Masochists readers probably have melted derivatives brains, not a champagne corporate finance brain, so they don’t know this stuff…maybe that’s the target audience for this essay? I don’t know.
I do know that I enjoy learning this and just want to share, which is an instinct I’ve learned to trust.
Elm’s version: P-CAPE
At the same time I’m brushing up on this stuff, by serendipity or Baader-Meinhof, I noticed that the Elm Wealth squad uses a similar concept to adjust their market valuation for growth. They explain their method in Introducing P-CAPE.
To summarize it:
1. Start with Shiller’s CAPE: price ÷ the 10-year average of inflation-adjusted earnings. Flip it and you get CAEY, the cyclically adjusted earnings yield, which they treat as the expected real return if all earnings were paid out. (Notice how this maps to the floor scenario above where E[r] is only 5.46% except that’s in nominal terms.)
2. Adjust the 10-year lookback’s undercounting of earnings because it ignores what got retained (buybacks included) along the way. So for each of the last 10 years, they take the unpaid portion of earnings and compound it forward at that year’s CAEY, then average. Their example, 10 years back with a 60% payout, $10 of real earnings and a 6% CAEY:
60% × $10 + 40% × $10 × (1.06)¹⁰ ≈ $13.2
Price over that adjusted number is P-CAPE.
Its reciprocal, P-CAEY, is the return forecast.
They say that from 1890–2024, the P-CAPE earnings measure averaged 2% above the next year’s actual earnings, whereas plain CAPE ran 13% below. It explains 35% of the variance in 10-year forward real returns versus 24% for CAPE (33% vs 15% since 1950).
Comparing the two
The wedge in methods comes down to what a retained dollar earns.
We started by letting it earn ROE, but Elm lets it earn the earnings yield, claiming that the marginal investment yields the average return on equity already in place which just collapses to the full payout case. The earnings yield is the return. The payout adjustment goes into the earnings number instead of into a growth term stacked on top.
Their capital market assumptions as of 9/30/26 reflect this conservativeness, with US stocks implying a 2.92% real expected return (P-CAEY). Tacking on a breakeven inflation rate from Treasuries of about 2.20% brings the nominal projection to ~5.12%, a touch less than our 5.46% floor.
The gap between the floor of about 5% and the ceiling of about 19% is 14 return points. If you took the midpoint and say E[R] is 12% give or take 7 points. That sounds low compared to a 1-year SPX straddle, which at 18% vol would give or take about 14 points* around a mean of a 4% RFR.
But don’t forget…most of the volatility is not in the earnings but the change in the multiple! If God decreed that earnings volatility only accounted for 1/3 of total volatility, with the rest attributed to changes in multiples as Brett’s tweet alluded, then we’d expect the SPX should be closer to a 21-point straddle or about 50% more than it’s priced. The market’s best guess for the price of the straddle (indeed ~14 points) is worth accepting, so I think that means our range of E[R] due to earnings only of 5 to 19% is just excessively wide.
*straddle is 80% of a standard deviation or vol
